Miss. Dep't of Transp. v. Musgrove

• Decision Date: 16 April 2020
• Docket Number: NO. 2018-IA-01139-SCT,2018-IA-01139-SCT
• Parties: MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. Kenneth MUSGROVE and Latasha Musgrove, Individually
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

294 So.3d 609

MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

v.Kenneth MUSGROVE and Latasha Musgrove, Individually

NO. 2018-IA-01139-SCT

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

April 16, 2020

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: MICHAEL D. GOGGANS, Meridian, B. ADAM HAYS, CHRISTOPHER O. MASSENBURG

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: MICHAEL V. RATLIFF, OBY T. ROGERS, Collins, COREY D. GIBSON, Laurel

BEFORE KITCHENS, P.J., COLEMAN AND GRIFFIS, JJ.

KITCHENS, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Mississippi Governor Phil Bryant declared a state of emergency on January 27, 2014, in anticipation of an imminent winter storm. In response to the governor's declaration, Mississippi Department of Transportation (MDOT) placed limestone material on roadways as a remedial measure. Four days after the state of emergency was declared, Kenneth Musgrove lost control of his car and crashed on Highway 37, where MDOT had placed the limestone material, severely injuring his wife and himself.

¶2. The Musgroves filed a complaint against MDOT in the Circuit Court of Covington County on June 23, 2015, for damages from the car accident. MDOT filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that it was participating in emergency-management services under the Mississippi Emergency Management Law (MEML) and therefore was immune from liability. The trial court denied MDOT's motion for summary judgment, finding that there was a "genuine issue of material fact as to whether MDOT exercised due care in maintaining the road by placing gravel on the road and failing to warn drivers" of the gravel. MDOT timely filed its petition for interlocutory appeal, arguing that the MEML explicitly grants state agencies complete immunity from liability and that the trial court had erred by applying the standards set forth in the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) instead of applying the willful-misconduct standard set forth in the MEML.

¶3. This Court finds that MDOT has immunity under the MEML and that the trial court erred by applying the MTCA's immunity standards instead of applying the MEML's standard. Accordingly, we reverse and render.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

¶4. On January 27, 2014, Mississippi Governor Phil Bryant issued a proclamation declaring a state of emergency because a significant winter storm was approaching the state. The proclamation warned portions of the state, including Covington County, of the impending storm and of the potential for hazardous driving conditions. It directed all agencies of the state, including MDOT, to discharge their emergency responsibilities. The proclamation was in effect from January 27, 2014, through February 10, 2014. In response to the proclamation, MDOT deployed its emergency-management services and used deicing techniques on roads across the affected regions, including Highway 37 in Covington County. MDOT's deicing techniques consisted of placing limestone materials on roadways in anticipation of the expected hazardous driving conditions.

¶5. On January 31, 2014, Kenneth Musgrove was driving on Highway 37 when he lost control of his car and wrecked. Musgrove claims that he lost control due to the placement of the limestone materials, which had been applied to Highway 37 as it led into a curve. Both Kenneth and Latasha Musgrove were severely injured in the wreck.¹

¶6. The Musgroves filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Covington County on June 23, 2015. They claim that MDOT's placement of the limestone material and its failure to warn drivers of the limestone's presence was the ultimate cause of their wreck. The Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol's accident report states that the vehicle's driver lost control "due to gravel which was on [the] roadway due to recent ice storm." A highway patrolman testified in a deposition that there had been an accident earlier in the day that was in the same general area as the Musgroves’ accident.² Nothing in the record indicates that MDOT had knowledge of the prior accident.³

¶7. On December 6, 2016, MDOT filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that it was immune from the suit because the MEML protected it from tort liability during an emergency situation.

¶8. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order on April 20, 2017, denying MDOT's motion for summary judgment. The trial court found the following:

1. MTCA does not supersede the MEML, but each should be read in conjunction with the other statute.

2. Mississippi Code Section 63-3-303 made MDOT's placement and maintenance of traffic-control devices a discretionary function, but there still could be liability under MTCA Sections 11-46-9(1)(v) and (w), for failure to warn of a known danger that is not open and obvious.

