Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. Adams
| Decision Date | 02 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2014–IA–01419–SCT.,2014–IA–01419–SCT. |
| Citation | 197 So.3d 406 |
| Parties | MISSISSIPPI TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION and Mississippi Department of Transportation. v. Christopher D. ADAMS, Deceased, by and through Dominique D. ADAMS, Individually and on Behalf of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Christopher D. Adams, Deceased. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Stephen G. Peresich, Mary W. Van Slyke, Biloxi, Johanna M. McMullan, Jackson, attorneys for appellants.
Paul T. Benton, Biloxi, Patricia L. Beale, attorneys for appellee.
Before DICKINSON, P.J., LAMAR and KITCHENS, JJ.
LAMAR, Justice, for the Court:
¶ 1. This is an interlocutory appeal. The Mississippi Transportation Commission (“MTC”) and the Mississippi Department of Transportation (“MDOT”) (collectively, the “defendants”) filed a motion for summary judgment in the Jackson County Circuit Court and argued that they were immune from liability under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”). The trial judge denied their motion because the plaintiff had alleged—and provided evidence—that they had violated specific regulations.1 The trial judge rejected the defendants' argument that, notwithstanding certain narrower regulations requiring specific actions, they were immune from liability because the broader function of traffic-control-device placement is discretionary. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 2. Christopher Adams died from injuries he sustained when his motorcycle wrecked on Interstate 10 in Jackson County. After traveling north on Interstate 110 in Harrison County, Adams merged onto an eastbound lane of I–10, where he entered a construction zone. According to the complaint, Adams inadvertently drove into a closed lane and then, when he tried to navigate back into an open lane, his motorcycle hit an uneven surface between lanes and “rotated.” Adams was thrown from his motorcycle and into traffic, where two other vehicles hit him, causing injuries from which he later died.
¶ 3. Adams's spouse, Dominique, filed suit against the defendants2 and alleged eight causes of action:
¶ 4. The defendants answered Adams's complaint and denied all claims. Soon thereafter, the defendants filed two motions; a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment based on MTCA immunity and a motion asking the trial judge to hold their summary-judgment motion in abeyance and to enter a scheduling order for discovery on its immunity defenses. The trial judge ultimately entered an agreed scheduling order setting various deadlines for discovery on the defendants' immunity-related defenses.
Moody's Affidavit
¶ 5. During the discovery period, the defendants designated two experts, Dean Moody and Gary McCollom, both of whom were also MDOT employees. Moody, the project engineer for the I–10 expansion where the accident occurred, submitted an affidavit. He stated that “MDOT employees monitored compliance with the Temporary Traffic Control Plan routinely and frequently throughout the duration of the Construction project.”3 Moody also stated that “Mallette Brothers was in compliance with the Construction Plans and the Temporary Traffic Control Plan during the entire course of the Construction Project.” Moody's affidavit continued:
The MDOT had and has no knowledge of any noncompliance by Mallette Brothers relating to the Temporary Traffic Control Plan for the Construction Project and site. During Phase 4 of the Project and before the accident which is the subject of the claims against the MDOT, I examined the traffic control devices set out by Mallette Brothers and found that the traffic control devices complied with the Temporary Traffic Control Plan. The Temporary Traffic Control Plan for Phase 4 of the Project also did not require additional pavement markings other than those specified in the Temporary Traffic Control Plan.
Tekell's Affidavits
¶ 6. Adams designated V.O. “Dean” Tekell Jr. as an expert. Tekell submitted two affidavits. In the first affidavit, he opined—based on his review of the “pleadings, documents and photographs of the parties”—that the defendants “ha [d] a duty to maintain, repair and inspect state-maintained highways,” and that the defendants “breached this duty by failing to regularly inspect the area where the subject incident occurred.”
