Miranda v. People
| Decision Date | 17 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 10PDJ097.,10PDJ097. |
| Citation | 276 P.3d 122 |
| Parties | Michael T. MIRANDA, Petitioner v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Attorney Regulation. Following a reinstatement hearing, a Hearing Board granted Michael T. Miranda (Attorney Registration Number 24702) reinstatement to the practice of law in the State of Colorado pursuant to C.R.C.P. 251.29. Miranda drove his car while intoxicated, causing the death of Kristopher Mansfield, a United States Air Force veteran who had just returned from a tour of duty in Iraq. Miranda was convicted of vehicular homicide/DUI and sentenced to eight years' incarceration, followed by five years of mandatory parole. In 2007, Miranda's law license was also suspended for two years. The Hearing Board concluded that reinstatement is appropriate because Miranda, who is now serving his parole sentence, has proved by clear and convincing evidence his rehabilitation, his fitness to practice law, and his full compliance with all applicable disciplinary orders.On February 6 and 7, 2012, a Hearing Board composed of EDWIN S. KAHN and PAUL J. WILLUMSTAD, members of the bar, and WILLIAM R. LUCERO, the Presiding Disciplinary Judge (“the PDJ”), held a reinstatement hearing pursuant to C.R.C.P. 251.29(d) and 251.18. David C. Japha represented Michael T. Miranda (“Petitioner”), and April M. McMurrey appeared on behalf of the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel (“the People”). The Hearing Board now issues the following “Opinion and Decision Granting Reinstatement Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 251.29.”
On September 4, 2004, Petitioner drove his car while intoxicated, causing the death of Kristopher Mansfield, a United States Air Force veteran who had just returned from a tour of duty in Iraq. Petitioner was convicted of vehicular homicide/DUI and sentenced to eight years' incarceration, followed by five years of mandatory parole. His law license was also suspended for two years. Petitioner, who is now serving his parole sentence, has petitioned for reinstatement to the bar. Petitioner has proved by clear and convincing evidence his rehabilitation, his fitness to practice law, and his full compliance with all applicable disciplinary orders, and the Hearing Board thus concludes Petitioner's law license should be reinstated immediately.
Petitioner took the oath of admission and was admitted to the bar of the Colorado Supreme Court on October 14, 1994, under attorney registration number 24702. On April 14, 2006, the Colorado Supreme Court immediately suspended Petitioner from the practice of law without objection. A hearing board later suspended Petitioner from the practice of law for two years, effective August 10, 2007.
On September 17, 2010, more than three years after the effective date of his two-year suspension but while he was still in the custodyof the Department of Corrections, Petitioner filed with the PDJ a “Petition for Order of Reinstatement Pursuant to Rule 251.29, C.R.C.P.” The People filed a motion to dismiss the petition on October 5, 2010, arguing that pursuant to C.R.S. § 18–1.3–401(3), Petitioner was not entitled to practice law while in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Petitioner filed a response to the People's motion on October 25, 2010.1 On December 6, 2010, the PDJ denied the People's motion.
Petitioner was released from community corrections2 on intensive supervised probation in March 2011. On November 30, 2011, Petitioner's sentence to confinement, incarceration, and probation was discharged, he was released from the custody of the Department of Corrections, and he was placed on mandatory parole under the supervision of the parole board. Based on his status as a parolee, Petitioner filed a motion in limine seeking to prohibit the People from arguing in the reinstatement hearing that he is legislatively barred from practicing law by operation of C.R.S. § 18–1.3–401(3). The PDJ granted Petitioner's motion but allowed the People to argue that Petitioner should not be reinstated because he is currently serving a parole sentence. The PDJ then denied another of Petitioner's motions in limine, filed February 3, 2012, to prohibit introduction of certain exhibits and testimony.
During the reinstatement hearing, the Hearing Board heard testimony from Petitioner, R.J. Driscoll, Dr. David Wahl, Jessica Lee, Emily Tompkins, Juliann Legg, and Craig Mansfield, and the PDJ admitted Petitioner's exhibits 1–17 3 and the People's exhibits A–C.