3. Applying the standard set forth in Brantley v. City of Horn Lake , 152 So. 3d 1106 (Miss. 2014), Mississippi Code Section 65-1-65 required MDOT to maintain the roads at all times; thus MDOT had a ministerial duty and there was nothing to suggest that duty was altered during an emergency situation.

4. The [c]ourt finds there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether MDOT exercised due care in maintaining the road by placing gravel on the road and failing to warn drivers of the road condition that the gravel placed on the road.

That order was not received by MDOT's counsel, who filed a motion for relief under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60. On July 19, 2018, the trial court entered an amended order denying MDOT's motion for summary judgment. MDOT timely filed its petition for interlocutory appeal, which was granted.

¶9. MDOT raises the following issues on appeal: 1) whether MDOT is immune from liability for acts undertaken under the MEML and 2) whether the trial court erred by ruling that the MTCA immunity standard applied rather than the MEML immunity standard. MDOT argues that the MEML explicitly grants state agencies complete immunity from liability for its "emergency management activit[ies]" during a state of emergency, absent willful misconduct. MDOT argues also that the trial court erred when it considered the MTCA's limited immunity provisions instead of the MEML's complete immunity. The Musgroves argue that the trial court did not err by denying the motion for summary judgment because the "trial court correctly found that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether MDOT is liable under the MTCA and is not excused for its willful misconduct by the MEML."

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10. Under Rule 56(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "This Court reviews a trial court's grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss under a de novo standard." Arceo v. Tolliver , 949 So. 2d 691, 694 (Miss. 2006) (citing Monsanto v. Hall , 912 So. 2d 134, 136 (Miss. 2005) ). "[T]he burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of fact exists is on the moving party." Moore ex rel. Moore v. Mem'l Hosp. of Gulfport , 825 So. 2d 658, 663 (Miss. 2002). "The party opposing the motion must be diligent and may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings but must by allegations or denials set forth specific facts showing there are genuine issues for trial." Davis v. Hoss , 869 So. 2d 397, 401 (Miss. 2004)

(citing Richmond v. Benchmark Constr. Corp. , 692 So. 2d 60, 61 (Miss. 1997) ).

DISCUSSION

I. Whether MDOT has immunity for its actions during the state of emergency.

¶11. MDOT argues that the MEML gives it complete immunity for its emergency-management activities during emergency situations, such as when a state of emergency has been proclaimed. The Mississippi Emergency Management Law (MEML), specifically Mississippi Code Section 33-15-21(a), states,

Neither the state nor any political subdivision thereof, nor other agencies, nor, except in cases of willful misconduct, the agents, employees, or representatives of any of them engaged in any emergency management activities, while complying with or attempting to comply with this article or any rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to the provisions of this article, shall be liable for the death of or any injury to persons, or damage to property, as a result of such activity.

Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-21(a) (Rev. 2010).

¶12. Under the MEML, the state and its agencies shall not be liable for their actions when dealing with emergencies, except when such actions constitute willful misconduct. The Musgroves argue that MDOT's placement of the limestone material and its failure to warn constituted willful misconduct. They contend also that MDOT engaged in willful misconduct by failing to warn after having knowledge of a recent prior accident near the location of their accident.

¶13. We first interpret the MEML and then we determine whether MDOT committed willful misconduct and, thus, cannot claim immunity under the MEML.

A. The MEML

¶14. Neither party disputes that there was a state of emergency in effect at the time of the accident and that MDOT's actions were undertaken in response to the governor's emergency proclamation, thus implicating the MEML. MDOT asserts that because an accident occurred during a declared state of emergency and because MDOT's emergency-management activities failed to constitute willful misconduct, it is entitled to immunity under the MEML.

¶15. The Musgroves rely on a Mississippi Court of Appeals case's definitions and interpretation of "reckless disregard" and "willful misconduct" to support their claim that "liability for willful misconduct under MEML appears to be the same as liability for reckless disregard under MTCA." See Herndon v. Miss. Forestry Comm'n , 67 So. 3d 788 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).⁴ But these definitions from Herndon undermine rather than support the Musgroves’ position. The Herndon court defined "reckless...