Mitchell P., In re

• Decision Date: 22 December 1978
• Citation: 22 Cal.3d 946,587 P.2d 1144,151 Cal.Rptr. 330
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 587 P.2d 1144 In re MITCHELL P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. Stewart C. SMITH, as Chief Probation Officer, etc., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MITCHELL P., Defendant and Appellant. L.A. 30886.

Page 330

151 Cal.Rptr. 330

22 Cal.3d 946, 587 P.2d 1144

In re MITCHELL P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

Stewart C. SMITH, as Chief Probation Officer, etc., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MITCHELL P., Defendant and Appellant.

L.A. 30886.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Dec. 22, 1978.

Charles J. Nacsin, San Bernardino, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Bobby R. Vincent, San Bernardino, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Daniel J. Kremer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Alan S. Meth, A. Wells Petersen and Rudolf Corona, Jr., Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

CLARK, Justice.

Appeal by Mitchell P., a minor, from juvenile court judgment finding him to come within provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, and adjudging him a ward of that court. ¹ Appellant contends that because the only evidence received at the jurisdictional or adjudicatory hearing was uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice to the alleged misconduct, the judgment must be reversed. (See Pen.Code, § 1111.) We disagree and affirm judgment.

Appellant and other juveniles entered a jewelry store at night through a broken window, removing jewelry valued at $13,000.

In a petition filed pursuant to section 602, appellant was alleged to have committed acts constituting burglary (Pen.Code, § 459), grand theft (Pen.Code, § 487) and receiving stolen property (Pen.Code, § 496). At the jurisdictional hearing one of the juveniles entering the store with appellant was granted immunity from further proceedings against him and testified he had witnessed appellant participate in the affair. The juvenile court judge found the allegations relating to Penal Code section 496 to be true, those relating to Penal Code sections 459 and 487 to be untrue. Appellant was declared a ward of the court and returned to the custody of his parents. It is undisputed the only evidence of appellant's misconduct is the accomplice testimony.

Had appellant been criminally charged and convicted based solely on the accomplice's uncorroborated testimony, Penal Code section 1111 would require reversal of the conviction. That section provides: "A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by other such evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense . . . ." However, a finding of wardship pursuant to section 602 does not constitute a "conviction" within the meaning of Penal Code section 1111 (see § 203 ("An order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose . . . .")), and our courts have uniformly held Penal Code section 1111 has no application in juvenile court proceedings. (In re R. C. (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 887, 114 Cal.Rptr. 735; In re D. L. (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 65, 73, 120 Cal.Rptr. 276; In re Eugene M. (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 650, 657, 127 Cal.Rptr. 851.) Appellant contends the juvenile court's refusal to allow him to assert the accomplice testimony rule violates his constitutional rights.

The accomplice testimony rule is not constitutionally based. Rather it was court created in the first instance. (People v. Eckert (1860)16 Cal. 110, 112.) Eckert reached its holding not on constitutional grounds but on English common law (see 7 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2056, fn. 5) and today's legislative codification of the rule may be modified or repealed without infringing constitutional rights. The rule does not exist in many states and where it does exist it is normally of statutory origin. (7 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2056, p. 319.) Federal courts have rejected the rule, holding "a conviction may be based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice . . . ." (United States v. Turner (1975) 9 Cir., 528 F.2d 143, 161; see also United States v. Daniel (1972) 9 Cir., 459 F.2d 1029.) Therefore, due process does not require the rule be adopted in either criminal or juvenile proceedings.

A more difficult constitutional issue is presented by appellant's contention that, because the state deems uncorroborated accomplice testimony insufficient to support a criminal conviction, equal protection requires the same quality of proof in support of a juvenile jurisdictional finding. The Supreme Court in In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 held that a minor cannot be subjected to "institutional confinement on proof insufficient to convict him were he an adult." (Id. at p. 367, 90 S.Ct. at p. 1074.)

