Mines v. State, 70893

• Decision Date: 14 October 1992
• Docket Number: No. 70893,70893
• Citation: 852 S.W.2d 941
• Parties: Charles E. MINES, Jr. aka Charles Anderson, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 941

852 S.W.2d 941

Charles E. MINES, Jr. aka Charles Anderson, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 70893.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas En Banc.

Oct. 14, 1992.

Rehearing Denied March 17, 1993.

James R. Jenkins, Waxahachie, for appellant.

Mary Lou Shipley, Dist. Atty., and Robert W. Rucker, Asst. Dist. Atty., Waxahachie, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

Before the court en banc.

OPINION

MILLER, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of capital murder. V.T.C.A. Penal Code § 19.03(a)(2). Upon the jury's affirmative findings on the three special issues submitted, the trial judge sentenced appellant to death. ¹ Art. 37.071(b)(1)-(3) and (e), V.A.C.C.P. Appellant presents two points of error in this direct appeal. Art. 37.071(h). We will affirm the trial court's judgment.

In his first point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in overruling his challenge to the array. At the conclusion of the voir dire process ², appellant filed and presented to the court a motion alleging the jury in this cause was unlawfully impaneled in that "no black, negroid or colored (the phrase preferred by the Defendant himself) jurors were seated by the Court[.]" ³ Of the three black prospective jurors on the panel, defense counsel peremptorily challenged one and the State so challenged the remaining two. Appellant asserts these two prospective jurors were struck by the State solely because of their race in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and Art. 35.261, V.A.C.C.P. ⁴

In response to appellant's motion, the prosecutor took the stand and testified as to her reasons for striking the two venirepersons, both of whom were black females. There were two main reasons why the prosecutor struck prospective juror Hamilton. First, Hamilton stated on her juror questionnaire form that she believed in punishment, but not capital punishment. The prosecutor acknowledged, however, that after the three special issues were explained to Hamilton, she stated that she believed in the death penalty and could answer the issues "yes." Nevertheless, the prosecutor felt Hamilton was tentative in her answers, had difficulty understanding the issues, and tended to agree with whatever question was asked of her. On cross-examination by defense counsel, the prosecutor reiterated these same feelings regarding prospective juror Hamilton and added that Hamilton's answers concerning the death penalty needed to be viewed within the context of her voir dire. The second reason proffered for the peremptory challenge against Hamilton was that she had been a maid in defense counsel's home, and the prosecutor felt that that situation might cause Hamilton to have a bias toward any evidence presented by the defense.

There were several reasons offered by the State for its peremptory challenge of prospective juror Champion, who was a minister's wife. Champion stated on her juror questionnaire form that she did not believe in the death penalty because of her religious training, but upon voir dire examination she stated she could answer affirmatively the punishment issues. The prosecutor felt that "[Champion's] answers to questions still tended to be some [sic] equivocal in regard to the death penalty." Moreover, in the prosecutor's opinion, Champion had difficulty understanding the third special issue and the question of insanity. ^{5 5} On cross-examination, the prosecutor acknowledged that Champion said she could answer the special issues, but she felt Champion had previously been "very emphatic" in her disbelief in the death penalty.

After explaining why she peremptorily challenged these two black venirewomen, the prosecutor gave her unsolicited reasons for striking seven similarly situated white female venirepersons. The prosecutor also noted for the record that she did not strike a third black female on the jury panel who initially indicated on her questionnaire that she could assess the death penalty if the offense involved a child. According to the prosecutor, after the law was explained to this venirewoman she stated unequivocally that she could follow the law and answer the special issues according to the evidence. Defense counsel peremptorily challenged this venirewoman.

The trial judge entered on the record his findings of fact and conclusions of law, noting that he was able to observe the prospective jurors' tone of voice, physical reactions to questions, and any pauses, delays, or spontaneity in their answers to questions. The court found the prosecutor's reasons for striking the challenged venirepersons were related to an issue in the case, namely whether the prospective jurors could affirmatively answer the punishment issues knowing the consequences thereof. The court further found that all jurors, regardless of race, were questioned in the same manner on the same subject matter for essentially the same amount of time. The court concluded the challenged black venirepersons were struck for race-neutral reasons. Appellant's challenge to the array was thus overruled.

