Miranda v. Sims
| Decision Date | 18 January 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 42814-4-I.,42814-4-I. |
| Parties | Yolanda MIRANDA and Dessiree Price, Appellants, v. Ronald C. SIMS, King County Executive; The Honorable Mark C. Chow, King County District Court Judge Sitting as Presiding Officer over inquest; King County District Court; and Norm Maleng, King County Prosecuting Attorney, Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Theodore F. Spearman, Bainbridge Island, for Appellants on appeal.
Thomas William Kuffel, Sr. Deputy Prosecuting Atty., Jeffrey Allen Richard, Deputy Prosecuting Atty., Seattle, for Respondents on appeal.
Yolanda Miranda, the mother of Robert Wayne Guy Jr. and Dessiree Price, the mother and guardian of Guy's son, appeal a superior court ruling denying them reimbursement for attorney fees and costs for their participation in an inquest into Guy's death while in police custody. In King County, family members of the deceased have a right to participate in inquest proceedings but are not entitled to counsel at public expense. Guy's family members are indigent and argue that appointed counsel is necessary to protect their right to participate in the inquest. They further argue that the denial of counsel at public expense violates their right to equal protection under the state and federal constitutions. We conclude that the family has no constitutional right to representation in such proceedings and that this conclusion is not affected by the County's provision of representation for its agents and employees. Therefore, we affirm.
On December 27, 1997, the King County police stopped Robert Wayne Guy Jr. for speeding and discovered various outstanding warrants. Guy was arrested on misdemeanor charges and taken to the county jail. On December 29, Guy began to act out and threw himself head first against a cement wall. Jail personnel handcuffed Guy and placed him in restraints. When Guy became suddenly quiet, the jail contacted its medical staff and all restraints were removed. Guy went into a coma and was transported to Harborview Medical Center, where he died five days later. The autopsy report indicated that Guy had cocaine in his system and had sustained a heart attack. Because Guy had been in police custody, the prosecuting attorney's office requested the County Executive, Ron Sims, to convene an inquest into his death. On February 10, 1998, Sims ordered an inquest and requested that a district court judge be assigned to conduct the proceedings. District Court Judge Mark Chow was assigned.
Under the King County Code, the County Executive has the authority to conduct inquests. KCC 2.24.110(A). Executive order PHL 7-1(AEP) sets forth procedures that permit family members of the deceased to participate in inquest proceedings but does not provide for their representation at public expense.1 Guy's family is indigent and sought reimbursement for their attorney fees and the costs for their participation, which was denied. County employees, however, including correction officers and health services workers, were represented by attorneys who were paid by the County.
The family filed a declaratory judgment action in superior court challenging the constitutionality of the County's policies and seeking to prevent the inquest from proceeding unless they received reimbursement for their expenses. Counsel for the family submitted a declaration indicating that he was not able to perform a substantial amount of document review, discovery, and investigation required to prepare for the proceeding, including numerous interviews and toxicological and pathological consultations. The court denied the family's motion for an injunction and dissolved a temporary restraining order staying the inquest. A panel of this court denied emergency relief from the order. Because the inquest was proceeding with the participation of the family's counsel, the Supreme Court determined that injunctive relief was not necessary and denied review. On November 20, 1998, the inquest jury returned a verdict finding that County personnel were not responsible for Guy's death.
Guy's family appealed the Superior Court order denying their motion for a preliminary injunction. The family also moved to supplement the record with additional evidence, including two declarations from their attorney. The declarations indicate that the family incurred approximately $64,000 for legal services and $4,982.65 in costs for their participation in the inquest. Counsel also states in the declarations that after the inquest jury returned its verdict, he learned that some of the testimony presented was not true and that the prosecutor's office has since reopened its investigation into Guy's death. We grant the motion to supplement. But after considering the declarations, we find that the additional information is not germane to our analysis of the issues presented in this appeal.
Guy's family first contends that the County's denial of funds for their representation conflicts with their constitutional right of access to the courts, citing Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 117 Wash.2d 772, 819 P.2d 370 (1991). In Puget Sound, the court affirmed a discovery ruling that required the blood center to disclose who had donated the contaminated blood that the plaintiff had received. The court based its decision, in part, on the plaintiff's substantial right to be indemnified for his injuries and his right of access to the courts under article 1, section 10 of our state constitution. See Puget Sound, 117 Wash.2d at 782-83,
819 P.2d 370. The civil litigant's right of access, however, has never been construed by our courts to provide a right to counsel at public expense in every proceeding. Rather, our courts have limited the right to appointed counsel in civil cases to proceedings where the litigant's physical liberty is threatened or where a fundamental liberty interest, similar to the parent-child relationship, is at risk. In re Dependency of Grove, 127 Wash.2d 221, 237, 897 P.2d 1252 (1995).
882 P.2d 173. Nevertheless, our courts have repeatedly rejected the argument that an inquest is equivalent to a trial.
Guy's family, however, argues that appointed counsel is necessary to ensure that their interests are represented and that their right to participate in the inquest is meaningful. But contrary to the family's assertions, the family's interest in a fair proceeding, as well as the public's interest in a neutral inquiry into the County's responsibility for the death, are represented under the statutory scheme. The statutes contemplate a fair and objective inquiry. As stated above, the purpose of an inquest is to obtain an objective, nonpartisan, and independent opinion on the cause of death and the circumstances surrounding the death. Carrick, 125 Wash.2d at 143, 882 P.2d 173 (citing RCW 36.24.020 and RCW 36.24.040). To this end, the coroner must examine all individuals who have, in the coroner or jury's opinion, "any knowledge of the facts." See RCW 36.24.050; Carrick, 125 Wash.2d at 144 n. 9, 882 P.2d 173. In the instant case, the prosecutor's office, which is charged by law to determine if a crime has been committed, also participated in the inquest. For these reasons, we reject the family's argument that appointed counsel is constitutionally required to protect their interests and right to participate in the inquest.
Guy's family next contends that the County's provision of counsel for the other participants in the proceedings violates their right to equal protection under the state and federal constitutions. The family contends that the County policy denying indigent representation in inquest proceedings creates, in effect, two classes of participants: indigent family members of the deceased and indigent County employees.
Guy's family contends that article 1, section 12 of our state constitution provides greater protection in the context of such proceedings, but failed to present an analysis applying the criteria set forth in State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808, 76 A.L.R.4th 517 (1986) until their reply brief. The respondents moved to strike the Gunwall analysis, arguing that it was not presented in a timely manner. In light of our disposition of this issue, we conclude that there is no need for responsive briefing and deny the motion to strike.
In Gunwall, the court set forth six "nonexclusive neutral criteria" to direct the application of an independent state constitutional analysis in a given situation. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d at 61-62,720 P.2d 808. They are: (1) the text of the state constitution; (2) significant differences in the texts of the federal and state constitutions; (3) state constitutional and common law history; (4) preexisting state law; (5) differences in structure between the federal and state constitutions; and (6) matters of particular state interest or local concern. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d at 61-62,720 P.2d 808.
The first and second Gunwall criteria focus on the text of the state provision and its comparison with parallel...
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