Milner v. Hare

• Decision Date: 27 December 1926
• Citation: 135 A. 522
• Parties: MILNER v. HARE.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

135 A. 522

MILNER

v. HARE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Dec. 27, 1926.

Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Knox County, at law.

Action by William H. Milner against Dennis Hare. A demurrer to the declaration was sustained, and the plaintiff excepts. Exceptions overruled. Demurrer sustained.

Argued before WILSON, C. J. and PHILBROOK, DEASY, and STURGIS, JJ, and MORRILL, A. R. J.

E. W. Pike, of Rockland, for plaintiff.

Rodney 1. Thompson, of Rockland, for defendant.

DEASY, J. Action brought under R. S. chap. 87, § 159, by a defeated litigant, in a case heard by a referee, against his successful adversary, to recover damages caused by the alleged perjury of the latter. A demurrer to the declaration was sustained by the Presiding Justice. The plaintiff excepts.

The statute in question reads thus:

"When a judgment has been obtained against a party by the perjury of a witness introduced at the trial by the adverse party, the injured party may bring an action on the case within three years after such judgment or after final judgment in any proceedings for a review thereof, against such adverse party, or any perjured witness, or confederate in the perjury, to recover the damages sustained by him, by reason of such perjury; and the judgment in the former action is no bar thereto."

The defendant contends that, within the purview of the statute, a party whose testimony is introduced by himself or his counsel is not a witness, or at all events is not introduced a such. The plaintiff contends that the contrary is true.

The defendant maintains that a mere witness is civilly responsible for the consequences of his perjury, but that a witness who is also a party is not so responsible; and he says further that under the statute a party is accountable for the perjury of his witnesses but not for his own. The plaintiff replies that the Legislature did not intend to make distinctions so unreasonable and illogical.

The defendant fears that the plaintiff's construction will cause interminable litigation. To this it is rejoined that the very little litigation that this statute has caused in the 62 years of its existence has been speedily terminated; and that the statute has been and will be very seldom invoked for the reason that there are other and much better legal remedies.

The defendant cites some cases. The plaintiff replies that the cases cited are inapplicable, inasmuch as they do not construe the Maine statute nor any statute.

Another theory advanced on one side, and denied on the other, is that the word "trial" in the statute, read in. the light of the original enactment (Act 1864, chap. 253), means a trial in court and not a hearing by a referee.

We have thus stated the contentions of the parties. But the case does not require a decision of these controversies. For another reason the ruling of the Presiding Justice must be sustained.

Perjury is a heinous offense against the state and against the administration of justice. For this offense there are provided the drastic penalties of the criminal law. Redress for private...