Mitchell v. Methodist Hosp.

• Decision Date: 26 July 2012
• Docket Number: No. 01–11–01099–CV.,01–11–01099–CV.
• Citation: 376 S.W.3d 833
• Parties: Chiquita MITCHELL, Verazona Mitchell, Dominique Mitchell, Aaron Mitchell, Samuel Mitchell, Frank Mitchell, III, Carl Mitchell, Marie Ophelia Mitchell, Theodore Mitchell, and Johnathon Mitchell, Appellants v. The METHODIST HOSPITAL, Denise M. Stuckey, Bernice C. Onyenezi, Melissa Abbot, Rosie Young, Gordon K. Walters, Richard A. Kleinrock, Lini Thomas, Servanda Inting, Babyann C. Bekee, Rolando R. Rivas, and Veronica J. Montes, Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

376 S.W.3d 833

Chiquita MITCHELL, Verazona Mitchell, Dominique Mitchell, Aaron Mitchell, Samuel Mitchell, Frank Mitchell, III, Carl Mitchell, Marie Ophelia Mitchell, Theodore Mitchell, and Johnathon Mitchell, Appellants

v.The METHODIST HOSPITAL, Denise M. Stuckey, Bernice C. Onyenezi, Melissa Abbot, Rosie Young, Gordon K. Walters, Richard A. Kleinrock, Lini Thomas, Servanda Inting, Babyann C. Bekee, Rolando R. Rivas, and Veronica J. Montes, Appellees.

No. 01–11–01099–CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas,

Houston (1st Dist.).

July 26, 2012.

Babajide Asis Adio–Oduola, Omotola Ayodele Oresusi, Tola & Associates, Houston, TX, for Appellants.

Sameer S. Karim, Dwight Willis Scott Jr., Lisa Lepow Turboff, Carolyn C. Smith, Munsch Hardt Kopf & Harr, PC, Houston, TX, for Appellees.

Panel consists of Justices BLAND, MASSENGALE, and BROWN.

OPINION

HARVEY BROWN, Justice.

Chiquita Mitchell, Verazona Mitchell, Dominique Mitchell, Aaron Mitchell, Samuel Mitchell, Frank Mitchell, III, Carl Mitchell, Marie Ophelia Mitchell, Theodore Mitchell, and Johnathon Mitchell—the spouse and children of decedent Frank Mitchell—appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of The Methodist Hospital, Denise M. Stuckey, Bernice C. Onyenezi, Melissa Abbot, Rosie Young, Gordon K. Walters, Richard A. Kleinrock, Lini Thomas, Servanda Inting, Babyann C. Bekee, Rolando R. Rivas, and Veronica J. Montes (collectively, Methodist) based on the expiration of the statute of limitations for health care liability claims. The Mitchells contend that because they substantially complied with the presuit notice requirement for health care liability claims, limitations was tolled for a period of seventy-five days and the trial court erred by concluding that their claims were time-barred. We affirm.

Background

Frank Mitchell was admitted to Methodist on November 27, 2005, complaining of chest pain. Mitchell was diagnosed with a myocardial infarction and underwent cardiac catheterization and placement of a cardiac stent. During his three-day stay, hospital staff placed an IV catheter in Mitchell's left arm.

Methodist discharged Mitchell on November 30, 2005. Shortly after his discharge, Mitchell developed a fever and began to suffer pain in his left arm. He went to the emergency room at Methodist, where he was given a prescription for amoxicillin and told to take Motrin for the pain. After his symptoms did not improve, he returned to the emergency room at Methodist. Mitchell was diagnosed with septic thrombophlebitis—an inflammation of a vein caused by a bacterial infection—and readmitted to the hospital on December 2, 2005. During his second hospitalization, Mitchell developed multisystemic organ failure. He died on December 27, 2005. Mitchell's spouse and children prosecuted claims for damages resulting from Mitchell's wrongful death.

Health care liability claims like those asserted by Mitchell's family are governed by special procedures in Chapter 74 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, including a presuit-notice requirement. Health care liability claimants must provide written notice of a health care liability claim “by certified mail, return receipt requested, to each physician or health care provider against whom such claim is being made at least 60 days before the filing of a suit[.]” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. CodeE § 74.051(a) (West 2011). Proper notice of a health care liability claim tolls the statute of limitations for seventy-five days. Id. § 74.051(c). To be proper, “notice must be accompanied by [an] authorization form for release of protected health information as required under Section 74.052.” Id. § 74.051(a). Chapter 74 prescribes the form and content of the required authorization. Id.§ 74.052(c).

