Minley v. Browning

• Decision Date: 04 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2 CA-SA 2016-0006,2 CA-SA 2016-0006
• Parties: JUDY MINLEY, Petitioner, v. HON. CHRISTOPHER BROWNING, JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIMA, Respondent, and THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Real Party in Interest.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona

JUDY MINLEY, Petitioner,
v.
HON. CHRISTOPHER BROWNING, JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
THE STATE OF ARIZONA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PIMA, Respondent,
and
THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Real Party in Interest.

No. 2 CA-SA 2016-0006

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION TWO

May 4, 2016

THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f); Ariz. R. P. Spec. Actions 7(g), (i).

Special Action proceeding Pima County Cause No. CR20131358002

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF GRANTED

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COUNSEL

David W. Basham, Tucson

and

Barton & Storts, P.C., Tucson
By Brick P. Storts III
Counsel for Petitioner

Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney
By Jacob R. Lines, Deputy County Attorney, Tucson
Counsel for Real Party in Interest

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Miller authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Vásquez and Chief Judge Eckerstrom concurred.

MILLER, Judge:

¶1 Judy Minley seeks special action relief from the respondent judge's order precluding as irrelevant the testimony of expert witnesses in support of her defense to charges of felony murder and intentional or knowing child abuse. We accept jurisdiction and grant relief.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 Minley and her boyfriend, James Robinson, have been charged with two counts of child abuse and first-degree murder in connection with the death of her four-year-old son. The state's homicide theory against Minley is limited to felony murder. The child abuse counts against each defendant allege direct abuse by beating and by failing to seek medical assistance. In separate trials, the state seeks the death penalty for both defendants.

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¶3 The events in question¹ began on March 20, 2013, when Minley allegedly struck her son several times with a sandal before instructing Robinson to continue to discipline the child. Robinson then beat the child for an extended time. The child's injuries leading to his death started with extensive trauma to the muscles, which caused in a serial, cascading fashion the release of potassium and other toxins into the blood, renal failure, cardiac arrest, and deprivation of oxygen to the brain. The respondent judge concluded it was "impossible to identify and isolate the exact number of blows" or "to determine which Defendant inflicted what specific blows to the victim." It accepted the opinions of the medical examiner and a pediatric intensivist that the injuries causing the child's death the following day were cumulative in effect rather than arising from a single injury.

¶4 The state moved to preclude the testimony of three medical expert witnesses disclosed by Minley who would testify that Robinson's behavior the day he disciplined the child was unpredictable due to "emergent delirium" resulting from anesthetics and prescription painkillers administered during and after Robinson's wisdom teeth were removed that morning. The experts also would opine that the unusual effects were caused by his "[c]hronic solvent intoxication" from occupational exposure to solvents including jet fuel and his existing personality disorder. The state argued that evidence of "aberrant behavior" by Robinson was irrelevant and that the testimony was, in any event, speculative.

¶5 The respondent judge granted the state's motions to preclude, citing State v. Payne, 232 Ariz. 360, ¶¶ 70-71, 306 P.3d 17,

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34 (2013),² for the proposition that, to convict Minley of child abuse, the state did not have to prove "a specific mens rea" as to whether the child abuse had occurred "under circumstances likely to produce death or serious injury." The respondent thus determined it was irrelevant whether Minley had "reason to know or suspect that Robinson would act as he did."

Special Action Jurisdiction

¶6 We have broad discretion to accept jurisdiction of special actions arising out of capital cases. State v. Arellano, 213 Ariz. 474, ¶ 4, 143 P.3d 1015, 1017 (2006). Our exercise of special action jurisdiction generally is appropriate only when there is no "equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal." Ariz. R. P. Spec. Actions 1(a). We recognize that Minley has a remedy by appeal should she be convicted following a jury trial. A.R.S. § 13-4033(A)(1). However, that fact does not foreclose our exercise of special action jurisdiction. Nordstrom v. Cruikshank, 213 Ariz. 434, ¶ 8, 142 P.3d 1247, 1250-51 (App. 2006). An appellate remedy may be inadequate if "trial would proceed in an incorrect manner." Id. We accept special action jurisdiction here, in part, because the error is plain and correcting that error may avoid the delay and expense caused by a retrial—one that is very likely to occur should Minley be convicted and raise this issue on appeal. See id.; see also Cravens, Dargan & Co. v. Superior Court, 153 Ariz. 474, 477, 737 P.2d 1373, 1376 (1987) (exercising special action jurisdiction because "[t]here is no justifiable reason" to require appeal when eventual reversal "inevitable"); State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 129 Ariz. 156, 159, 629 P.2d 992, 995 (1981) (exercise of special action jurisdiction appropriate "to correct a plain and obvious error . . . [that] would have resulted in substantial delay").

¶7 Further, the respondent judge based his ruling on a reading of Payne and A.R.S. § 13-3623 that Minley challenges as a

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matter of law. To resolve the issues presented, we must interpret recent authority from our supreme court affecting the application of the statute that is the core of the indictment. Because the application of a statute presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo, it is "particularly appropriate for review by special action." Sierra Tucson, Inc. v. Lee ex rel. Cty. of Pima, 230 Ariz. 255, ¶ 7, 282 P.3d 1275, 1277 (App. 2012). Finally, we observe that § 13-3623 has been the operative statute in prior homicide cases, which suggests its interpretation and application may occur in future cases. See, e.g., State v. West, 238 Ariz. 482, ¶¶ 2-4, 362 P.3d 1049, 1053 (App. 2015); State v. Jones, 235 Ariz. 501, ¶¶ 2-3, 334 P.3d 191, 192 (2014); State v. Villalobos, 225 Ariz. 74, ¶¶ 2-8, 235 P.3d 227, 230-31 (2010). We further observe that the respondent judge's ruling, if erroneous, would significantly hamper Minley's constitutional right to present a complete defense. See State v. Boyston, 231 Ariz. 539, ¶ 55, 298 P.3d 887, 898 (2013) ("'[T]he Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.'"), quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683,...