In the early evening of September 4, 2004, Petitioner was driving his car northbound on South Colorado Boulevard, having traveled from his sister-in-law's house, where he had spent the afternoon alone watching a football game and consuming the equivalent of several gin and tonics.4 When he decided to stop at a local grocery store on his way home, he turned left toward the store's parking lot and in front of oncoming traffic in the southbound lanes. As he executed the turn, a southbound motorcycle collided with the rear right panel of Petitioner's vehicle. The motorcycle was driven by Kristopher Mansfield (“Mansfield”), a twenty-three year-old senior airman with the United States Air Force who had recently returned from a tour of duty in Iraq.
After the impact, Petitioner pulled his vehicle into the parking lot out of the way of oncoming traffic, and then returned to check on Mansfield, supine in the roadway. Petitioner left Mansfield's side ten minutes later, when other people arrived to provide care, and was soon thereafter arrested at the scene. Denver police tested Petitioner's blood alcohol level from a blood sample. An initial test indicated Petitioner's blood alcohol content was 0.217, and a second test showed a blood alcohol content of 0.198.5 Upon Petitioner's arrest, a restraining order was entered, prohibiting him from contacting Mansfield or his relatives.6
Mansfield was taken to Denver Health Medical Center and was later pronounced dead at 4:45 p.m. on September 6, 2004. Of this awful tragedy Petitioner recalled,
Petitioner testified that since September 4, 2004, he has abstained from consuming alcohol. Between October 2004 and September 2005, Petitioner sought treatment at Arapahoe House, an alcohol rehabilitation program, for anxiety, depressed mood, and feelings of guilt, remorse, and grief.7 His treatment there included education about substance abuse, relapse and recidivism, and stress management.8 Petitioner also joined Colorado Lawyers Helping Lawyers (“CLHL”), a peer support group for attorneys who experience problems with alcohol or substance abuse or suffer from mental health problems. Through CLHL, Petitioner was referred to Peer Assistance Services, Inc., where he received additional treatment beginning in February 2005.9 During this period, Petitioner wound down his law practice, choosing not to accept new cases for fear he would not be able to complete work on those matters prior to conclusion of his own criminal case.10
On September 29, 2005, Petitioner entered a guilty plea to vehicular homicide/DUI, a class three felony, in violation of C.R.S. § 18–3–106(1)(b)(I).11 On December 2, 2005, he was sentenced to eight years in the custody of the Department of Corrections and five years of mandatory parole.12 He was taken into custody the same day.
Petitioner was soon transferred from the Denver County Jail to Sterling Correctional Facility, where he was housed in a minimum security area from December 2005 through February 2008. He was assigned a forty-hour-a-week job teaching inmates who were studying for GED tests, and he volunteered one or two nights a week as a reading and writing tutor for inmates who were not proficient in English. On weekends, he assisted other inmates with their studies. Petitioner also regularly attended Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”) meetings.
During Petitioner's time at Sterling, his lawyer settled a suit brought against Petitioner by Mansfield's family for $1,000.000.00,13 which subsumed a restitution order of $20,866.20 in Petitioner's criminal case. 14 Also around this time, the Colorado Supreme Court immediately suspended Respondent from the practice of law. The People then initiated the disciplinary case underlying this matter. After the PDJ granted the People's motion for judgment on the pleadings, a hearing board suspended Petitioner from the practice of law for two years, effective August 10, 2007. Petitioner appealed the sanction and sued for malpractice against the attorney who represented him in his disciplinary proceeding; as he explained, he believed he was required to appeal his disciplinary case if his professional negligence suit were to go forward. The case against his former counsel was ultimately dismissed.
In February 2008, Petitioner's application for placement in community corrections was denied, so he volunteered for transfer to the Cheyenne Mountain Reentry Center on the advice of his caseworker. On arrival, Petitioner found the facility chaotic and dangerous; he inured himself to these conditions by volunteering to work in the law library and attending AA and Narcotics Anonymous meetings almost every night.15 As he recalled,the meetings represented a “refuge” and an “escape from the chaos” of the center, but he also hoped the parole board would look at his attendance at these meetings as an indication that he was committed to change.
Following his transfer to Cheyenne Mountain Reentry Center, Petitioner initiated a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Miranda
...that Miranda's parole conditions would “create some practical impediments to running an efficient legal practice.” Miranda v. People, 276 P.3d 122, 129 (Colo.O.P.D.J.2012). For example,the prohibition against driving and the requirement that Petitioner seek permission to travel outside the ......