At issue in Winship was the Degree of factual proof of charged misconduct. In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 established that, while due process does not require an adjudicatory hearing conform to all requirements of a criminal trial, it nevertheless requires " 'the essentials of due process and fair treatment' " at such a hearing (Id. at p. 30, 87 S.Ct. at p. 1445). One such essential in juvenile proceedings is that the minor be adjudicated by proof beyond a reasonable doubt a due process rather than an equal protection compulsion according to Winship. Winship thus holds that due process compels only the reasonable doubt degree of proof for adjudicatory findings in either criminal or juvenile proceedings. As we have seen, due process simply does not compel the accomplice corroboration rule in either criminal or juvenile proceedings.

Appellant's equal protection contention cannot be rejected, of course, merely because it is not supported by Winship. The state has created a classification placing those persons charged with crimes and subject to criminal penalties in a category different from those treated as juveniles and subject to restrictions the state deems to be for their best interests and necessary for their rehabilitation. The issue is whether the state can require a lesser Quality of evidence in juvenile proceedings. This is not to say Degree of proof may be different in the two proceedings Winship established proof beyond reasonable doubt shall apply to juvenile as well as criminal proceedings. The issue is whether evidence deemed insufficient in a criminal proceeding although standing alone it may constitute proof of criminal conduct beyond reasonable doubt is sufficient in a juvenile proceeding, so long as the charged misconduct is established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. ²

Appellant appears to argue on equal protection grounds that all rules of evidence in criminal proceedings must extend to juvenile court proceedings because in both criminal and juvenile proceedings the person charged faces the possibility of loss of freedom. However, disparities among classes are constitutionally permissible when reasonably related to proper purpose. ³ In T. N. G. v. Superior Court 1971) 4 Cal.3d 767, 94 Cal.Rptr. 813, 484 P.2d 981 we upheld procedures permitting the court to retain in an unsealed condition juvenile court records of charged misconduct even though no adjudication followed. While juveniles charged with but not convicted of criminal violations were entitled to immediate sealing of their records, no denial of equal protection resulted because retention was shown to relate to rehabilitation. (Id. at pp. 782-783, 94 Cal.Rptr. 813, 484 P.2d 981.) "Such rehabilitative need for retaining arrest records does not pertain to the case of a minor who has been dealt with as an adult in the criminal courts. The adult criminal courts neither perform the special rehabilitative functions of the juvenile court nor provide the particular procedures for protective confidentiality of the juvenile court. Thus, the Legislature has reasonably provided to minors who are treated as adults in criminal courts the immediate sealing of any arrest record . . . ." (Id. at pp. 783-784, 94 Cal.Rptr. at p. 824, 484 P.2d at p. 992.) ⁴

The critical question is whether the purpose served by the accomplice corroboration rule permits, as in the case of record sealing, disparate treatment between persons charged with crime and persons charged with juvenile misconduct. We examine the differing effects of the rule when applied in different procedures.

Accomplice testimony is generally suspect because it may have been proferred in the hope of leniency or immunity, and thus greater weight may be accorded such testimony than is warranted. (See People v. Wallin (1948) 32 Cal.2d 803, 808, 197 P.2d 734.) However, when a judge rather than a jury is trier of fact it is not unreasonable to assume he is more critical of accomplice testimony and more likely to accord it appropriate weight. Although juries are generally required upon demand by defendant in a criminal proceeding, the state is not constitutionally compelled to provide a jury in juvenile proceedings (see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971) 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647), the juvenile court judge or referee being the trier of fact. (Cf. People v. Superior Court (Carl W.) (1975) 15 Cal.3d 271, 124 Cal.Rptr. 47, 539 P.2d 807.) It thus follows there is less reason for application of the arbitrary accomplice corroboration rule in juvenile court proceedings. (See, In re R. C., supra, 39 Cal.App.3d 887, 895, 114 Cal.Rptr. 735.)

While adjudication of a juvenile offender may well result in an incarceration which is not unlike that in the case of persons convicted of crimes, it must be acknowledged that a person convicted of a serious crime is generally exposed to a greater and more onerous term of confinement than a juvenile ward charged with the same misconduct. In providing for the kind of evidence which can constitute proof of charged misconduct, it is not unreasonable that our Legislature has placed more severe limitations on evidence which may be used to prove the criminal violation, bearing in mind of course that the degree of proof calls for the same reasonable doubt standard in each instance.

Although the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile court...