Minnesota Ass'n of Public Schools v. Hanson, 42095

• Decision Date: 26 June 1970
• Docket Number: No. 42095,42095
• Citation: 287 Minn. 415,178 N.W.2d 846
• Parties: MINNESOTA ASSOCIATION OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al., Appellants, v. Kenneth HANSON, County Auditor of Otter Tail County, et al., Respondents, Duane Mattheis, Comm'r, of Education of Minnesota, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 846

178 N.W.2d 846

287 Minn. 415

MINNESOTA ASSOCIATION OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al Appellants, v. Kenneth HANSON, County Auditor of Otter Tail County, et al Respondents Duane Mattheis, Comm'r, of Education of Minnesota Respondent.

No. 42095.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 26, 1970.

Syllabus by the Court

1. In this state a court has no jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment in the absence of a justiciable controversy. The controversy must be justiciable in the sense that it involves definite and concrete assertions of right and the contest thereof touching the legal relations of parties having adverse interests in the matter with respect to which the declaration is sought, and must admit of specific relief by a decree or judgment of a specific character as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.

2. A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must show that it affects his rights in an unconstitutional manner and not merely the rights of others. It is not sufficient that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.

3. The cause of action attempted to be alleged in count two of the complaint was properly dismissed on the ground that L.1967, c. 833, does not impair existing contracts between teachers employed by common school districts contrary to U.S.Const. art. I, § 10, and Minn.Const. art. 1, § 11. The trial court was correct in ruling that no justiciable controversy exists.

Feinberg, Mirviss, Meyers, Schumacher & Malmon, Minneapolis, for appellants.

Harlan L. Nelson, County Atty., Fergus Falls, for respondent Hanson.

Douglas M. Head, Atty. Gen., Richard Kyle, Solicitor Gen., and Douglas L. Skor, Spec. Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent Mattheis.

OPINION

NELSON, Justice.

Appeal from a district court order granting defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint and from judgment entered thereon.

Plaintiffs initiated a declaratory judgment action on two counts seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality of L.1967, c. 833 (Minn.St. 122.41 to 122.52) requiring that all school districts not maintaining classified elementary and secondary schools on July 1, 1970, be dissolved and attached to districts which do maintain such schools.

The first count, brought by the Minnesota Association of Public Schools (M.A.P.S.), alleges that c. 833 is unconstitutional because it violates (1) the requirement for a general and uniform system of public schools; (2) the prohibition against unreasonable classifications; and (3) the prohibition against establishment of religion. The second count, a class action brought on behalf of two groups of teachers, alleges that c. 833 violates the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contractual obligations.

Prior to filing their answer, defendants moved to dismiss both counts on the grounds (1) that there was a failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; (2) that there was a lack of a justiciable controversy; (3) that the action was premature; and (4) that plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain the action.

The trial court in its memorandum stated that it presumed defendants' motions were made pursuant to Rule 12.02, Rules of Civil Procedure, and were based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court assumed that the motions could also be made pursuant to Rule 56.02 and that, although the motions were made for dismissal of the action, in effect the parties were seeking summary judgment on the merits. The trial court proceeded to grant defendants' motions to dismiss count one of the complaint on the grounds of the absence of a justiciable controversy resulting in lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter. However, the court proceeded to rule on the merits and upheld the constitutionality of c. 833. The trial court also ruled on the merits of count two of the complaint and granted defendants' motion to dismiss on the grounds that there was no impairment of the teachers' contract and thus no justiciable controversy. This appeal followed.

The complaint indicates that M.A.P.S. is a nonprofit corporation consisting of members and representatives of school boards of public schools within the state. Its stated purpose is 'to develop, strengthen and correlate the work of the school boards of the public schools of the State of Minnesota in their efforts to promote the educational interests of the children of the State of Minnesota.'

The complaint is based on the existence of c. 833, § 8 (Minn.St. 122.48), which provides:

'Sections 122.41 to 122.46 shall not apply to any school district or unorganized territory in which is located any existing private school maintaining elementary and secondary education for 75 percent of the eligible pupils within the district or territory and complying with the requirements of Minnesota Statutes, Section 120.10, Subdivision 2.'

