Mitchell v. Emblade
| Decision Date | 02 October 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 6094,6094 |
| Citation | 81 Ariz. 121,301 P.2d 1032 |
| Parties | Marshall L. MITCHELL and Pearl M. Mitchell, husband and wife, Appellants, v. Magnus EMBLADE, Appellee. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Shimmel, Hill & Cavanagh, Phoenix, and Westover & Mansfield, Yuma, for appellants.
Rolle, Jones & Pace, Yuma, for appellee.
In our original opinion, 80 Ariz. 398, 298 P.2d 1034, we stated that the legislature in 1950 repealed section 66-101, A.C.A.1939, which fixed a maximum speed limit of 20 miles per hour in business districts and enacted section 66-157a, 1952 Supp. A.C.A.1939, A.R.S.1956, section 28-701, which fixed a maximum limit of 25 miles per hour in such districts. We further stated that in the absence of a highway sign indicating a different speed limit one driving through a business district in excess of 25 miles per hour would be negligent per se. The foregoing pronouncement is made one of the bases for a motion for rehearing.
We are of the opinion that we were in error in saying that a violation of section 66-157a, supra, would be negligence per se, and while in our opinion this error does not affect the result, we granted rehearing for the purpose of rendering a corrective opinion. The section reads as follows:
'(b) Where no special hazard exists that requires lower speed for compliance with paragraph (a) of this section the speed of any vehicle not in excess of the limits specified in this section or established as hereinafter authorized shall be lawful, but any speed in excess of the limits specified in this section or established as hereinafter authorized shall be prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that in is unlawful:
It is clear that this section properly interpreted does not fix an absolute speed limit of 25 miles per hour in business districts but merely prescribes that speeds in excess of those prescribed in the section or established by lawful authority is 'prima facie evidence' that such excess is not reasonable and prudent. Such excess speed does not necessarily establish a violation of law and cannot therefore be negligence in and of itself.
One exceeding the prescribed speed must be given the opportunity to rebut such prima facie evidence and show if he can...
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State v. Grilz
...Daniels, supra; Arizona Corporation Commission v. Reliable Transportation Co., 86 Ariz. 363, 346 P.2d 1091 (1960); Mitchell v. Emblade, 81 Ariz. 121, 301 P.2d 1032 (1956). This line of cases is based on Flores v. Tucson Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., supra. In Flores the court discussed a......
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