Minder v. State
| Decision Date | 18 July 1901 |
| Citation | 113 Ga. 772,39 S.E. 284 |
| Parties | MINDER. v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
CRIMINAL LAW—CONTINUANCE—HOMICIDE— INSTRUCTIONS—INSANITY—NEW TRIAL.
1. Even if refusing to continue a criminal case because of the absence of material witnesses for the accused, who reside in another state, is, under any circumstances, cause for a new trial, it certainly is not when it appears that the court unsuccessfully employed all the power at its command to procure the attendance of these witnesses. It is not within the power of a court of this state to send its officers beyond the territorial limits of this state, with a view to enforcing the attendance of nonresident witnesses upon such court. The failure of the law to provide a method for enforcing the attendance of nonresident witnesses, or for the procuring and reception of their depositions, is not, in a particular case, a denial to the accused of the equal protection of the laws, or a deprivation of his life or liberty without due process of law.
2. The charge of the judge presented with sufficient fullness and clearness not only the general rule applicable to the defense of insanity at the time of the killing, but also the rule relating to delusional insanity. It was not essential, in charging the jury on this branch of the law, for the court to use the term "paranoia, " but enough if the principle involved was plainly stated to the jury.
3. In order to sustain the independent defense of insanity at the time of the commission of an alleged criminal act, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove that he was insane at that time; and an instruction that he must prove this to a "reasonable certainty" is not erroneous, when the jury are distinctly informed that a preponderance of the testimony is ail that is requisite to establish such reasonable certainty.
4. The assignments of error in the motion for a new trial not referred to above presented no sufficient reason for granting a new trial. The case was fairly submitted to the jury, the evidence authorized the verdict, and the discretion of the trial judge in refusing to grant a new trial will not be interfered with.
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Error from superior court, Bibb county; W. H. Pelton, Jr., Judge.
J. Minder was convicted of murder, and brings error. Affirmed.
John R. Cooper and Herman Brasch, for plaintiff in error.
Wm. Brunson, Sol. Gen., Robt Hodges, and J. M. Terrell, Atty. Gen., for the State.
COBB, J. Minder was placed on trial upon an indictment charging him with the offense of murder, and, having been convicted, was sentenced to death. His motion for a new trial was overruled, and he excepted.
1. In one of the grounds of the motion for a new trial complaint is made that the court erred in refusing to continue the case. The application for a continuance was made upon the ground of the absence of certain witnesses whose testimony, it is claimed, was very material to the defense of insanity set up by the accused. It appeared that these witnesses resided in the state of Alabama; that the court had caused subpoenas to be issued, directed to these witnesses; that they had been transmitted by mail to the wit nesses; that the subpœnas had been received by them; and that they had refused to attend court, upon the advice of their counsel in Alabama that there was no law requiring them to leave their state to attend as witnesses a court of another state. It distinctly appeared that the witnesses had refused to attend, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that there were any reasonable grounds for hoping that they might be induced to attend at a subsequent term of the court if the case had been continued. Under such circumstances, it does not seem to us that the court erred in refusing to postpone the case. In a case of this character, where the life of the accused is at stake, and the court has at its command no compulsory process which could be used to enforce the attendance of the witnesses from beyond its jurisdiction, a promise by the witnesses to attend at a subsequent term of the court might address itself very strongly to the discretion of the trial judge, and authorize him to continue the case; but certainly there is no abuse of discretion when the witnesses are beyond the jurisdiction of the court and beyond the power of its process, and not only...
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Grace v. State
...of proving his sanity. See in this connection Beck v. State, 76 Ga. 452(7); Keener v. State, 97 Ga. 388(3), 24 S.E. 28; Minder v. State, 113 Ga. 772(3), 39 S.E. 284; Allams v. State, 123 Ga. 500(1), 51 S.E. 506 (1 Justice absent); Polk v. State, 148 Ga. 34(5), 95 S.E. 988 (1 Justice absent)......
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Carter v. State
... ... immediately afterwards sane again. It is, however, useless to ... elaborate any further, as this court is bound by its former ... decisions upon this subject, which will be found cited in ... Carr v. State, 96 Ga. 284, 22 S.E. 570; Taylor ... v. State, 105 Ga. 746, 31 S.E. 764; Minder v ... State, 113 Ga. 773, 39 S.E. 284. We therefore conclude ... that requests to charge which sought to substitute another ... test of sanity for the knowledge of right and wrong should ... not have been given. With regard to the exception to the ... general rule in case of delusional ... ...