Mitchell v. Holzer Med. Ctr., Case No. 16CA20

• Decision Date: 27 September 2017
• Docket Number: Case No. 16CA20
• Citation: 2017 Ohio 8244
• Parties: RUBIN A. MITCHELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HOLZER MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

2017 Ohio 8244

RUBIN A. MITCHELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HOLZER MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Case No. 16CA20

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT GALLIA COUNTY

September 27, 2017

DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

APPEARANCES:

Rubin A. Mitchell, Orient, Ohio, pro se.

Zachary J. Lyon, Columbus, Ohio, for appellees Kyle E. McCausland, M.D., Katha Wilcoxon, R.N., and Holzer Medical Center.

Michael DeWine, Ohio Attorney General, and Morgan A. Linn, Ohio Assistant Attorney General, Columbus, Ohio, for appellees Ohio State Highway Patrol, Sergeant Nicholas Johnson, Trooper James Trelka, Trooper Keith Fellure, Trooper Mark McFann, and Lieutenant Karla Taulbee.

CIVIL CASE FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT

ABELE, J.

{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a Gallia County Common Pleas Court judgment that granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of Holzer Medical Center, Kyle McCausland, M.D., Katha Wilcoxon, R.N. (the Holzer defendants), Ohio State Highway Patrol Sergeant Nicolas S. Johnson, Trooper James M. Trelka, Trooper Keith Fellure, Lieutenant Karla Taulbee, and Trooper Mark McFann (the OSHP defendants), defendants below and appellees herein. Rubin A. Mitchell, plaintiff below and appellant herein, raises the following assignments of error for review:

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

"THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND VIOLATED THE PLAINTIFF['S] DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY NOT RULING ON SUBMITTED MOTIONS IN A TIMELY MANNER."

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATING THE STATUE [SIC] OF LIMITATIONS CLAUSE."

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

"THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS IN NOT APPOINTING HIM COUNSEL IN THE PRESENT CASE."

{¶ 2} On June 21, 2016, appellant filed a pro se complaint against appellees that asserted that, as a result of a May 31, 2014 traffic stop, he was subjected to an unconstitutional cavity search-both at the OSHP post and at Holzer Medical Center. Appellant alleged, in essence, that the series of events that surrounded the May 31, 2014 traffic stop and cavity search violated his civil rights and constituted assault, battery, and negligence. Appellant additionally requested the trial court to appoint counsel to represent him.

{¶ 3} After appellees answered, appellant filed an extension of time to respond to appellees' answer and an extension of time to file a motion for discovery, a motion for leave to amend the complaint, a motion for leave for joinder, and a renewed motion to appoint counsel. Appellant also requested additional time to serve interrogatories.

{¶ 4} Both appellees subsequently filed Civ.R. 12(C) motions for judgment on the pleadings. The OSHP defendants alleged that appellant's complaint is barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to claims alleging civil rights violations. The Holzer defendants asserted that appellant's complaint is barred by the one-year statutes of limitations applicable to medical claims and to assault and battery claims.

{¶ 5} Appellant did not respond to either of the motions for judgment on the pleadings, but instead filed (1) a "request for joinder" that asked the court to "join all parties that [were] named in the complaint," (2) a motion for extension of time to file affidavits of merit, (3) another motion to appoint counsel, and (4) a request for an extension of time "to file all answers, reply briefs, [and] requests for discoveries from defendants."

{¶ 6} On October 6, 2016, the trial court overruled all of appellant's outstanding motions and granted appellees' motions for judgment on the pleadings. This appeal followed.¹

I

{¶ 7} Before we consider appellant's assignments of error, we observe that appellant is acting pro se in this appeal. Because we ordinarily prefer to review a case on its merits rather than dismiss an action due to procedural technicalities, we generally afford considerable leniency to pro se litigants. E.g., Viars v. Ironton, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 16CA8, 2016-Ohio-4912, 2016 WL 3670171, ¶25; Miller v. Miller, 4th Dist. Athens No. 14CA6, 2014-Ohio-5127, 2014WL 6488876, ¶13; In re Estate of Pallay, 4th Dist. Washington No. 05CA45, 2006-Ohio-3528, 2006 WL 1875899, ¶10; Robb v. Smallwood, 165 Ohio App.3d 385, 2005-Ohio-5863, 846 N.E.2d 878, ¶5 (4th Dist.); Besser v. Griffey, 88 Ohio App.3d 379, 382, 623 N.E.2d 1326 (4th Dist.1993); State ex rel. Karmasu v. Tate, 83 Ohio App.3d 199, 206, 614 N.E.2d 827 (4th Dist.1992). "Limits do exist, however. Leniency does not mean that we are required 'to find substance where none exists, to advance an argument for a pro se litigant or to address issues not properly raised.'" State v. Headlee, 4th Dist. Washington No. 08CA6, 2009-Ohio-873, 2009 WL 478085, ¶6, quoting State v. Nayar, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 07CA6, 2007-Ohio-6092, 2007 WL 3407169, ¶28. Furthermore, we will not "conjure up questions never squarely asked or construct full-blown claims from convoluted reasoning." Karmasu, 83 Ohio App.3d at 206. We will, however, consider a pro se litigant's appellate brief so long as it "contains at least some cognizable assignment of error." Robb at ¶5; accord Coleman v. Davis, 4th Dist. Jackson No. 10CA5, 2011-Ohio-506, 2011 WL 345772, ¶14 (considering pro se litigant's brief when it contains "some semblance of compliance" with appellate rules of practice and procedure). In the case sub judice, we believe that appellant's brief does contain some cognizable assignments of error that we may consider on the merits.

