Minot v. Stevens
| Decision Date | 13 February 1911 |
| Citation | 207 Mass. 588,93 N.E. 973 |
| Parties | MINOT et al. v. STEVENS, Treasurer and Receiver General. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Rackemann & Brewster, for appellants.
Dana Malone, Atty. Gen., and Fred T. Field, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
This case comes before us by reservation on an appeal from a decree of the probate court, instructing the trustees that a succession tax is due upon certain property, referred to in a deed of trust which conveyed the property to trustees who were to pay the income of it to Nancy Willing Wharton for her life, and, on her death, to convey it to such person or persons as she by her will, or by any instrument of appointment in the nature of a will, should devise or bequeath it to, or should order and appoint to receive it and, in default of such will or instrument of appointment, to convey it in fee to her heirs at law. Mrs. Wharton has deceased, leaving a will in which she expressly disclaimed any intention to exercise any power of appointment that she might have.
The respondent claims a succession tax upon the property under St. 1909, c. 527, § 8, the first part of which is as follows This statute was intended to cover certain cases where property passing into the possession of new owners was not previously subject to a tax upon the succession, and other cases where, with a possible construction of previous statutes, the property might be subject to a tax under them. It provides that the taxation shall be in the same manner as though the property belonged absolutely to the donee of the power, and had been bequeathed or devised by the donee by will. In this respect the provision is different from the construction that was given by this court to the previous statute in its application to the taxation of property passing under the execution of a power. Emmons v. Shaw, 171 Mass. 410, 50 N.E. 1033. The statute must be held to cover all cases that come within its terms, and to supersede all previous inconsistent legislation applicable to such cases.
The facts of the case before us are strictly within the language and purpose of the statute, and our decision must be governed by this enactment if it can be supported as constitutional.
It is contended that it calls for a taking of property without due process of law, because the persons who would take under a previously existing will or deed containing a power of appointment, if the power is not exercised, have a vested right in the property under the will or deed, such that their subsequent acquisition of it, in possession and enjoyment, is not a succession, and cannot be taxed as such.
It generally has been held that a title derived through a power of appointment in a will or deed is to be taken as coming from the donor of the power, rather than from the donee. But in many particulars the donee is often more directly responsible for the possession and enjoyment of the beneficiary than the donor. This is referred to in some of the cases from the English reports that are cited in Emmons v. Shaw, 171 Mass. 410-413, 50 N.E. 1033. In England it is expressly provided by statute that, in the case of a general power, the person executing the power shall be deemed to be the one from whom the estate is received. The reasonableness of this doctrine is also shown in the opinion in Chanler v. Kelsey, 205 U.S. 466, 27 S.Ct. 550, 51 L.Ed. 882.
The condition of property which is subject to a general power of appointment contained in a will or deed, and which, in default of appointment, is to be given over to persons named is peculiar. The donee of the power has no title to it, but he has an absolute right to dispose of it by the exercise of the power. If the power is to dispose of it by an instrument in the nature of a will signed by three witnesses, as was the fact in this case, if he exercises the power the property becomes a part of his estate for administration after his...
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