Missourians for Honest Elections v. Missouri Elections Commission

• Citation: 536 S.W.2d 766
• Decision Date: 26 February 1976
• Docket Number: No. 37875,37875
• Parties: MISSOURIANS FOR HONEST ELECTIONS a corporation, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MISSOURI ELECTIONS COMMISSION et al., Defendants-Respondents. . Louis District, En Banc
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 766

536 S.W.2d 766

MISSOURIANS FOR HONEST ELECTIONS a corporation, et al Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MISSOURI ELECTIONS COMMISSION et al., Defendants-Respondents.

No. 37875.

Missouri Court of Appeals, St. Louis District, En Banc.

Feb. 26, 1976.

Motion for Rehearing or Transfer Denied April 13, 1976.

Application to Transfer Denied June 14, 1976.

Lewis C. Green, St. Louis, for plaintiffs-appellants.

John W. Inglish, Jefferson City, for defendants-respondents.

SMITH, Chief Judge, and SIMEONE, Presiding Judge.

This is an appeal by the appellants-Missourians for Honest Elections and two individuals ¹ from an order of the circuit court of St. Louis County entered on February 6, 1976, denying relief which sought to review a rule of the Missouri Elections Commission under the Administrative Procedure Act. § 536.050, RSMo 1969. ²

This appeal, in which the parties do not raise any constitutional issues, questions the validity of Rule 33 ³ of the Missouri Elections Commission, which requires that a candidate for public office in the state file a report concerning economic disclosure even though such candidate has not or does not intend to expend more than $500 on a campaign seeking public office. The appeal questions the ruling of the court below (1) in upholding the validity of Rule 33 because it is contrary to the 'language, purpose and legislative history of the Campaign Finance Reform Act,' and (2) 'in ruling that Section 8 ⁴ of the Act does not authorize the exemption of a candidate for public office who, neither receives nor expends more than $500 on his campaign, from filing any portion of the report of 'contributions received and expenditures made' required by Section 7.1 ⁵ of the Act.'

The facts are not difficult but the legal issues presented are of great significance.

During the 1974 Session of the General Assembly 'campaign reform' legislation was introduced and debated. No compaign law was, however, passed. After the General Assembly failed to pass a campaign reform act, an ad hoc group of legislators and other interested persons decided to draft and circulate an initiative petition to fill the campaign reform vacuum. In due course, the group formed itself into an organization known as the 'Missourians for Honest Elections' (MHE). The group assigned a small number of persons to draft an initiative measure in the words of the appellants 'in an extremely short period' and took as their starting point the conference committee substitute which was approved by the House. The required signatures were obtained. MHE spearheaded the citizen's effort to persuade the voters to approve the proposition. Some 400,000 brochures were distributed, press releases were sent, various organizations participated, and finally on November 5, 1974 the Proposition No. 1 was overwhelmingly adopted by the people of Missouri and the Campaign Finance Reform Act became effective January 1, 1975.

As stated, the drafters of the proposition took as their starting point the legislative proposal. The proposed legislation did not contain the specific provisions of subsections (4), (5) and (6) of Section 7.1, but only contained subsections (1), (2) and (3). These three subsections--(4), (5) and (6)--were added by the drafters of Proposition No. 1 after the proposed legislation failed. These additional clauses were added 'in an effort to ferret out 'hidden' campaign contributions.' ⁶

During the campaign differing interpretations of the Act were noted by the proponents and opponents. The differing interpretations were 'hotly debated.' But the Act was passed and became law.

After the Act became law the Missouri Elections Commission adopted Rule 33 on December 12, 1975, which held that the reporting of exemptions available to candidates meeting certain requirements would not extend to economic disclosures of candidates. Plaintiffs then sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the court below, alleging that Rule 33 is invalid and in violation of the Act as adopted by the people. The trial court denied relief, and plaintiffs appeal to this court.

Appellants urge us to reverse the trial court because (1) Section 8 of the Act on its face exempts 'small candidates' ⁷ from 'all' reporting provisions of the Act, (2) Rule 33 would be destructive of the legislative purpose in that the 'small candidate' who does not receive or expend more than $500.00 is not within the 'primary target' area of the legislation, which area is designed only to 'curb the abuses of 'big money' in election campaigns,' (3) 'the 'legislative history' of the campaign for adoption of the initiative proposition demonstrates that the people intended that a candidate who receives or spends not more than $500 should be exempt from all reporting requirements of the Act' ⁸ (emphasis added); and (4) the draftsmen of the initiative proposition clearly intended that 'small candidates' should be exempt from the reporting requirements of Section 7 'in their entirety.'

