Grace v. State

• Decision Date: 20 September 1973
• Docket Number: No. 28073,28073
• Citation: 231 Ga. 113,200 S.E.2d 248
• Parties: Hamp GRACE v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 248

200 S.E.2d 248

231 Ga. 113

Hamp GRACE v. The STATE.

No. 28073.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Sept. 20, 1973.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The evidence did not authorize the trial judge to instruct the jury that the state had the burden of proof of the sanity of the appellant at the time of the commission of the crime.

2. The verdict of the jury was not contrary to the law and the evidence. It was authorized by the evidence.

Jean Sonne, Macon, for appellant.

Fred M. Hasty, Dist. Atty., Walker P. Johnson, Walter Matthews, Macon, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Courtney Wilder Stanton, Daniel I. MacIntyre, Asst. Attys. Gen., B. Dean Grindle, Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.

GRICE, Presiding Justice.

The appellant Hamp Grace was tried and convicted for the murder of Winnie Mae Watson in the Superior Court of Bibb County and sentenced to life in imprisonment.

The appellant's sole defense upon the trial was insanity at the time of the commission of the offense. He introduced into evidence in 'Application for Hospitalization of a Mentally Ill Person' and a physician's certificate dated November 27, 1967, certifying the appellant to be mentally ill with acute paranoid schizophrenia and in need of hospitalization at a psychiatric hospital; and a letter to the Judge of the Court of Ordinary of Bibb County which stated that the appellant was being 'Discharged other than restored' from Central State Hospital on December 21, 1968.

Upon appeal the appellant enumerates two errors: (1) that the trial court committed prejudicial error in failing to instruct the jury without request that under the circumstances in this case the state had the burden of proof of the sanity of the appellant at the time of the commission of the crime on September 5, 1972, since he had previously been adjudged insance; and (2) that since he had been adjudged insance and released 'other than restored,' and the state had failed to introduce any evidence to rebut the defense of insanity, the verdict of the jury was contrary to the law and the evidence.

1. The appellant urges that the burden was upon the state to prove the sanity of a defendant when he had been previously adjudicated insane, and that the court should have so charged. See in this connection, Allams v. State, 123 Ga. 500(3), 51 S.E. 506; Geer v. State, 184 Ga. 805(3), 193 S.E. 776; Troutman v. Troutman, 223 Ga. 700, 701, 157 S.E.2d 437.

In our view, the evidence here was not sufficient to authorize such a charge. The appellant was never adjudicated insance.

At the time the appellant was admitted to Central State Hospital such commitments were governed by Chapter 88-5 of the Georgia Public Health Code, Ga.L.1964, pp. 499, 530 (presently Ga.L.1969, p. 505 et seq.). Under Section 88-506 of this Act (Ga.L.1964, pp. 499, 534) no adjudication of insanity was made. The judicial procedure provided merely for a determination of mental illness.

Section 88-511 (Ga.L.1964, pp. 499, 541) further provided that 'The superintendent of a hospital shall as frequently as practicable, but not less often than every six months, examine or cause to be examined every patient and, whenever he determines that the condition justifying the hospitalization no longer exists, discharge the patient and immediately make a report thereof to the Department and to the court of ordinary which ordered the patient hospitalized.'

The report to the court of ordinary in the record there reveals that the appellant was placed on convalescent status on December 21, 1967, and discharged one year later 'other than restored.' Under the Act such discharge could only indicate that the authorities had determined that hospitalization was no longer necessary in view of the appellant's improved mental condition.

Moreover, the evidence here showed that the appellant, when first examined after admission to Central State Hospital, was determined to be acutely psychotic with hallucinations and delusions. The psychiatrist who examined him there concluded that he was then 'probably the same as when they call him lunatic or insance or crazy.' However, this doctor also testified that after the appellant was placed on medication he 'improved greatly' until he was released from the hospital; and that if he had regressed to his previous mental state, 'he probably would have been back.'

