Misek-Falkoff v. IBM

• Decision Date: 25 August 1993
• Docket Number: No. 89 CIV. 6269 (VLB).,89 CIV. 6269 (VLB).
• Citation: 829 F. Supp. 660
• Parties: Linda D. MISEK-FALKOFF and Adin Falkoff, Plaintiffs, v. INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

829 F. Supp. 660

Linda D. MISEK-FALKOFF and Adin Falkoff, Plaintiffs, v. INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION, Defendant.

No. 89 CIV. 6269 (VLB).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

August 25, 1993.

William D. Frumkin, Donald Sapir, White Plains, NY, for moving attorney.

William Weber, Hauppauge, NY, for plaintiffs.

M. William Munno, Michael Enright, Seward & Kissel, New York City, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

VINCENT L. BRODERICK, District Judge.

I

This suit, initiated in 1989, alleges handicap discrimination by an employer under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., and is possibly subject to the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.

A motion to withdraw as counsel was filed by plaintiffs' attorney (the "moving attorney"). Before the motion was fully submitted, the plaintiffs retained new counsel. The moving attorney and plaintiff executed a stipulation substituting new counsel for the moving attorney, which stipulation was "so ordered" by me on August 2, 1993.

The pending motion presents questions as to procedures applicable with respect to withdrawing counsel in federal question cases where a critical point in the pretrial phase of the litigation has been reached and where federal fee-shifting statutes are involved.

The moving attorney seeks a charging lien against any proceeds arising from judgment or settlement in the action, and a retaining lien on the clients' files.¹ He also requests reconsideration of that portion of an order dated June 9, 1993 which provided that determination of his attorney's fees would be postponed until resolution of the case; he seeks a summary determination of fees and expenses on an expedited basis.

I grant the moving attorney's request for reconsideration with respect to the June 9, 1993 order, and I modify that order to the extent that I refer this matter to United States Magistrate Judge Mark D. Fox for a report and recommendation as to the amount, if any, of attorney's fees and disbursements due to the moving attorney (see part V below). The matter is to be considered by Magistrate Judge Fox only after defendant's motion for summary judgment has been fully submitted.²

I deny the application for a retaining lien. The moving attorney is directed promptly to transfer the files in this case to plaintiffs' present counsel. I do not require that plaintiffs post a bond, for the reasons discussed in part IV below.

In light of the delay resulting from the withdrawal and substitution of counsel, plaintiffs' sur-reply with respect to the summary judgment motion is to be filed by October 22, 1993.³

II

The complaint in this case was filed in September 1989 with the moving attorney as plaintiffs' counsel of record. Some six months later, plaintiffs consented to substitution as their counsel of an attorney who left the moving attorney's law firm. The second counsel was relieved as plaintiffs' counsel 13 months later by consent, and the moving attorney once again was retained by plaintiffs. He was permitted to withdraw upon my approval of the most recent stipulated substitution of counsel earlier this month.

A dispute over fees and disbursements arose between plaintiffs and their second attorney at the time she was relieved in early April 1991. I referred that controversy to a special master. The litigation at that time was in the early stages of discovery and the parties were engaged in efforts to achieve settlement of the case. On July 23, 1991 I approved a resolution of the controversy between plaintiffs and their second attorney.

Following payment of the agreed-upon sum to the second attorney, which was far less than the amount now asserted to be due by the moving attorney, the second attorney turned the file over to the moving attorney.⁴ Plaintiffs' new counsel, who is also representing the plaintiffs in pending state litigation with respect to which a trial has been scheduled in early October, has indicated that materials in the federal case file are necessary to prepare for the state litigation as well as to proceed in the federal case.

In this four-year-old litigation, discovery has been completed. It involved over 33 deposition days and production of approximately 6,000 pages of documents. A summary judgment motion has been filed by the defendants and awaits only a sur-reply by plaintiffs which I have authorized. Extensive negotiations have been pursued including efforts to devise a settlement that would incorporate all outstanding litigation between the parties.

The moving attorney and the plaintiffs dispute both the nature of their fee arrangement and the amounts due. The plaintiffs oppose an early determination of fees, claiming a need to apply their time and money to the pending federal and state litigation, and they seek an extension of time to submit their sur-reply with respect to defendant's motion for summary judgment.

