In re Miranda
| Decision Date | 27 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 12SA112.,12SA112. |
| Citation | 2012 CO 69,289 P.3d 957 |
| Parties | In the Matter of Michael T. MIRANDA. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel, Charles E. Mortimer, Jr., Deputy Regulation Counsel, April M. McMurrey, Assistant Regulation Counsel, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Respondent–Appellant.
Michael T. Miranda, Denver, Colorado, pro se.
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶ 1 In this appeal, Attorney Regulation Counsel challenges the Hearing Board's order FN1
reinstating Michael T. Miranda to the practice of law. FN2 Miranda is currently serving the mandatory parole portion of his felony criminal sentence. The Hearing Board nevertheless determined that he is fit to practice law and reinstated him to practice. We disagree. Pursuant to section 18–1.3–401(3), C.R.S. (2012), and C.R.C.P. 251.29, we hold that Miranda cannot be reinstated to practice law until he has completed his felony sentence. Accordingly, we reverse the Hearing Board's order.
¶ 2 On the evening of September 4, 2004, Miranda turned his vehicle left into a parking lot out of a northbound lane of South Colorado Boulevard, colliding with a southbound motorcyclist, who died two days later from his injuries. Blood tests carried out subsequent to Miranda's arrest revealed his blood alcohol content at the time of the accident was approximately twice the legal limit.
¶ 3 Miranda entered a guilty plea to vehicular homicide/DUI, a class three felony under section 18–3–106(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2012)
, on September 29, 2005. On December 2, 2005, the trial court sentenced Miranda to the Department of Corrections for eight years followed by five years of mandatory parole. We placed Miranda under immediate suspension from the practice of law on April 14, 2006, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 251.8.FN3 On July 10, 2007, the Hearing Board imposed a two-year suspension (effective August 10, 2007), concluding that public censure was “an insufficient sanction for a lawyer who cause[d] the death of another while operating a vehicle after knowingly consuming alcohol to excess.” People v. Miranda, 168 P.3d 11, 13 (Colo.O.P.D.J.2007).
¶ 4 On September 17, 2010, Miranda filed a petition for reinstatement of his license to practice law pursuant to C.R.C.P. 251.29
. At that time, he was still incarcerated.FN4 On October 5, 2010, Attorney Regulation Counsel filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the basis that section 18–1.3–401(3) barred reinstatement while Miranda remained in the custody of the Department of Corrections. The Presiding Disciplinary Judge (PDJ) denied this motion and initially scheduled a reinstatement hearing for November 1–2, 2011. On November 30, 2011, the parole board allowed Miranda to begin serving his mandatory parole, which is slated to end November 20, 2016.
the prohibition against driving and the requirement that Petitioner seek permission to travel outside the Denver metropolitan area will force him to limit his case load and carefully plan his schedule. Even more significant, the proscription against associating with those who have been charged with criminal conduct may raise client conflict issues that cannot be waived.
Nonetheless, the Hearing Board concluded that, “rather than rejecting outright Petitioner's bid for reinstatement[,] ... the better practice is to [put in] place conditions ... designed to protect the public.” Id. Accordingly, the Board conditioned Miranda's reinstatement on his compliance with the following seven requirements:
A.) Petitioner shall successfully complete all conditions of his parole. Petitioner has the duty to notify the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel within forty-eight hours if he violates any condition of his parole....
B.) Petitioner shall abstain from using alcohol or any other [non-prescription] mood-altering substance ... until his parole sentence is discharged. Petitioner has the duty to notify the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel within forty-eight hours of any [such] use....
C.) Until Petitioner's parole sentence is discharged, he shall fully disclose in writing and discuss with all prospective clients his status as parolee and shall, upon the formation of any attorney-client relationships, obtain written informed consent from such clients confirming that he disclosed his status as parolee. Petitioner shall provide written confirmation of compliance with this condition on a quarterly basis....
D.) ... Petitioner shall attend monthly counseling with a psychiatrist or a psychologist (“doctor”) who is pre-approved by the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel ... until Petitioner's parole sentence is discharged, unless the doctor reports in writing ... that such counseling is no longer required or can be modified or reduced. Petitioner shall execute an authorization for release, requiring the doctor to notify the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel if Petitioner fails to participate in this required counseling, or if the doctor reasonably believes that Petitioner has failed to abstain from the use of alcohol or any other [non-prescription] mood-altering substance....
E.) Petitioner shall attend AA meetings at least once a month until his parole sentence is discharged. Petitioner shall provide written confirmation of compliance ... on a quarterly basis....
F.) Petitioner shall consult monthly with a peer mentor selected by the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel in conjunction with Petitioner ... until Petitioner's parole sentence is discharged, unless the peer mentor and the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel jointly determine that such mentoring is no longer required or can be modified or reduced. Petitioner shall execute an authorization for release, requiring the mentor to notify the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel if Petitioner fails to participate in this required mentoring, or if the mentor reasonably believes that Petitioner has failed to abstain from the use of alcohol or any other [non-prescription] mood-altering substance.... Petitioner shall provide written confirmation of compliance with this condition on a quarterly basis....
G.) Petitioner shall engage in fifty hours of community education and outreach by December 31, 2013, through public speaking or other volunteer opportunities to increase community awareness about the harms associated with excessive alcohol consumption and drunk driving. Such engagements must be pre-approved by the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel.
¶ 6 By nature, condition “A” is a compound condition, comprised of the nine standard and nine “additional” conditions set forth in Miranda's parole order/agreement, as well as the twenty-plus directives dictated by his parole officer. These include confinement to the Denver metropolitan area and a requirement that Miranda submit the name and date of birth of any person he would like to associate with (including by phone, mail, or email correspondence) to his parole officer in order to fulfill the mandate that he request and receive permission prior to associating with anyone with a criminal history (encompassing felonies, misdemeanors, and municipal code violations).
¶ 7 Attorney Regulation Counsel appealed Miranda's reinstatement.
¶ 8 Pursuant to section 18–1.3–401(3)
and C.R.C.P. 251.29, we hold that Miranda cannot be reinstated to practice law until he has completed his felony sentence. Accordingly, we reverse the Hearing Board's order.
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¶ 9 As with any appeal, we review questions of law de novo. See C.R.C.P. 251.27(b); In re Haines, 177 P.3d 1239, 1245 (Colo.2008). Whether or not an applicant for reinstatement's parolee status precludes reinstatement to the Colorado Bar is a question of law. In construing a statute, we ascertain and effectuate the General Assembly's intent. See Associated Gov'ts of Nw. Colo. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 2012 CO 28, ¶ 11, 275 P.3d 646, 649. We apply the plain meaning of the statutory language, give consistent effect to all parts of a statute, and construe each provision in harmony with the overall statutory design. Id. at ¶ 11, 275 P.3d at 649. If the statutory language is ambiguous, we employ additional tools of statutory construction. Id. at ¶ 11, 275 P.3d at 649. We avoid interpretations that would produce absurd results. S. Ute Indian Tribe v. King Consol. Ditch Co., 250 P.3d 1226, 1233 (Colo.2011).
of the Colorado Criminal Code provides:
Every person convicted of a felony, whether defined as such within or outside this code, shall be disqualified from holding any office of honor, trust, or profit under the laws of this state or from practicing as an attorney in any of the courts of this state during the actual time of confinement or commitment to imprisonment or release from actual confinement on conditions of...
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