R. C., In re

• Decision Date: 19 June 1974
• Citation: 114 Cal.Rptr. 735,39 Cal.App.3d 887
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re R.C., a minor. Jewel SMITH, Supervising Probation Officer, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. R.C., Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 33488.

Page 735

114 Cal.Rptr. 735

39 Cal.App.3d 887

In re R.C., a minor.

Jewel SMITH, Supervising Probation Officer, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. R.C., Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. 33488.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

June 19, 1974.

Hearing Denied Aug. 28, 1974.

Jonathan Newman, San Francisco, for defendant and appellant (under appointment by the Court of Appeal).

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Edward A. Hinz, Jr., Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., John T. Murphy, Ann K. Jensen, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.

CHRISTIAN, Associate Justice.

R.C. appeals from an order of the juvenile court committing him to the Youth Authority after it had been determined that he had set fire to two structures; appellant was found to be a minor within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602.

The evidence is not in conflict. At about 3:40 a.m., February 26, 1973, two police officers patrolling the area of O'Farrell and Fillmore Streets, in San Francisco, observed a young man standing in the partly opened doorway of a building and looking inside. The young man turned and walked across the street where he joined another boy. The officers stopped them, asked for their names, dates of birth and addresses, and asked what they were doing. After the boys had identified themselves as R.C. and J.J., the officers placed them in the back of the police vehicle and explained that they were being detained while the officers checked further into what they had been doing. Appellant had been identified to one of the officers earlier that evening as a possible suspect in a series of fires that had been set in the Fillmore area.

Inspecting the doorway where J.J. had first been seen, the officers observed fresh scratches and impressions indicating that the door had been forced open. The officers then checked the lot across the street, where they had seen appellant making a tossing motion; a knife was found. The officers then took the boys into custody.

On arrival at the Hall of Justice, the two boys were placed in separate rooms for questioning concerning a fire in which two deaths had occurred. J.J. convincingly denied knowledge of that fire, but admitted that he, D.B. and appellant were members of 'the Flames' and were responsible for 14 or 15 other fires in the Western Addition area. As a result of this conversation, the officers concluded that the boys were not responsible for the arsonhomicide which had been the primary focus of investigation. Appellant refused to talk.

It was stipulated at the hearing on the petition against appellant that fires set at 935 Webster Street and 1437--39 Golden Gate Avenue were incendiary in origin. It was also stipulated that if minors D.B. and J.J. were called to the stand, both would testify that they, along with appellant had set fire to vacant buildings at 1437--39 Golden Gate Avenue and 935 Webster Street, with the intent to burn the buildings. Appellant did not testify.

Counsel for appellant moved to strike the petition on the ground that Penal Code section 1111 required corroboration of the stipulated testimony of D.B. and J.J., who were accomplices in the offense charged against appellant. The motion was denied.

Appellant points out that he was found to have violated a state law and was thereby brought within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 602), ¹ solely on the testimony of two accomplices. Penal Code section 1111 provides that a 'conviction can not be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; . . .' (Emphasis added.) According to the strict language of the statute, there was corroboration in that the two accomplices supported each other. But it has been held that the testimony of one accomplice cannot corroborate that of another. (People v. Creegan and Becker (1898) 121 Cal. 554, 53 P. 1082; People v. Scofield (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1026, 95 Cal.Rptr. 405.)

Appellant first contends that Penal Code section 1111 should by its own terms be construed as applying to a juvenile proceeding. Proof that a juvenile has violated a state law must be 'supported by evidence, legally admissible in the trial of criminal cases, . . .' (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 701.) Historically, accomplice testimony was inadmissible, but the rule of exclusion was replaced in the British courts as early as the 18th Century (7 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 2056). Courts in this state have also repeatedly held that Penal Code section 1111, requiring corroboration, does not go to the admissibility of evidence, but to the effect to be given that testimony. (See People v. Bowley (1963) 59 Cal.2d 855, 858, 31 Cal.Rptr. 471, 382 P.2d 591; People v. Santos (1933) 134 Cal.App. 736, 746, 26 P.2d 522.)