Since the evidence presented showed that the conditions justifying the appellant's hospitalization for mental illness no longer existed, the burden of proof of insanity was properly placed upon the appellant, and the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury that the state had the burden of proving his sanity. See in this connection Beck v. State, 76 Ga. 452(7); Keener v. State, 97 Ga. 388(3), 24 S.E. 28; Minder v. State, 113 Ga. 772(3), 39 S.E. 284; Allams v. State, 123 Ga. 500(1), 51 S.E. 506 (1 Justice absent); Polk v. State, 148 Ga. 34(5), 95 S.E. 988 (1 Justice absent); Currie v. State, 153 Ga. 178(2), 111 S.E. 727 (2 Justices dissenting); Lively v. State, 178 Ga. 693, 699, 173 S.E. 836; Rozier v. State, 185 Ga. 317, 319, 195 S.E. 172; Murray v. State, 201 Ga. 201(2), 39 S.E.2d 842; Carroll v. State, 204 Ga. 510(2), 50 S.E.2d 330; Boyd v. State, 207 Ga. 567(2), 63 S.E.2d 394; Clark v. State, 224 Ga. 311(1), 161 S.E.2d 836; Riggins v. State, 226 Ga. 381(1b), 174 S.E.2d 908 (1 Justice dissenting upon other grounds).

These and other decisions are the law in this state on this subject. There is nothing in the Georgia Criminal Code (Ga.L.1968, p. 1249 et seq.) or any other statute in force which militates against them. The Supreme Court of the United States has not ruled upon a charge like the one involved here.

2. The verdict of the jury was not contrary to the law and the evidence was sufficient to support it.

The appellant contends that his very conduct during the commission of the crime was relevant to show that he was insane; and that this, together with his commitment to Central State Hospital for mental illness in 1967 and the testimony of the psychiatrist who examined him, demanded a verdict of insanity.

In this regard, the evidence shows that the appellant walked into the restaurant where the victim was employed at 9:30 in the morning, oblivious to all the customers, made no attempt to hide a shotgun, and after a few words to her concerning his wallet which he believed she had stolen, shot her in the chest in the presence of many witnesses.

A psychiatrist who examined the appellant shortly after his commitment to Central State testified that he did not know the mental state of the appellant at the time he was released, but that he could 'assume' that it had improved greatly prior to his discharged. This doctor also examined the appellant in the Bibb County Jail in December, 1972, approximately three months after the crime, and testified that at that time he had 'decompensated' back to his psychotic state and on that day 'was not sane'; however, he admitted that he did not have any opinion as to the appellant's mental state on the date of the murder.

Another psychiatrist also examined the appellant on two occasions several weeks after the commission of the crime. He testified that in his opinion on those occasions the appellant 'would not know right from wrong.' However, upon questioning he admitted that a schizophrenic paranoid type could 'function at times where he would know right from wrong in relation to acts that he is about to commit'; and that it would be most difficult for him or any psychiatrist to definitely establish whether the appellant was 'clear, or on a lucid interval at the time the act was committed.'

The detective from the Macon Police Department, who shortly before the murder investigated the appellant's complaint that the victim had taken his wallet, swore that he had known the appellant for 15 or 20 years and that in his opinion the appellant was acting 'normal' and knew right from wrong on the morning of the homicide. He also testified that on the afternoon of the homicide, when he advised the appellant of his rights, the appellant told him that he had already hired the attorney who represented him upon the trial.

Although the evidence presented was on conflict, it did not demand a verdict of insanity. It supported the verdict of guilty.

We find no error in the proceedings.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except GUNTER and INGRAM, JJ., who dissent.

JORDAN, J., concurs specially.

JORDAN, Justice (specially concurring).

I concur in the judgment of affirmance because I am of the opinion that the evidence on the question of the defendant's sanity at the time of the commission of the crime did not demand a finding of sanity or insanity and was sufficient to authorize the jury to conclude that the defendant was sane at the time of the crime.

Our Criminal Code contains many presumptions, some in favor of a defendant and some in favor of the state. The most important presumption in favor of the defendant, of course, is that every person is presumed innocent until proved guilty. This presumption remains with the defendant throughout his trial. Even though he presents no evidence this presumption alone is sufficient to form the general issue for a jury and must be overcome by evidence sufficient to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.

One of the most important presumptions in favor of the state is that every person is presumed to be of sound mind and discretion. This presumption is conclusive unless the defendant offers evidence to the contrary. Only evidence of a legal adjudication of insanity could overcome this presumption as a matter of law. Any quantum of evidence less than this merely forms an issue between the state and the defendant as to his sanity. Whether or not the presumption of sanity has been successfully rebutted by the defendant in such a case is a question for the jury.

I fail to see the analogy suggested in the...