II

{¶ 8} For ease of discussion, we first address appellant's second assignment of error. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his complaint because the court incorrectly determined that the statute of limitations bars his complaint. Appellant appears to agree that, at most, a two-year statute of limitations applies to his claims against appellees. Appellant's brief, however, fails to clarify why he believes the trial court wrongly determined that he did not file his complaint within the two-year statute of limitations.

{¶ 9} Appellees argue that the trial court correctly determined that the statute of limitations bars appellant's complaint, and thus, that the court properly granted their motions for judgment on the pleadings. Appellees point out that appellant's complaint alleges that the alleged wrongful acts occurred on May 31, 2014, and that he did not file his complaint until June 21, 2016. Appellees therefore assert that appellant failed to file his complaint within either (1) the one-year statutes of limitations applicable to medical claims and to assault and battery, or (2) the two-year statute of limitations applicable to alleged civil rights violations.

{¶ 10} In his reply brief, appellant asserts that he did not discover the facts giving rise to his cause of action until the motion to suppress hearing held in his criminal case, which he states occurred between August 11, 2014 and February 13, 2015.² Appellant contends that he did not know or have reason to know of his injury until the suppression hearing. He additionally asserts the he timely filed his complaint in accordance with the prisoner mailbox rule.

A

{¶ 11} Civ.R. 12(C) provides: "After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings."

When considering a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court must construe the material allegations in the complaint, along with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in favor of the nonmoving party as true.

Rayess v. Educational Comm. for Foreign Med. Graduates, 134 Ohio St.3d 509, 2012-Ohio-5676, 983 N.E.2d 1267, ¶18. Judgment is proper only if it appears beyond doubt that the nonmoving party can prove no set of facts entitling it to relief. Id.

Ohio Manufacturers' Assn. v. Ohioans for Drug Price Relief Act, 147 Ohio St.3d 42, 2016-Ohio-3038, 59 N.E.3d 1274, ¶10; accord Maynard v. Norfolk S. Ry., 4th Dist. Scioto No. 08CA3267, 2009-Ohio-3143, ¶12; Dolan v. Glouster, 173 Ohio App.3d 617, 2007-Ohio-6275, 879 N.E.2d 838, ¶7 (4th Dist.). "Consequently, 'as long as there is a set of facts, consistent with the plaintiff's complaint, which would allow the plaintiff to recover, the court may not grant a defendant's motion * * * [for judgment on the pleadings].'" Kerr v. Logan Elm School Dist., 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 14CA6, 2014-Ohio-5838, 2014 WL 7477955, ¶12, quoting York v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 145, 573 N.E.2d 1063.

{¶ 12} "A motion for judgment on the pleadings is an appropriate vehicle to seek dismissal of a cause of action, where the running of the statute of limitations is apparent from the face of the complaint." Walling v. Wagner, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 26807, 2016-Ohio-5444, 2016 WL 4418765, ¶3, citing Oskowski v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 2d Dist. Clark No. 95-CA-88, 1996 WL 125915, *2 (Mar. 22, 1996). Accordingly, if "the pleadings unequivocally demonstrate that the action was commenced after the limitations period expired, Civ.R. 12(C) relief is appropriate." Greenview Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Staffco Constr., Inc., 2016-Ohio-7321, 71 N.E.3d 1275, ¶12 (2nd Dist.).

{¶ 13} "A motion under Civ.R. 12(C) presents only questions of law, and the determination of the motion is restricted solely to the allegations in the pleadings." Quality Car & Truck Leasing, Inc. v. Pertuset, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 11CA3436, 2013-Ohio-1964, ¶7. Thus, appellate courts independently review trial court decisions regarding a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings. Rayess v. Educational Comm. for Foreign Med. Graduates, 134 Ohio St.3d 509, 2012-Ohio-5676, 983 N.E.2d 1267, ¶18 ("Because the review of a decision to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C) presents only questions of law, * * * our review is de novo.").

B

{¶ 14} In general, "[s]tatutes of limitations are designed to encourage plaintiffs 'to pursue diligent prosecution of...