Minnesota Citizens Concerned v. Kelley

• Citation: 427 F.3d 1106
• Decision Date: 04 November 2005
• Docket Number: No. 03-4077.,03-4077.
• Parties: MINNESOTA CITIZENS CONCERNED FOR LIFE, INC.; David Racer; and the Committee for State Pro-Life Candidates, Appellants, v. Doug KELLEY, Clyde Miller, Sidney Pauly, Wil Fluegel, Terri Ashmore, and Robert Milbert, in their capacities as Chair and members of the Campaign Finance and Disclosure Board; and Amy Klobuchar, in her official capacity as County Attorney for Hennepin County, Minnesota, Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

427 F.3d 1106

MINNESOTA CITIZENS CONCERNED FOR LIFE, INC.; David Racer; and the Committee for State Pro-Life Candidates, Appellants, v. Doug KELLEY, Clyde Miller, Sidney Pauly, Wil Fluegel, Terri Ashmore, and Robert Milbert, in their capacities as Chair and members of the Campaign Finance and Disclosure Board; and Amy Klobuchar, in her official capacity as County Attorney for Hennepin County, Minnesota, Appellees.

No. 03-4077.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: October 18, 2004.

Filed: November 4, 2005.

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James Bopp, Jr., argued, Terre Haute, Indiana (Jeffrey Gallant, on the brief), for appellant.

Kristinen L. Eiden, argued, St. Paul, Minnesota (Mike Hatch, Jennifer A. Service, and Mark B. Levinger, on the brief), for appellee.

Before COLLOTON, LAY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Two pro-life organizations and an unsuccessful candidate for state senate challenge the constitutionality of several Minnesota campaign finance laws. As relevant here, Minnesota requires registration with the Campaign Finance and Disclosure Board by all organizations that accept or spend money "to influence," or whose major purpose is "to influence," the nomination or election of a specific candidate. Minn.Stat. § 10A.01, subds. 27 and 28 (defining "political committee" and "political fund"). It also requires lobbyists to disclose the source of funds spent on lobbying, and restricts religious, charitable, and educational organizations from requesting money from candidates. Minn.Stat. §§ 10A.04, subd. 4(d); 211B.08. Further, Minnesota prohibits candidates from accepting money from another candidate's campaign committee, and caps per-candidate contributions from political committees, political funds, lobbyists, and large contributors at 20 percent of the candidate's expenditure limit. Minn.Stat. § 10A.27, subd. 11. On summary judgment, the district court found these statutes constitutional. Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Kelley, 291 F.Supp.2d 1052 (D.Minn.2003). The challengers appeal.

Jurisdiction being proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms in part, reverses in part, and remands.

I.

Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc., is a non-profit corporation whose purposes include informing the public on abortion and related topics. Before each election, MCCL publishes the results of a questionnaire identifying a candidate's position on such issues. MCCL does not expressly advocate the election or defeat of specific candidates.

The Committee for State Pro-Life Candidates is a registered political committee affiliated with MCCL, devoted to electing (or defeating) candidates based on abortion-related issues. Unlike MCCL, CSPC publishes and distributes materials expressly advocating the election (or defeat) of candidates. CSPC also contributes directly to campaign committees of favored candidates.

Plaintiff David Racer ran unsuccessfully for state senate in November 2002. He plans to run again for office in Minnesota.

Just before the November 2002 election, MCCL, CSPC and Racer sought to enjoin enforcement of various campaign finance statutes, alleging violations of the First Amendment. Citing a failure to comply with the "short and plain" requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), the district court withheld ruling on the complaint before the November election. After the election, the court permitted the challengers to file an amended complaint. Cross motions for summary judgment followed.

Ruling on the motions, the district court found the definition of "campaign material" in Minn.Stat. § 211B.01, subd. 2, unconstitutionally vague, and the disclaimer requirement of Minn.Stat. § 211B.04(a) as violating the right to speak anonymously. These rulings are not contested.

MCCL, CSPC and Racer appeal the district court's rulings on the following six provisions: A) the definitions of "political committee" and "political fund," Minn.Stat. § 10A.01, subds. 27 and 28; B) the lobbying allocation interpretation of Minn.Stat. § 10A.04, subd. 4(d); C) the ban on transfers between candidates' political committees, Minn.Stat. § 10A.27, subd. 9; D) the year-based contribution limits, Minn.Stat. § 10A.27, subd. 1; E) the aggregate limit on contributions from political committees, political funds, lobbyists, and large contributors, Minn.Stat. § 10A.27, subd. 11; and, F) the restriction on solicitations by religious, charitable, and educational organizations, Minn.Stat. § 211B.08.

II.

