Minor v. State

• Decision Date: 18 October 1994
• Docket Number: No. 48A02-9405-PC-301,48A02-9405-PC-301
• Citation: 641 N.E.2d 85
• Parties: Jeffrey E. MINOR, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent. 1
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 85

641 N.E.2d 85

Jeffrey E. MINOR, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent.

No. 48A02-9405-PC-301. ¹

Court of Appeals of Indiana First District.

Oct. 18, 1994.

Transfer Denied Dec. 7, 1994.

Jeffrey E. Minor, pro se.

Pamela Carter, Atty. Gen., Mary Dreyer, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

BAKER, Judge.

Pro se appellant-defendant Jeffrey E. Minor opposes the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief that alleged his guilty plea was not intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily made, and that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Most notably he challenges the propriety of the court's order of probation where his plea agreement was silent as to this sentencing provision.

FACTS

Minor entered a written plea agreement with the State on September 9, 1981, admitting the commission of robbery as a Class C felony. At the guilty plea hearing on September 21, 1981, the court first advised Minor of his constitutional rights and then allowed the State to present a factual basis for Minor's plea. The State did this by questioning Minor himself. Minor admitted that he and a co-defendant knocked a woman down in a parking lot and stole her purse. Upon finding that Minor understood his rights and that the State had established a factual basis, the court accepted Minor's guilty plea. At Minor's sentencing hearing on September 28, 1981, the court imposed a five-year sentence but suspended all of it except for 52 weekends in accordance with the plea agreement. Additionally, the court placed Minor on probation for two years.

On September 11, 1990, Minor filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging 1) ineffective assistance of counsel regarding pre-trial preparation and 2) inadequate advisement of the nature of the charges and of his right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses. His petition was summarily denied on March 25, 1993, but resurrected through grants of motions to correct error and to amend his petition. ² Minor amended his petition to add allegations that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered because the factual basis for his guilty plea was insufficient, that the trial court violated the plea agreement by imposing two years of probation, and that his counsel provided ineffective assistance on the probation issue. Following a hearing in 1994, the post-conviction court denied all relief.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Adequacy of Post-Conviction Court's Decision

Minor's first contention on appeal is that the post-conviction court's findings of fact and conclusions of law failed to address all of the issues raised in his amended petition. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1, § 6 requires the court to make specific findings and conclusion on all issues presented. The State concedes that the post-conviction court made findings only on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. However, remand is not necessary where the facts underlying the claims are not in dispute and the issues are clear. Shackelford v. State (1986), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 1014, 1018.

The facts regarding Minor's claims are not disputed and he has fully discussed in his brief the alleged deficiencies in the record and his trial counsel's performance, except for the compulsory process issue. Likewise, the State has responded to all of these issues. In the interest of judicial economy, we will review Minor's allegations argued in his brief rather than remand for further findings.

II. Guilty Plea

The next issue Minor raises is whether his guilty plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. He alleges several grounds urging vacation of his guilty plea. We consider each separately mindful of our standard of review. We will reverse the denial of post-conviction relief only where the evidence is without conflict and leads only to a conclusion different from that of the post-conviction court. Lyons v. State (1992), Ind.App., 600 N.E.2d 560, 563.

We examine first whether the trial court failed to properly advise Minor of his Boykin rights and secure his waiver of those rights. Minor concedes that the court told him that he would be giving up his Boykin rights--the right of confrontation, the right to a jury trial, and the right against self-incrimination. See White v. State (1986), Ind., 497 N.E.2d 893, 905 (quoting Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274). Nevertheless, he incredulously maintains that the court did not advise him that he had these rights. He further contends that he never waived his Boykin rights. More specifically he alleges that although he was informed that he could not be compelled to testify against himself, he did not understand that he could not be forced to incriminate himself. In addition, he maintains that the court half-heartedly informed him of his rights. He suggests that the right against self-incrimination should have been explained better since he had already made incriminating statements prior to entering his plea agreement.

