Robinson v. State

• Citation: 851 S.W.2d 216
• Decision Date: 17 April 1991
• Docket Number: No. 69568,69568
• Parties: William Alfred ROBINSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Page 216

851 S.W.2d 216

William Alfred ROBINSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 69568.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas,

En Banc.

April 17, 1991.

Rehearing Granted July 3, 1991.

Opinion Denying Motion for Rehearing Feb. 10, 1993.

Catherine Green Burnett and Janet Morrow (court appointed on appeal), Houston, for appellant.

John B. Holmes, Jr., Dist. Atty. and William J. Delmore, III, Bert Graham & J. Harvey Hudson, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

Before the court en banc.

OPINION

CAMPBELL, Judge.

Appeal is taken from a conviction for capital murder. See Tex. Penal Code § 19.03(a)(2). After finding appellant, William Alfred Robinson, guilty, the jury answered affirmatively the special issues required by Article 37.071(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and punishment was assessed at death. Direct review by this Court was then automatic. See Art. 37.071(h). On original submission, we abated the appeal and remanded the cause to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing regarding appellant's claim under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Robinson v. State, 738 S.W.2d 673 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). The record of the Batson hearing, together with the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law relevant thereto, have been forwarded to us. We will now affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence ¹ at trial showed that shortly after midnight, on June 12, 1985, appellant and two male accomplices robbed Steven Michael Creasey and his female companion at gunpoint in the Montrose section of Houston. During the course of the robbery, Creasey was shot and killed, either by appellant or one of his accomplices. See footnote 2, post. After Creasey's death, appellant and the others abducted and sexually assaulted Creasey's companion for approximately three hours. Creasey's companion was then released.

In sixteen points of error, appellant challenges the trial court's denial of a pretrial motion to suppress his inculpatory written statement; the trial court's refusal to adopt an alternative method of jury selection; the trial court's refusal to sustain appellant's Batson claim; the trial court's refusal to let him question four veniremen; the trial court's granting of the State's challenge of another venireman for cause; the trial court's denial of a mistrial based on juror "misconduct;" the trial court's denial of a special issue asking the jury whether it considered appellant's inculpatory written statement; the trial court's submission, to the jury, of the third special issue under Article 37.071(b); the trial court's refusal, at the punishment stage, to instruct the jury regarding uncharged misconduct; the validity of the jury selection method utilized at his trial; the validity, as applied to his case, of Article 37.071(b); and the validity of the Texas death penalty scheme under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

In his first point of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress an inculpatory written statement he gave to police shortly after his arrest. ² Appellant contends the statement was obtained in violation of his right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment. ³ More specifically, appellant contends that before he signed the statement he effectively requested the assistance of counsel, that the request was not honored, and that thereafter he did not initiate contact with the police. ⁴

The record reflects that appellant filed a pretrial motion requesting suppression of, inter alia, "the written statement of the Defendant which ... was taken in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution." A pretrial hearing was held on the motion. At the hearing appellant requested suppression of the statement on the ground "the actions taken on behalf of the police officers and members of the D.A.'s Office and judiciary of this State ... violated [appellant's] Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, those rights guaranteed to him under those amendments." There is nothing else in the record, or in appellant's brief to this Court, suggesting that the trial court and State's counsel were ever apprised of the specifics of appellant's objection to the admissibility of his written statement. On this record, then, we could properly overrule appellant's first point of error as not preserved for appellate review. Rezac v. State, 782 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex.Cr.App.1990). In the interests of justice, however, we will proceed to explain why appellant's argument has no merit.

At the pretrial hearing, only the State presented evidence, which consisted principally of the testimony of five witnesses. After the hearing, the trial court filed detailed written findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellant does not now contest the accuracy of the fact-findings or their support in the record, and our examination of the record shows that they are indeed well-supported by the record. ⁵

The trial court's fact-findings may be summarized as follows: Appellant, then-27 years old, was arrested around 5:00 p.m., June 24, 1985, in Dallas. At the time of the arrest, the arresting officer explained to appellant his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). That is, the arresting officer explained that appellant had the right to remain silent, that any statement he made could be used against him at trial, that he had the right to an attorney before and during any questioning, and that if he could not afford an attorney one would be appointed for him. Immediately after his arrest, appellant was taken to the Dallas County jail facility, where a magistrate again explained to him his rights under Miranda.

Appellant was later taken to a Dallas police station, where, at approximately 1:30 a.m., June 25th, another police officer explained his Miranda rights to him a third time. After explaining those rights, the officer asked appellant whether he understood them, and appellant responded that he did. The officer then asked appellant whether he would give a statement regarding the murder of Steven Creasey. Appellant again responded that he would, and then he gave the statement, which was reduced to written form. After the statement was read back to appellant verbatim, the interviewing officer asked him whether he would sign it. ⁶ Appellant responded with a question of his own: "Do I need to talk to a lawyer before I sign?" The officer answered that appellant could have a lawyer if he desired one, and then appellant stated that he was willing to sign immediately without a lawyer. Out of an abundance of caution, however, the officer refused to allow appellant to sign the statement, explaining to him that first he would have to be taken again before a magistrate, who would explain his Miranda rights yet again.

Shortly after 5:00 p.m. on June 25th, appellant was taken before a magistrate in Houston, after having been transported from Dallas. The magistrate explained to appellant his Miranda rights yet again and then asked appellant whether he understood those rights, and appellant stated that he did. The magistrate then read to appellant the statement he had given the night before in Dallas and again asked him whether he wanted to sign the statement without first consulting an attorney. Appellant responded that he did want to sign, even before consulting an attorney, and he did so.

In its fact-findings, the trial court found also that "[t]here was no evidence that the defendant ever appeared to be mentally or physically disabled or under the influence of any form of intoxicant" during the period in question, and that appellant was in no way coerced into making or signing the written statement. We note also that appellant does not argue to us that he had less than the normal use of his mental and physical faculties at the time he signed the written statement.

We turn now to a summary of the relevant legal principles. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protects an individual from being compelled by the state to be a witness against himself. See generally Holloway v. State, 780 S.W.2d 787 (Tex.Cr.App.1989). In Miranda, the Supreme Court established procedural safeguards to protect the exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege from the inherently coercive effects of custodial interrogation. This is not to say, however, that the police are free to interrogate whenever they have given the requisite warnings. The Court in Miranda went on to hold that if, after the warnings are given, the defendant is interrogated and a statement obtained, it will be admissible at trial only if the prosecution demonstrates that the defendant waived his rights voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628. See also Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 470-471, 100 S.Ct. 652, 653, 62 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980). Such waiver must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S.Ct. 515, 522, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). If the prosecution shows that a suspect's decision not to rely on his Miranda rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could stand mute and consult a lawyer, and that he was aware the State could use his statements against him, the State's burden of proof is met and waiver shown as a matter of law. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422-423, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141-1142, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986).

On the other hand, if a suspect, after being given the Miranda warnings, does request the assistance of counsel, "interrogation must cease, and officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present." Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153, 111 S.Ct. 486, 491, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990). See Murphy v. State, 801 S.W.2d 917 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). The mere...