On November 26, 2007, the Mitchells provided Methodist with notice of their health care liability claims. The medical authorization form attached to the Mitchells' notice was not in the form prescribed by section 74.052; instead, the Mitchells attached an authorization form compliant with the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA). The Mitchells filed their lawsuit two months later, on January 28, 2008. Their petition alleged that Methodist and certain of its nurses caused Mitchell's infection and death by their negligent use of the IV catheter in Mitchell's left arm during his first hospitalization.

More than three years later, Methodist moved for summary judgment on the ground that the applicable statute of limitations barred the Mitchells' claims because the Mitchells failed to provide a statutorily compliant authorization form with their presuit notice and therefore failed to invoke the seventy-five-day tolling provision.¹ The Mitchells responded that the limitations period was tolled because Methodist fraudulently concealed Mitchell's infection and used the authorization form in a meaningful way and without objection for more than three years. The trial court granted Methodist's motion, and the Mitchells appealed.

Standard of Review

We review summary judgments de novo and according to well-settled standards. See Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex.2005). A summary judgment movant must establish its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Little v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 148 S.W.3d 374, 381 (Tex.2004). When a defendant moves for traditional summary judgment on an affirmative defense, the defendant must conclusively establish each essential element of that affirmative defense. SeeTex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Shah v. Moss, 67 S.W.3d 836, 842 (Tex.2001); Alpert v. Gerstner, 232 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). It is an affirmative defense that a statute of limitations bars a claim. Tex. R. Civ. P. 94. Accordingly, Methodist bore the burden of establishing as a matter of law that the Mitchells' claims were time-barred. See KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison Cnty. Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex.1999).

Tolling Limitations for Health Care Liability Claims

Health care liability claims have a two-year limitations period, commencing from (1) the occurrence of the breach or tort, (2) the last date of the relevant course of treatment, or (3) the last date of the relevant hospitalization. SeeTex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.. § 74.251(a) (West 2011) (providing that “no health care liability claim may be commenced unless the action is filed within two years from the occurrence of the breach or tort or from the date the medical or health care treatment that is the subject of the claim or the hospitalization for which the claim is made is completed”); see also Shah, 67 S.W.3d at 841 (construing identical language in predecessor statute). Although the parties dispute when limitations commenced under section 74.251(a), there is no dispute that the Mitchells filed suit more than two years after their causes of action against Methodist accrued. ² The question that is dispositive of this appeal, then, is whether summary judgment was improperly granted because the medical authorization form attached to the Mitchells' presuit notice was effective to toll limitations.

The two-year limitations period imposed by section 74.251 is tolled for a period of seventy-five days if the claimant provides both the notice and medical authorization form required by Chapter 74. SeeTex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.. §§ 74.051(a), (c), 74.052; see also Carreras v. Marroquin, 339 S.W.3d 68, 74 (Tex.2011) (holding that “[f]or the statute of limitations to be tolled in a health care liability claim pursuant to Chapter 74, a plaintiff must provide both the statutorily required notice and the statutorily required authorization form”). Section 74.051(a) lists the notice requirements for a health care liability claim:

Any person or his authorized agent asserting a health care liability claim shall give written notice of such claim by certified mail, return receipt requested, to each physician or health care provider against whom such claim is being made at least 60 days before the filing of a suit in any court of this state based upon a health care liability claim. The notice must be accompanied by the authorization form for release of protected health information as required under Section 74.052.

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.. § 74.051(a). And section 74.052 prescribes the “Authorization Form for Release of Protected Health Information”:

Notice of a health care claim under Section 74.051 must be accompanied by a medical authorization in the form specified by this section. Failure to provide this authorization along with the notice of health care claim shall abate all further proceedings against the physician or health care provider receiving the notice until 60 days following receipt by the physician or health care provider of the required authorization.

Id.§ 74.052(a); see also id.§ 74.052(c) (setting forth medical authorization form).

Together, the notice and medical authorization form encourage presuit investigation, negotiation, and settlement of health care liability claims. See Carreras, 339 S.W.3d at 73 (“The Legislature intended that ‘by requiring a potential claimant to authorize the disclosure of otherwise privileged information sixty days before suit is filed, the statute [would] provide [ ] an opportunity for health care providers to investigate claims and possibly settle those with merit at an early stage.’ ”) (quoting In re Collins, 286 S.W.3d 911, 916–17 (Tex.2009)). Indeed, the statutorily approved medical authorization form explicitly states that it is intended to facilitate “investigationand evaluation of the health care claim described in the accompanying Notice of Health Care Claim” or “[d]efense of any litigation arising out of the claim made the basis of the accompanying Notice of Health Care Claim.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. CodeE § 74.052(c).

Here, the Mitchells gave notice of their health care liability claims on November 26, 2007—a date which...