Plaintiffs claim that the foregoing section violates the equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution by making an unreasonable classification of the schools, persons, and properties affected by the law, thereby denying to the pupils in the excepted districts the benefits of better educational opportunities and a more equitable distribution of public school revenue if they do not choose to attend private or parochial schools in their school district.

1. The first issue is whether M.A.P.S. has an interest in c. 833 such as to show a justiciable controversy which would permit it to challenge the constitutionality of the compulsory school consolidation law in a declaratory judgment action.

Minn.St. 555.02 of the Declaratory Judgments Act provides:

'Any person interested under a * * * written contract * * * or whose rights * * * or other legal relations are affected by a statute * * * may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, * * * and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.'

It is a well-established rule in this state that a court has no jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment in the absence of a justiciable controversy. State ex rel. Smith v. Haveland, 223 Minn. 89, 25 N.W.2d 474, 174 A.L.R. 544; County Bd. of Education v. Borgen, 192 Minn. 512, 257 N.W. 92; Hassler v. Engberg, 233 Minn. 487, 48 N.W.2d 343; Seiz v. Citizens Pure Ice Co., 207 Minn. 277, 290 N.W. 802. We stated in the Seiz case (207 Minn. 281, 290 N.W. 804):

'Proceedings for a declaratory judgment must be based on an actual controversy. The controversy must be justiciable in the sense that it involves definite and concrete assertions of right and the contest thereof touching the legal relations of parties having adverse interests in the matter with respect to which the declaration is sought, and must admit of specific relief by a decree or judgment of a specific character as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.'

2. A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must show that it affects his rights in an unconstitutional manner and not merely the rights of others. It is not sufficient that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally. Lott v. Davidson, 261 Minn. 130, 109 N.W.2d 336; Mesaba Loan Co. v. Sher, 203 Minn. 589, 282 N.W. 823.

In the instant case M.A.P.S. asserts only those rights which belong to the pupils. As the trial court's memorandum points out, M.A.P.S. cannot gain status to challenge the constitutionality of legislation affecting school boards merely by asserting that it is interested in the development, strengthening, and correlation of work of such school boards to promote educational interests of children, because the purpose of M.A.P.S. is not to promote the interests of the children but to assist the school boards 'in their efforts' to promote the educational interests of the children. This interest in good schools is not dissimilar to that of any other member of the general public. Thus, M.A.P.S. itself possesses no legal interest which has been or is about to be affected in a prejudicial manner.

Alternatively, if it is contended that the interest of M.A.P.S. is different from that of the public, it must necessarily identify itself with the interest of its school board members. Then, however, M.A.P.S. would lack standing to challenge this legislation on the grounds that a school district, as a quasi-municipal corporation created by statute and enjoying only the rights conferred upon it by the legislature, may not challenge the constitutionality of a statute with the avowed purpose of modifying, dissolving, and/or expanding various school districts. See, Kramer v. County of Renville, 144 Minn. 195, 175 N.W. 101; Independent School Dist. No. 581 v. Mattheis, 275 Minn. 383, 147 N.W.2d 374.

We conclude, therefore, that no justiciable controversy exists between plaintiff corporation and defendants, and we must affirm the trial court's dismissal of the first count of the complaint on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

It is incumbent upon us to mention that our refusal to consider the merits of c. 833 will not result in a crucial delay of such consideration since c. 833, § 12, provides for severability of all the provisions of the act. Thus, if c. 833, § 8, were held invalid subsequent to July 1, 1970, no proceedings under the balance of c. 833 would have to be terminated. If and when § 8 were determined to be invalid, it would only be necessary to commence consolidation proceedings for those districts which, up to that time, were excepted by § 8.

3. The second count of this declaratory judgment action is prosecuted by two classes of teachers. The first class consists of those teachers who are qualified to teach in ungraded schools only. When consolidation is completed...