Bean v. Cummings

Decision Date29 January 2008
Docket NumberDocket: Oxf-07-6.
Citation939 A.2d 676,2008 ME 18
PartiesDavid BEAN v. Richard N. CUMMINGS Sr.
CourtMaine Supreme Court

Thomas F. Hallett, Esq., The Hallett Law Firm, Portland, ME, for David Bean.

Linda P. Cohen, Esq., Hanley & Associates, South Paris, ME, for Richard Cummings, Sr.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, and GORMAN, JJ.

SILVER, J.

[¶ 1] David Bean appeals from a judgment dismissing his civil perjury claim entered in the Superior Court (Oxford County, Crowley, J.). Bean contends that the court abused its discretion when it dismissed his complaint because it required specific allegations of perjury. He also believes that the Superior Court (Oxford County, Cole, J.) abused its discretion when it denied his motion to impose sanctions for discovery violations. Richard N. Cummings Sr. appeals from a separate, earlier judgment entered in the District Court (South Paris, Beliveau, J.) declining to recalculate the amount of damages owed to him for services performed on Bean's camp as set forth in the original District Court judgment. We affirm the courts' judgments as to both Bean's appeal and Cummings's appeal.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] In 2000, Bean hired Cummings to perform construction services at his camp in Canton. Approximately one year after completion of the work, Cummings sued Bean in the District Court for failing to pay him. At trial, Cummings testified to the value of the services and materials provided to perform the improvements. Bean presented evidence from Cummings's foreman that disputed the reasonable value of the labor billed. Although the court found that the foreman was biased against Cummings, the court gave some weight to the contradictory evidence because of the foreman's personal knowledge of the project.

[¶ 3] The District Court entered judgment for Cummings in the amount of $24,133.82 and for Bean in the amount of $1000. Cummings v. Bean, 2004 ME 93, ¶ 5, 853 A.2d 221, 223. Bean did not appeal from the judgment. Id. ¶ 6, 853 A.2d at 223. Instead, he filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) after the expiration of the appeal period, and argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The trial court denied his motion and he appealed to us. Id. In 2004, we concluded that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to decide Cummings's quantum meruit claim and affirmed. Id. ¶¶ 7-11, 853 A.2d at 223-24.

[¶ 4] In December of 2005, Bean filed suit against Cummings in the Superior Court under 14 M.R.S. § 870 (2007), claiming that Cummings had committed perjury that caused an erroneous judgment in favor of Cummings. Cummings filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Bean failed to plead facts necessary to support a claim under section 870. The trial court agreed that Bean's complaint was not specific enough, but denied the motion to dismiss and gave Bean leave to amend his complaint. Likening a perjury claim to one of fraud and therefore imposing the higher pleading requirements of M.R. Civ. P. 9(b), the court advised Bean to file an amended complaint and plead with specificity (1) the trial testimony forming the basis of the instant suit, and (2) the facts discovered post-trial that reveal this testimony to be perjury. Bean filed an amended complaint with the court and Cummings again filed a motion to dismiss.

[¶ 5] Bean tried to gain through discovery the data necessary to establish his civil perjury claim. As a result, various discovery disputes erupted between Bean and Cummings. Bean was never able to obtain what he requested through discovery and asked for sanctions against Cummings. Cummings felt he was being harassed by Bean and sought the court's protection. The court did not order discovery sanctions, but it did grant Cummings's motion to dismiss.

[¶ 6] Three years after the judgment was entered in the first trial and more than two years after the appeal was final, awarding damages to Cummings, Cummings requested that the trial court correct a clerical error in the District Court judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(a). Cummings alleged that the court had incorrectly credited Bean for a $10,000 payment when determining the final damages awarded to Cummings. The first trial court (South Paris, Beliveau, J.) denied this request. Bean timely appealed from the dismissal of his civil perjury claim and the denial of his motion to impose sanctions on Cummings, and Cummings timely appealed from the denial of his motion to modify the District Court damages award. The two appeals were consolidated as ordered by this Court.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Bean's Civil Perjury Claim