Penal Code section 1111 by its own terms applies only to criminal convictions, while Welfare and Institutions Code section 503 provides that an 'order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the juvenile court be deemed a criminal proceeding.' (Emphasis added.) To apply Penal Code section 1111 to a juvenile proceeding would thus be contrary to the intention expressed in the statute.

It is argued, however, that the determination of wardship on the basis of uncorroborated accomplice testimony was a deprivation of due process. It is true that proceedings to determine whether a minor is a delinquent must comport with the essentials of due process and fair treatment. (In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 30--31, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527; Kent v. United States (1966) 383 U.S. 541, 553, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84.) Where a juvenile is charged with an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt' at the adjudicatory stage is one of these essentials. (In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368; Richard M v. Superior Court (1971)4 Cal.3d 370, 378, 93 Cal.Rptr. 752, 482 P.2d 664; see also Welf. & Inst.Code, § 701.)

Appellant bases his due process contention on a New York decision which reversed an adjudication of delinquency where the sole evidence connecting the juvenile to acts of arson and burglary consisted of testimony by the accomplice to those acts. (In re M. (1970) 34 A.D.2d 761, 310 N.Y.S.2d 399.) The New York court reversed on the basis of In re Winship, supra, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, reasoning that proof beyond a reasonable doubt requires corroboration of accomplice testimony. (In re M., supra, 310 N.Y.S.2d at pp. 400--401.) However, that application of Winship appears to be questionable. As the concurring opinion in In re M. noted: 'In the instant case the rule in question limiting the effect of accomplice testimony is obviously not an essential of due process as is shown by the fact that it is not the rule in the United States courts and in the vast majority of states (citations).' (In re M., supra, 310 N.Y.S.2d at pp. 401--402.) ² The federal courts do not require corroboration of accomplice testimony in federal prosecutions. (See United States v. Honore (9 Cir. 1971) 450 F.2d 31, 34, cert. den. 404 U.S. 1048, 92 S.Ct. 728, 30 L.Ed.2d 740; Quiles v. United States (9 Cir. 1965) 344 F.2d 490, 494, cert. den. 382 U.S. 992, 86 S.Ct. 571, 15 L.Ed.2d 479.) Instead, federal juries are instructed that accomplice testimony is to be received with caution and weighed with great care. (See Lyda v. United States, (9 Cir. 1963) 321 F.2d 788, 794--795.) The California requirement that accomplice testimony be corroborated is a legislative refinement; it is not a rule included within the traditional concepts of due process. (See Lisenba v. California (1941) 314 U.S. 219, 226--227, 62 S.Ct. 280, 86 L.Ed. 166.) If corroboration of accomplice testimony is not an essential of due process in criminal cases, it similarly is not required in juvenile cases.

An alternative ground for the New York holding in In re M., and a contention advanced by appellant in this case, is that application of Penal Code section 1111 in juvenile court proceedings is required by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The claim is that all the rules of evidence and standards of proof applied in criminal cases must be extended to juvenile proceedings because in either type of proceeding the accused or the juvenile faces the possibility of a substantial loss of freedom.

Both the United States Constitution ³ and the Constitution of California ⁴ require similar treatment of persons similarly situated, allowing discrimination between one class and another only on the basis of distinctions reasonably related to the proper purposes of the law. A classification which results in differences of treatment 'must not be arbitrary, but must be based upon some differences in the classes having a substantial relation to a legitimate object to be accomplished.' (In re S.A. (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 241, 246, 85 Cal.Rptr. 775, 778; see also 3 Witkin, Summary of California Law (7th ed. 1960) § 129, p. 1934.)

It is established that the differing needs and characteristics of adult offenders and juveniles justify the maintenance of a separate and different system of justice for each of the two classes. (T.N.G. v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 767 783--784, 94 Cal.Rptr. 813, 484 P.2d 981; In re S.A., Supra, 6 Cal.App.3d 241, 245--246, 85 Cal.Rptr. 775; cf. McKeiver v. Pennslyvania (1971) 403 U.S. 528, 545--551, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647.) It remains to be determined whether differences between the adult criminal justice system and the juvenile system reasonably justify withholding application of the accomplice rule in juvenile proceedings. Differences between the two systems will be examined, and...