¶ 7. According to Tekell, the defendants “knew or should have known of the absence of a solid white traffic stripe in the area of the subject incident and that the plastic drums were placed too far from the edge of the travel lane.” Tekell also stated that “[b]y failing to place a solid white traffic stripe and by failing to place the drums in conformance with their details, they breached this duty.” Tekell stated further that the defendants had a duty to designate a responsible person to monitor Mallette Brothers' compliance with the project's Construction Plan and Traffic Control Plan pursuant to Section 618.01.2 of the Red Book, and that they had failed to monitor for at least five days prior to the incident. According to Tekell, the defendants “knew or should have known of Mallette Brothers' non-compliance with the Traffic Control Plan,” and they “failed to require Mallette Brothers to place a solid white traffic strip in the area of the subject incident and failed to require the placement of drums in conformance with the traffic control detail.”
¶ 8. Tekell submitted a supplemental affidavit and opined that the defendants also had violated Red Book Section 618.03.3 ():
Based on the deposition testimony of Frank Mallette ... and the photographs produced by the parties, Mallette Brothers did not place any striping or edge lines in the area where the subject incident occurred.
Tekell further opined, “[i]n fact the contractor and MDOT permitted an edge line from a prior phase to remain in conflict with their barrels,” which is a violation of Red Book Section 619.03.2 and a breach of their duties.
Motion Hearing
¶ 9. After the immunity-defense discovery period, the defendants filed their supplemental motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. At the hearing on the motion, the defendants argued primarily that they enjoyed discretionary-function immunity for anything related to traffic-control devices. They argued further that this discretion conferred immunity even if there were other specific statutes and regulations that addressed traffic-control-device placement. Adams countered that, while Mississippi Code Section 63–3–303 did indeed give the defendants discretion regarding the overall function of placing and maintaining traffic-control devices, certain other statutes and Red Book sections rendered some narrower duties associated with traffic-control devices ministerial. See Miss.Code Ann. § 63–3–303 (Rev.2013).
¶ 10. After a recess, the trial judge denied the defendants' motion from the bench:
MDOT is not a constitutional creature, but is a creature of the Legislature. By empowering it to come into existence, it allowed it to promulgate and use certain standards, which ... have been in place for decades, perhaps at the inception of MDOT.... And in that case, those standards take on an entirely different role, and that role is statutory, it's legal, it is what binds MDOT to do its job.
This Court granted the defendants' petition for interlocutory appeal, and they now raise several issues on appeal, which we restate as:
We have consolidated and rearranged some of the issues in our discussion for clarity.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 11. Trial courts should grant motions for summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Immunity under the MTCA “is an entitlement not to stand trial rather than a mere defense to liability and, therefore, should be resolved at the earliest possible stage of litigation.” Brantley v. City of Horn Lake, 152 So.3d 1106, 1109 (Miss.2014) (quoting Mitchell v. City of Greenville, 846 So.2d 1028, 1029 (Miss.2003) ). This Court reviews de novo the application of the MTCA and grants or denials of summary-judgment motions. City of Magee v. Jones, 161 So.3d 1047, 1049 (Miss.2015) (citing Lee v. Mem'l Hosp. at Gulfport, 999 So.2d 1263, 1266 (Miss.2008) ; Johnson v. Pace, 122 So.3d 66, 68 (Miss.2013) ).
ANALYSIS
¶ 12. The crux of this appeal is whether ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Wilcher v. Lincoln Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors
...by statute, ordinance, regulation, or other binding directive, then he may proceed with his claim." Id. at 1114.¶ 57. In Mississippi Transportation Commission v. Adams , this Court held that, while Mississippi Code Section 63–3–303 is discretionary, the Mississippi Transportation Commission......
- Latham v. Latham
- Flowers v. Estate (In re Estate)
-
Hudson v. Yazoo City (In re Estate of Hudson)
...imposed on Yazoo City were ministerial, not discretionary.¶ 33. For authority, the Estate points to Mississippi Transportation Commission v. Adams , 197 So.3d 406, 412 (Miss. 2016), in which this Court held that the general discretionary function with respect to placement of traffic control......