Miranda C. v. Nissan Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 27 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. 5106.,5106.
• Citation: 741 S.E.2d 34,402 S.C. 577
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: MIRANDA C., a minor under the age of fourteen (14) years, by her Guardian ad Litem, Susan Renee Courtney, Respondent/Appellant, v. NISSAN MOTOR CO., LTD. and Nissan North America, Inc., Appellants/Respondents. Appellate Case No. 2011–190226.

402 S.C. 577

741 S.E.2d 34

MIRANDA C., a minor under the age of fourteen (14) years, by her Guardian ad Litem, Susan Renee Courtney, Respondent/Appellant,

v. NISSAN MOTOR CO., LTD. and Nissan North America, Inc., Appellants/Respondents.Appellate Case No. 2011–190226.

No. 5106.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard Sept. 12, 2012.

Decided March 27, 2013.

C. Mitchell Brown, William C. Wood, Jr., and Brian P. Crotty, of Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP, and Joel H. Smith, Courtney C. Shytle, Angela G. Strickland, and Kevin J. Malloy, of Bowman and Brooke, LLP, all of Columbia; for Appellants/Respondents.

John S. Nichols, of Bluestein, Nichols, Thompson and Delgado, LLC, of Columbia; Ronnie Crosby and Mark C. Ball, of Peters, Murdaugh, Parker, Eltzroth and Detrick, PA, of Hampton; and Rodney C. Jernigan, Jr., of Jernigan Law Firm, PA, of Florence; for Respondent/Appellant.

WILLIAMS, J.

In this defective-design products liability action, Appellants/Respondents Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. and Nissan North America, Inc. (collectively, Nissan) appeal the circuit court's denial of its post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) based on Respondent/Appellant Miranda C.'s (Miranda) failure to prove a feasible alternative design as required by Branham v. Ford Motor Company, 390 S.C. 203, 701 S.E.2d 5 (2010). On cross-appeal, Miranda argues the circuit court erred in granting Nissan's alternative request for a new trial. In addition, Miranda claims the circuit court erred in denying her motion to invalidate a special interrogatory, in which the jury found Miranda failed to prove a feasible alternative design in her case against Nissan. We affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This defective-design products liability action comes before this court after a Florence County jury rendered a verdict against Nissan for $2,375,000, which was subsequently set aside by the circuit court in the wake of the supreme court's ruling in Branham v. Ford Motor Company, 390 S.C. 203, 701 S.E.2d 5 (2010). In setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial, the circuit court found its failure to charge the jury on the necessity of proving a feasible alternative design was reversible error. The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of this appeal.

On the morning of February 11, 2007, nine-year-old Miranda was riding in the back seat of her parents' 2000 Nissan Xterra (Xterra). As her father attempted to make a left turn into their church parking lot, the Xterra was struck by an oncoming vehicle on the right rear passenger side. Upon impact, one of the body frame mount brackets punctured the fuel tank, resulting in a fire that caused injuries to Miranda and her mother.

As a result of Miranda's injuries, her mother filed suit on her behalf against Nissan alleging strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty. In her complaint, Miranda alleged Nissan was liable “in failing to design and build the 2000 Nissan Xterra XE with sufficient body integrity and structure to protect the fuel system in a reasonably foreseeable collision thereby exposing raw gasoline to ignition sources” and for “failure to use reasonable care to design a crashworthy vehicle.”

Following extensive discovery, the parties tried the case over the course of nine days. During trial, the circuit court and the parties discussed whether Miranda was required to prove the existence of a feasible alternative design. Despite Miranda's contention that such proof was not required, two experts testified extensively on her behalf regarding their proposed alternative designs. In response, Nissan attempted to discredit Miranda's experts' theories by proving their designs were nothing more than “ideas” or “concepts” that had yet to be tested and proven.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the circuit court denied Nissan's request to charge the jury on the necessity of establishing a feasible alternative design as a requisite element of Miranda's case. The parties and the circuit court agreed to submit seven special interrogatories to the jury. The interrogatories included six special interrogatories regarding whether Miranda had proven strict liability and negligence, and if so, the amount of damages Miranda was entitled to for her injuries. The seventh interrogatory ¹ pertained to whether Miranda had proven a feasible alternative design that would have prevented her injuries. Nissan requested the seventh interrogatory be submitted with the other interrogatories.