The record contradicts Minor's allegations that he was not adequately advised of his rights and that he did not waive them. It contains the written plea agreement Minor signed in which he was informed of his constitutional rights and acknowledged that he understood that he was waiving those rights. R. at 131. ³ Moreover, the judge did advise Minor of those same rights at the hearing. R. at 112-13. When asked if he understood those rights and that he was giving up those rights, Minor answered "yes." R. at 113. The court was not required to use particular words, such as "waiver" and "incrimination," when informing Minor of his rights and the consequences of pleading guilty so long as he was meaningfully advised. See Hampton v. State (1993), Ind.App., 616 N.E.2d 373, 375 (regarding adequacy of advisement of right of confrontation). The facts and circumstances surrounding Minor's plea show that an adequate advisement was given, and waiver was secured. See id. at 376 (guilty plea upheld where combination of written and oral advisement of rights satisfied Boykin ).

Next, Minor argues that the trial court violated Federal Criminal Rule 11 by failing to advise him of the essential elements of robbery and failing to establish a factual basis for the guilty plea. Minor erroneously relies upon a federal rule; Indiana courts do not follow federal rules of procedure. See Anderson v. State (1959), 239 Ind. 372, 375, 156 N.E.2d 384, 385. Additionally, Minor cites Indiana authority for his argument that the court failed to establish a factual basis for his plea, or to determine that he understood the nature of the charge. He maintains that the record is devoid of these necessary requisites to the court's acceptance of his guilty plea. He is wrong.

A trial court may not accept a guilty plea unless a sufficient factual basis has been established for the plea. IND.CODE § 35-35-1-3(b). When a post-conviction relief petitioner challenges the sufficiency of the factual basis, we neither weigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Hampton, 616 N.E.2d at 376. We confine our review to the evidence most favorable to the State, and if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's finding, we will affirm it. Id. at 376-77.

An adequate factual basis for the acceptance of a guilty plea may be established in several ways: 1) by the State's presentation of evidence on the elements of the charged offenses, 2) the defendant's sworn testimony regarding the events underlying the charges, 3) the defendant's admission of the truth of the allegations in the information read in court, or 4) the defendant's acknowledgement that he understands the nature of the crimes charged and that his plea is an admission of the charges. Carney v. State (1991), Ind.App., 580 N.E.2d 286, 289, trans. denied.

At the guilty plea hearing, Minor acknowledged that he was admitting to the truth of the facts alleged in the charging information. R. at 113. He testified that he and a co-defendant robbed a woman in a parking lot in Madison County by knocking the woman to the ground and stealing her purse. R. at 116. Minor's admissions established a proper factual basis for his guilty plea.

In a guilty plea situation, the court must also be satisfied that the defendant understands the charges. Melton v. State (1993), Ind.App., 611 N.E.2d 666, 668, trans. denied. Contrary to Minor's contention, the court is not required to advise the defendant of the elements of the crime, but rather the nature of the charge. See England v. State (1993), Ind.App., 625 N.E.2d 1264, 1265, trans. denied. An admission of facts which constitutes an admission of each element of the offense will fulfill the requirement that the defendant understands the true nature of the charge. Melton, at 669. Minor's sworn testimony about the robbery meets the requirement. Because Minor failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that his guilty plea was invalid, the post-conviction court's denial of relief is not clearly erroneous.

III. Probation

Minor asserts that the trial court improperly imposed probation when it was not part of the written plea agreement that the court accepted. Once a trial court accepts a plea agreement, it is bound by its terms. IND.CODE § 35-35-3-3(e). The State argues that IND.CODE § 35-50-2-2(c) mandated imposition of probation notwithstanding the terms of the plea agreement. I.C. § 35-50-2-2(c) provides that whenever the court suspends a sentence for a felony, it shall place the person on probation.

Our supreme court has considered this issue in relation to the shock probation statute, IND.CODE § 35-38-1-17, formerly IND.CODE § 35-4.1-4-8. In Goldsmith v. Marion County Superior Court (1981), 275 Ind. 545, 552, 419 N.E.2d 109, 114, the trial court was foreclosed from granting shock probation because the guilty plea contained an express agreement to executed sentences. The Indiana...