Appellants vigorously urge us to give the Act, which reforms the political process by the initiative, 'sympathetic reception' because the exercise of the initiative is one of the most fundamental rights of the people. They argue that if Rule 33 is to be upheld it would be destructive of the legislative purpose because the law was not intended to apply to these minor offices, and would defeat the purpose of the exemption and lead to absurd results. In sum, they contend that the 'record is uncontroverted. The League of Women Voters, Common Cause, numerous church organizations, and many other organizations and 78% of the voters, relied on the assurances of the proponents repeatedly reported to them by the media, and brought to them by the campaign literature.' Hence, this was the intent of the voters and such intent is persuasive in interpreting the provisions of the Act.

The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the Rule is valid and entitled to 'great weight' and if the Act is ambiguous and the governmental agency charged with its administration and enforcement interprets it, that interpretation is entitled to 'consideration and the highest respect' from the courts.

The only issue confronting us is whether Rule 33 is valid. ⁹ Or, put another way, the only issue confronting us is whether a candidate for public office is required to make economic disclosure as provided in Section 7.1, subsections (4), (5) and (6) of the Act, whether or not the candidate ¹⁰ receives or expends more than $500 in the aggregate for any election, or whether such candidates are, under Section 8, exempt from all disclosures under Section 7.1.

The scope of our review is governed by two rules. Rule 100.07 dealing with administrative review allows us to determine whether the action of the agency is in excess of its statutory authority or jurisdiction or is unauthorized by law. Rule 73.01 establishes our review in court-tried cases and warrants our determination of the case upon both the law and the evidence. Since there was no testimony, only documentary evidence, we are not limited by the usual deference on credibility. Additionally, the facts are undisputed and both the agency determination and that of the trial court are based upon a determination of the legal meaning of the basic statute. The powers of the Commission are set forth in Section 13 of the Act. ¹¹ The regulations made by the Commission must be consistent with the provisions of the Act. And under Rule 84.14, we should give such judgment as the court ought to give. We, therefore, examine Rule 33 in that context.

We start with the proposition that the Commission cannot by rule change the substantive requirements of the law. If, therefore, Section 8 does not provide an exemption from financial disclosure required in Section 7.1, subsections (4), (5) and (6) for candidates receiving or expending less than $500 for any election, the judgment of the trial court upholding the validity of Rule 33 must be affirmed. We do not find such an exemption.

Section 8 expressly refers to 'The provisions of this act regarding the reporting of campaign contributions and expenditures . . .' Section 2(7) defines 'contributions' or 'expenditures' as 'any advance, conveyance, deposit, distribution, transfer of funds, payment, gift, pledge, or subscription of money or anything of value, in support of or in opposition to any candidate or political committee . . ..' (Emphasis supplied).

Section 7.1, subsections (1), (2) and (3) require the reporting of items specifically referred to as 'contributions' or 'expenditures.' Section 7.1, subsections (4), (5) and (6) require the reporting of financial information which does not necessarily meet the definition of 'contribution' or 'expenditure' in Section 2(7). While the general reporting language refers to 'contributions' and 'expenditures,' the specific information required in (4), (5) and (6) goes beyond those terms. As noted, the exemption provided by Section 8 is from 'the reporting of campaign contributions and expenditures.' It gives no exemption beyond those items, and we cannot by judicial fiat create an additional exemption where one does not exist.

Plaintiffs have asserted that the terms 'contribution' and 'expenditure' encompass all of the information required to be reported under Section 7.1, subsections (1) through (6). Those two terms, in addition to being specifically defined, are used extensively throughout the Act. To engraft such a definition upon those words would result in absurdity. Two instances will suffice. Section 2(6) defines a 'Candidate' and provides that he is 'deemed to seek nomination or election when he first: (a) Receives contributions or makes expenditures . . ..' Section 7.1(5) and (6) requires a listing of all income. If income is a 'contribution,' then presumptively every working man, woman and child in the state is a 'candidate' subject to the reporting and other provisions of the law. Under ...