For claims made pursuant to Art. 35.261 and Batson, this Court has held that the correct standard of appellate review is "clearly erroneous." Hill, 827 S.W.2d at 865, citing Williams v. State, 804 S.W.2d 95, 101 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Tennard v. State, 802 S.W.2d 678 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); and Whitsey v. State, 796 S.W.2d 707, 726 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (Opinion on State's Motion for Rehearing). That is, the reviewing court must view the record in the light most favorable to the trial judge's ruling and must not disturb that ruling unless the court is "left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Harris v. State, 827 S.W.2d 949, 955 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), citing Williams and Whitsey, supra. This standard of review is necessarily a deferential one as a trial judge's findings on a claim of purposeful discrimination during jury selection are largely based on credibility evaluations made during voir dire and the "Batson" hearing. Robinson v. State, 851 S.W.2d 216, 226-27 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (pending on rehearing on other grounds). Thus, in determining whether a trial judge's finding of no purposeful discrimination was clearly erroneous, we consider the challenged prospective juror's voir dire as a whole, as well as other relevant circumstances of the voir dire of the panel, and accord due deference to the trial judge's ruling. Sterling v. State, 830 S.W.2d 114 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).

The record reflects that prospective juror Hamilton initially stated she was against the death penalty, but she recognized there were situations where capital punishment might be appropriate. Hamilton then agreed, however, with the prosecutor's assessment that she did not believe in the death penalty under any circumstances. The prosecutor explained the juror's role in the verdict at the punishment phase and reviewed the three punishment issues with her. After discussing these issues with the prosecutor, Hamilton stated that she now believed in the death penalty. Hamilton answered affirmatively the prosecutor's questions on whether she could answer the punishment issues and whether she believed society had a right to have the death penalty. Hamilton also stated that she was a former maid for defense counsel's mother, but that she had not worked in his home since the 1960s ⁶ and that affiliation would not influence her. Before concluding her voir dire examination of Hamilton, the prosecutor once again broached the subject of the death penalty. Hamilton stated on her questionnaire that she did not believe in the death penalty because she "had not thought about it really[.]" Since completing her questionnaire, Hamilton had considered the death penalty and concluded the death penalty was appropriate punishment depending on the crime committed and how it was committed.

Prospective juror Champion also indicated on her questionnaire form that she did not believe in the death penalty as a result of her religious training, but then her statements to the prosecutor regarding her beliefs toward capital punishment became unclear. Upon questioning about the three special issues rather than the death penalty per se, Champion stated that she could answer "yes" to the three punishment issues if the State met its burden of proof. ⁷ The prosecutor reviewed other relevant trial issues with Champion and then returned to the question of the death penalty. Champion expressed her view that "if the evidence really proved" that the defendant was incapable of rehabilitation, she would not be reluctant to impose the death penalty as punishment. The evidence proven at trial was the factor which would change Champion's "way of thinking" regarding the death penalty.

In his brief, appellant argues the prosecutor's reasons for peremptorily challenging Hamilton and Champion are contrary to direct statements made by the prospective jurors, are frivolous, and do not rebut the prima facie evidence of racial discrimination. The record reflects the prosecutor's reasons for striking these persons from the venire are clear, specific, relevant to issues in this cause, and, most importantly, are facially race-neutral. In our opinion, these reasons are sufficient in and of themselves to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination. The issue to be resolved is whether appellant has sustained his burden of persuasion and rebutted the race-neutral explanations given by the State at the Batson hearing. Williams, 804 S.W.2d at 101.

In his brief, appellant directs us to testimony in the record from the prospective jurors which is contrary to the race-neutral explanations offered by the State for its two peremptory challenges. Specifically, appellant cites the testimony of venireperson Hamilton where she stated she could answer affirmatively the special issues, that she believed in the death penalty, and that her work as a maid in defense counsel's home would...