Mitchell v. Money
| Decision Date | 01 August 1980 |
| Citation | 602 S.W.2d 687 |
| Parties | Joan C. MITCHELL, Appellant, v. Milton T. MONEY; Edward L. Mackey, Administrator of the Estate of Milton T. Money, Appellees, and Joan C. MITCHELL, Appellant, v. Milton T. MONEY, Deceased, by and through his Administrator, Edward L. Mackey; and Burniece W. Money, widow of Milton T. Money, Appellees. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
J. P. Hughett, Hughett, Hughett & Hughett, Louisville, for appellant.
Harry K. Herren, Jr., Woodward, Hobson & Fulton, Louisville, for appellees.
Before COOPER, HOGGE and HOWARD, JJ.
This is a consolidated appeal from the dismissal of separate actions filed by the appellant. The original action was dismissed pursuant to KRS 395.278. The second action was also dismissed, the trial court ruling that the dismissal of the senior action was res judicata with respect to it. At issue is the question of whether the trial courts acted correctly in so dismissing said actions.
On February 13, 1978, the appellant, Joan C. Mitchell, filed a personal injury action against the decedent/appellee, Milton T. Money, for injuries resulting from an automobile collision occurring on February 13, 1977. This action was filed in Jefferson Circuit Court, Division 7. On March 10, 1978, an answer was filed on behalf of the appellee. At the time the original action was filed, Mr. Money was deceased, having died on October 12, 1977. On March 10, 1978, the will of the decedent was admitted to probate by the Jefferson District Court. The petition of the surviving spouse to dispense with administration was also filed at this time.
On February 23, 1979, the appellee moved the trial court to dismiss the action as the appellant had failed to revive same within one year of the death of the decedent. KRS 395.278. This motion was sustained by the trial court. However, on February 7, 1979, the appellant filed a second action in the Jefferson Circuit Court setting forth the same personal injury claim as was filed in the original action. This was assigned to division 12. In this second action, the appellant named as defendant the appellee by and through his administrator, Edward L. Mackey, the appellee herein. On May 21, 1979, counsel for the appellee filed a motion to dismiss this action on the ground that it represented a second suit filed for the same cause of action arising out of the same accident and injury. Accordingly, he argued that the action should be dismissed in that the dismissal of the original action was res judicata as to the second claim filed by the appellant. This motion to dismiss was sustained by the trial court. It is from the action of both trial courts that the appellant now appeals.
KRS 395.278 states, in part, as follows:
An application to revive an action in the name of the representative or successor of a plaintiff, or against the representative or successor of a defendant, shall be made within one (1) year after the death of the deceased party.
Within this jurisdiction, it is a well-recognized rule of law that any statute relating to the revivor of an action is a statute of limitation, rather than a statute relating to pleading, practice, or procedure. Clay, Kentucky Practice, CR 6.02, Comment 3; Daniel v. 4th and Market, Inc., Ky., 445 S.W.2d 699 (1968). In effect, the courts in this and other jurisdictions have held that a personal representative does not automatically succeed to the rights and status of a decedent. Rather, he is permitted, by an act of the legislature, to revive an action which dies with the decedent. See Daniels, supra, p. 701. Consequently, the time limitation provided for within any revivor statute is mandatory and not discretionary, thereby preventing a party or the court from extending such time under CR 6.02.
Notwithstanding the language of KRS 395.278 and its construction by the courts, the...
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Harris v. Jackson, No. 2004-SC-000121-DG.
...revivor of an action is a statute of limitation, rather than a statute relating to pleading, practice, or procedure." Mitchell v. Money, 602 S.W.2d 687, 688 (Ky.App., 1980). Being of limitations itself, estoppel may, under the appropriate circumstances, operate to bar assertion of a limitat......
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Gailor v. Alsabi
...court could acquire jurisdiction, the complaint was a nullity. Ratliff v.. Oney, Ky.App., 735 S.W.2d 338 (1987); Mitchell v. Money, Ky.App., 602 S.W.2d 687 (1980). The amended complaint was filed long after the expiration of the period of KRS 396.011 affords no relief in this case. Subsecti......
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A.E. v. M.C.
...against a deceased person. See, e.g., Bricker v. Borah, 127 Ill.App.3d 722, 469 N.E.2d 241, 82 Ill.Dec. 707 (1984); Mitchell v. Money, 602 S.W.2d 687 (Ky.Ct.App.1980); and Mercer v. Morgan, 86 N.M. 711, 526 P.2d 1304 (Ct.App.1974); see also Garlock Sealing Techns., LLC v. Pittman, [Ms. 2008......
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A.E. v. M.C.
...against a deceased person. See, e.g., Bricker v. Borah, 127 Ill. App. 3d 722, 469 N.E.2d 241, 82 Ill. Dec. 707 (1984); Mitchell v. Money, 602 S.W.2d 687 (Ky.Page 36Ct. App. 1980); and Mercer v. Morgan, 86 N.M. 711, 526 P.2d 1304 (Ct. App. 1974); see also Garlock Sealing Techns., LLC v. Pitt......