[¶ 7] Dismissal of a civil action is proper when the complaint fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When reviewing a trial court's dismissal of an action, we "`examine the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal theory.'" Shaw v. S. Aroostook Cmty. Sch. Dist., 683 A.2d 502, 503 (Me. 1996) (quoting Hamilton v. Greenleaf, 677 A.2d 525, 527 (Me.1996)). We will uphold a dismissal only when it appears beyond doubt that a plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set of facts that he might prove in support of his claim. Id. (quotation marks omitted). "`The legal sufficiency of a complaint challenged pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is a question of law.'" Id. (quoting Hamilton, 677 A.2d at 527). We review issues of law de novo. Blanchard v. Sawyer, 2001 ME 18, ¶ 5, 769 A.2d 841, 843; State v. Thibodeau, 2000 ME 52, ¶ 5, 747 A.2d 596, 598.

[¶ 8] Most civil actions must meet the notice pleading requirements of M.R. Civ. P. 8. M.R. Civ. P. 9(b), however, identifies certain claims that require pleading with specificity: "In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity." (Emphasis added.)

[¶ 9] Title 14 M.R.S. § 870 provides:

When a judgment has been obtained against a party by the perjury of a witness introduced at the trial by the adverse party, the injured party may, within 3 years after such judgment or after final disposition of any motion for relief from the judgment, bring an action against such adverse party, or any perjured witness or confederate in the perjury, to recover the damages sustained by him by reason of such perjury; and the judgment in the former action is no bar thereto.

We construe section 870 strictly. Spickler v. Greenberg, 644 A.2d 469, 471-72 (Me. 1994). The elements of a civil perjury claim are "(1) a judgment obtained against a party, (2) by the perjury of the witness, and (3) introduced at the trial by the adverse party." Kraul v. Me. Bonding & Cas. Co., 672 A.2d 1107, 1109 (Me.1996) (quoting Milner v. Hare, 126 Me. 14, 16, 135 A. 522, 523 (1926)). We have imposed a "clear and convincing evidence" standard of proof in civil perjury actions. Spickler, 644 A.2d at 471. Claims of perjury "should not be submitted to a new factfinder solely on the same record as in the original trial." Id. We have long required newly discovered evidence in perjury cases. See, e.g., Parker-Danner Co. v. Nickerson, 554 A.2d 1193, 1196 (Me.1989) (holding that contradictions in witness testimony are not sufficient to constitute perjury); State v. Cormier, 535 A.2d 913, 916 (Me.1987) (finding that "substantially inconsistent" testimony does not meet standard for perjury); Boisvert v. Charest, 135 Me. 220, 222-23, 193 A. 841, 842-43 (1937) (concluding that evidence discoverable by due diligence before the trial cannot later be introduced as new evidence to establish perjury).

[¶ 10] Courts are at liberty to define the standard of proof to be applied in particular cases where a statute is silent as to the standard of proof. Taylor v. Comm'r of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 481 A.2d 139, 144 (Me.1984) (citing State v. Shackford, 262 A.2d 359, 365 (Me.1970)). In Spickler, we analogized the elements of civil perjury claims to those of fraud and imposed a "clear and convincing evidence" standard of proof 644 A.2d at 471. We, however, have never ruled directly on the appropriate pleading standards for civil perjury claims, but we now agree with the trial court's application of a heightened pleading requirement in civil perjury cases.

[¶ 11] Where a Maine Rule of Civil Procedure is identical to the comparable federal rule, "we value constructions and comments on the federal rule as aids in construing our parallel provision." Me. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 395 A.2d 1107, 1114 (Me.1978) (emphasis added). Maine's Rules 8(a) and 9(b) are practically identical to the comparable federal rules. See FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a), 9(b). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that federal courts may not require heightened pleading standards in the absence of any rule or statutory authority. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002). More recently, however, in Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1973 n. 14, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), the Supreme Court stated: "[W]e do not apply any `heightened' pleading standard, nor do we seek to broaden the scope of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9.... On certain subjects understood to raise a high risk of abusive litigation, a plaintiff must state factual allegations with greater particularity than Rule 8 requires." In Bell Atlantic, the Supreme Court required the dismissal of a `largely groundless claim', id. at 1966 (quoting Dura Pharms, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577 (2005)), in favor of judicial efficiency because the plaintiffs had failed to plausibly plead all elements of their claim with factual support. Id. at 1966-67, 1974. Clearly, civil perjury...

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