The circuit court denied Nissan's request, stating,

I think the best way to do it is ... to ask them to answer the interrogatory with regard to the alternative design after the fact.... It keeps them from debating about something that's not a necessary element for recovery, and they could get it confused. So I think that it's a good idea to do that, for judicial economy and it gives the appellate courts more information to rule on it without remanding it for another trial.

Despite Nissan's objection that the jury “might not be happy with [them] at that point,” the circuit court concluded proof of a feasible alternative design was not required; therefore, the interrogatory would not be submitted before the verdict was rendered. Miranda's counsel reiterated the circuit court's ruling in his closing when counsel stated, “And then the last question after you've signed [the verdict form] is just a question—really, it doesn't have anything to do with the front side. But it's a question about whether or not the plaintiff had proven a feasible alternative design, essentially, something that could have prevented that.”

During the circuit court's general charge to the jury on what a plaintiff must prove in a design defect case, it did not differentiate between the consumer expectations test and the risk-utility test. The court did, however, charge the jury under both tests.² In charging the jury, the circuit court did not include the necessity of proving a feasible design alternative pursuant to the risk-utility test based on its conclusion that feasible alternative design was not a required element of proof in a design defect case.

Prior to sending the jury out for deliberations, the circuit court informed the jury it would be answering one additional interrogatory after the verdict was returned that was irrelevant to the deliberations of the case and to the verdict. After three and a half hours of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict for $2,375,000 against Nissan. After individually polling the jury members, the circuit court stated,

I'm once again going to have to ask you to assist us in one regard and to answer this interrogatory which says, has the plaintiff prove[n] by [a] preponderance of the evidence that a safer, feasible alternative design was available at the time the 2000 Nissan Xterra was manufactured and such design would have prevented the plaintiff's injuries. Just answer that simply yes or no. And it has to be unanimous.

Neither party objected to the content of the interrogatory or the extent of the court's instructions. After three minutes, the jury returned to the courtroom. The jury responded “no.” The circuit court then excused the jury and granted the parties ten days to file post-trial motions.

Nissan submitted a post-trial motion requesting the circuit court grant it JNOV pursuant to Rule 50(b), SCRCP, or in the alternative, a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a), SCRCP. Miranda also submitted a post-trial motion requesting the circuit court disregard the jury's response to the seventh interrogatory on the grounds that it was submitted after the jury returned its verdict and was not accompanied by sufficient instructions on what constituted a feasible alternative design.

The circuit court held a hearing on August 13, 2010, and orally denied both parties' motions. Three days later, the supreme court issued its decision in Branham, wherein the supreme court concluded “the exclusive test in a products liability design case is the risk-utility test with its requirement of showing a feasible alternative design.” 390 S.C. at 220, 701 S.E.2d at 14. After receiving supplemental briefs as to the effect of Branham on the circuit court's ruling, the circuit court held a second hearing on January 4, 2011.

After hearing from both parties, the circuit court denied Nissan's motion for JNOV but granted Nissan's motion for a new trial. The circuit court acknowledged Branham's declaration that the risk-utility test, which requires proof of a feasible alternative design, was the sole test for a defective-design products liability case. The circuit court applied Branham retroactively based on its conclusion that the supreme court's decision merely recognized a new remedy to vindicate existing rights. As a result, the circuit court issued an order, in which it concluded its decision not to charge the jury on proof of a feasible alternative design was reversible error and required the grant of a new trial. Both parties appealed to this court.

LAW/ANALYSIS

In its appeal, Nissan claims that because proof of a feasible alternative design is a required element in a design defect case, the circuit court erred when it denied its motion for JNOV after the jury found that Miranda failed to prove a feasible alternative design. In her cross-appeal, Miranda claims the circuit court erred in refusing to invalidate the post-verdict interrogatory finding she had not proven a feasible alternative design. In addition, Miranda avers the circuit court improperly granted Nissan a new trial because the verdict was rendered pursuant to the consumer expectations test, which was the law in South Carolina at the time of trial. Moreover, she claims the circuit court charged the jury under both the consumer expectations test and the risk-utility test without objection; therefore, the two-issue rule and law of the case permit the jury verdict to stand. We address each argument in turn.

A. ...