III

A federal court "`may, in its discretion, exercise ancillary jurisdiction to hear fee disputes ... between litigants and their attorneys when the dispute relates to the main action...'" Chesley v. Union Carbide Corp., 927 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir.1991), quoting Cluett, Peabody & Co. v. CPC Acquisition Co., 863 F.2d 251, 256 (2d Cir.1988) (citations omitted); see 28 U.S.C. § 1367; Jenkins v. Weinshienk, 670 F.2d 915, 918 (10th Cir 1982).

Litigation between parties and their counsel may be considered peripheral in diversity and certain federal question cases. In suits arising from federal claims where a federal fee-shifting statute in involved, the matter of attorney's fees becomes part of an inextricable whole.

This case does involve a fee-shifting statute. The Rehabilitation Act provides in 29 U.S.C. § 794a that "in any action or proceeding to enforce or charge a violation of a provision of this subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." See parallel provision in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12205.

Under New York law the moving attorney would have a charging lien⁵ against any recovery or settlement if the fee has not yet been paid for his services and disbursements, see People v. Keeffe, 50 N.Y.2d 149, 428 N.Y.S.2d 446, 448, 405 N.E.2d 1012, 1014 (1980), unless the magistrate judge decides that the attorney withdrew without good and sufficient cause, see Marrero v. Christiano, 575 F.Supp. 837, 839 (1983); Holmes v. Y.J.A. Realty Corp. v. Goldman, 128 A.D.2d 482, 513 N.Y.S.2d 415, 416 (1st Dep't 1987).

While in the normal case I would defer determination of the fees and disbursements due the moving attorney until the resolution of the main case to avoid injecting side issues, see, e.g., Gale v. Stallone, 1992 WL 73476 (S.D.N.Y. Keenan, J.), I depart from that approach here. In deciding to depart I have considered the length of time that the moving attorney has represented the plaintiffs, and the correspondingly large fee and disbursements that may be at issue.

IV

A retaining lien under New York common law entitles an attorney who has rendered services or made disbursements on behalf of a client to retain, as security for payment, the client's papers and funds which are in the attorney's possession. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Elman, 949 F.2d 624, 626 (2d Cir.1991), citing People v. Keeffe, 50 N.Y.2d 149, 428 N.Y.S.2d 446, 449, 405 N.E.2d 1012, 1015 (1985).

Authorizing a retaining lien in this case would entail undue delay of the litigation. Such delay would prolong the adjudication of the merits of the plaintiffs' discrimination claim, and thus I must consider the application of federal law in this federal question case, and the objectives of Fed.R.Civ.P. 1 applicable to all cases brought in federal court.

Although New York provides special circumstances under which a court may order the transfer of case files without payment or a bond, see Jenkins v. Weinshienk, 670 F.2d 915, 919-20 (10th Cir.1982) (citing New York case law); Rosen v. Rosen, 97 A.D.2d 837, 468 N.Y.S.2d 723 (2d Dep't 1983), I do not reach state law grounds in deciding on the availability vel non of a retaining lien.

The nature and extent of an attorney's lien is controlled — certainly in a federal question case, and perhaps in all cases in federal court — by federal law. Pomerantz v. Schandler, 704 F.2d 681, 682 (2d Cir.1983) (per curiam), citing National Equipment Rental Ltd. v. Mercury Typesetting Co., 323 F.2d 784, 786 n. 1 (2d Cir.1963). The purposes of the relevant federal statute should prevail even if a departure from what state law might otherwise provide is necessary, as Resolution Trust Corp. v. Elman, 949 F.2d 624, 627 (2d Cir.1991), makes clear. In Elman, the court determined that the right of a law firm to retain files where a retaining lien might be permissible under state law could be altered where "a federal statute ... superimposes a new arrangement over the state law scheme," id. at 627 (involving the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989).

In fashioning remedies for disputes arising in the course of federal litigation between attorneys and their clients, a federal court may determine whether assertion of a retaining lien is "in such conflict with important principles that it must be relinquished when balanced against considerations of public policy." Jenkins v. Weinshienk, 670 F.2d 915, 919 (10th Cir.1982); see Elman, 949 F.2d at 629 (the public interest in cases arising under a given federal statute outweighs the purely private interest of the law firm).

Where a federal statute provides for fee-shifting, litigation invoking such a statute is intended by Congress to be for the benefit of the public as well as that of the plaintiffs; the plaintiffs function as private attorneys general. Fee-shifting inextricably interweaves fee issues with the rest of the litigation. Thus, I impose no bond requirement upon the plaintiffs...