This court reviews de novo a grant of summary judgment, applying the same standard used by the district court. See Essco Geometric v. Harvard Indus., 46 F.3d 718, 729 (8th Cir.1995). This court affirms where there are no genuine issues of material fact, and judgment is appropriate as a matter of law. See id., citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

A. Definitions of Political Committee and Political Fund

MCCL challenges the definitions of "political committee" and "political fund," which read:

"Political committee" means an association whose major purpose is to influence the nomination or election of a candidate or to promote or defeat a ballot question, other than a principal campaign committee or a political party unit.

Minn.Stat. § 10A.01, subd. 27.

"Political fund" means an accumulation of dues or voluntary contributions by an association other than a political committee, principal campaign committee, or party unit, if the accumulation is collected or expended to influence the nomination or election of a candidate or to promote or defeat a ballot question.

Minn.Stat. § 10A.01, subd. 28. MCCL claims that the phrase "to influence" in both definitions is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, violating the First Amendment.

The parties argued their case before this court on October 18, 2004. Then, no Minnesota court had construed these subdivisions. Without controlling state precedent, this court would have to speculate or conjecture. See Kaiser v. Mem'l Blood Ctr. of Minneapolis, Inc., 938 F.2d 90, 93 (8th Cir.1991). See also Virginia Soc'y for Human Life, Inc. v. Caldwell, 152 F.3d 268, 272 (4th Cir.1998) (certifying question to Virginia Supreme Court as to whether state campaign finance statute should be narrowly construed under Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976)); Virginia Soc'y for Human Life, Inc. v. Caldwell, 256 Va. 151, 500 S.E.2d 814 (1998) (narrowly construing the statute).

On December 13, this court certified a question to the Minnesota Supreme Court as to the construction of subdivisions 27 and 28. That court, after briefing and argument, ruled on June 30, 2005. By this court's order, the case is resubmitted for decision.

The Minnesota Supreme Court held:

[T]o clarify the conformity of our statute with Buckley, we choose to reformulate the Eighth Circuit's question as follows:

Whether the use of the phrase "to influence the nomination or election of a candidate or to promote or defeat a ballot question" and related phrases in Minn.Stat. § 10A.01, subds. 27 and 28 may be narrowly construed to limit the application of those statutes to groups that expressly advocate the nomination or election of a particular candidate or the promotion or defeat of a ballot question.

We answer the certified question, as reformulated, in the affirmative.

Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Kelley, 698 N.W.2d 424, 430 (Minn.2005).

In its opinion, the Minnesota Supreme Court holds that the challenged definitions do not apply to groups that engage only in pure issue advocacy. Id. at 429. MCCL claims to engage only in pure issue advocacy. The district court, therefore, correctly found that MCCL lacks standing to challenge the definitions of "political committee" and "political fund."

B. Lobbying Allocation Formula

Minn.Stat. § 10A.04, subdivision 4(d), requires MCCL's lobbyists to report each source of over $500 per year that MCCL used for lobbying, including the source's name, address, and employer. MCCL contends this requirement violates the First Amendment by compelling disclosure of personal information about contributors who give generally to MCCL. The district court held that the state's interest in regulating lobbying outweighs MCCL's First Amendment interests. MCCL, 291 F.Supp.2d at 1066, quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66, 96 S.Ct. 612 ("compelled disclosure" may be upheld where "government interests [are] sufficiently important to outweigh the possibility of infringement.").

In an advisory opinion, the Board has interpreted subdivision 4(d) to require that a lobbyist principal, such as MCCL, provide its lobbyists the names of persons meeting either of two thresholds: 1) those who "earmarked" donations over $500 to MCCL for lobbying — which has never happened and thus MCCL does not attack this reporting requirement — or 2) those "whose aggregate contributions multiplied by the percentage of the budget the lobbyist principal used for lobbying is greater than $500." Minn. Campaign Fin. and Pub. Disclosure Bd. Op. 336 (Jan. 25, 2002) (Issue 5). MCCL claims the statute as applied is vague and overbroad because the formula requires disclosure of contributors whose funds may not be used for lobbying.¹

Both the Supreme Court and this court have upheld lobbyist-disclosure statutes based on the government's "compelling" interest in requiring lobbyists to register and report their activities, and avoiding even the appearance of corruption. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66, 96 S.Ct. 612; Minnesota State Ethical Pract. Bd. v. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n, 761 F.2d 509, 512 (8th Cir.1985) (upholding the predecessor statute to section 10A.04), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 853, 88 L.Ed.2d 893 (1986). Applying Buckley, this court in NRA "examined the record to determine whether any contributors had experienced threats of physical or economic harm as a result of the disclosure requirement." NRA, 761 F.2d at 512, applying Buckley,...