Mitchell v. State
| Decision Date | 21 February 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 2004-KA-00317-COA.,2004-KA-00317-COA. |
| Citation | 931 So.2d 639 |
| Parties | Scott Keith MITCHELL, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee. |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
William Mitchell Moran, attorney for appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Scott Stuart, attorney for appellee.
Before KING, C.J., CHANDLER and ISHEE, JJ.
ISHEE, J., for the Court.
¶ 1. Scott Keith Mitchell was convicted in the Circuit Court of Leake County for possession of methamphetamine and precursor chemicals, for which he was sentenced to a total of forty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections ("MDOC"). Aggrieved by his conviction and sentence, Mitchell appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶ 2. On or about April 17, 2002, Leake County Sheriff's Department officers executed a search warrant at Mitchell's residence. The warrant was procured after receiving tips from several confidential informants that Mitchell was engaged in illegal drug activities, and after Leake County deputies patrolling the road near Mitchell's home smelled a strong chemical smell typically associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine. Upon entering the residence to execute the warrant, officers saw Mitchell and Hershell Monk standing in the kitchen, and subsequently handcuffed the men. Upon searching the residence, the officers found paraphernalia and precursor chemicals used to make methamphetamine, as well as methamphetamine. The officers then transported Mitchell and Monk to the Leake County Correctional Facility, and while en route, Mitchell made incriminating statements that the methamphetamine and precursor chemicals were his.
¶ 3. Mitchell was indicted on charges of possession of methamphetamine and precursor chemicals, and was subsequently tried, convicted of both charges, and sentenced to the custody of the MDOC for a total of forty years. Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence, Mitchell appeals, asserting: (1) that the trial court erred when it overruled his motion to suppress the search warrant because there was insufficient probable cause and the issuing judge was not detached and neutral; (2) that he is entitled to a new trial based on discovery violations by the State and the trial court's admission into evidence of an oral confession made by Mitchell; (3) that the results of the search of his residence should not have been admitted into evidence because police did not knock and announce, and the judge issuing the warrant did not have authority to issue a "no knock" warrant.
ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
¶ 4. This Court is not required to make a de novo determination of probable cause on appeal. Pittman v. State, 904 So.2d 1185, 1190(¶ 4) (Miss.Ct.App.2004). Rather, we must only make a determination whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for finding probable cause. Id. As to the standard for probable cause, the test requires examination of the totality of the circumstances. Lee v. State, 435 So.2d 674, 676 (Miss.1983) (). This simply requires the magistrate "to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the `veracity' and `basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317.
¶ 5. The record supports the contention that police received several tips from multiple confidential informants concerning Mitchell's involvement in illegal drug activity. While neither the search warrant nor the affidavit securing it appear in the record on appeal, it seems likely that the veracity and basis of knowledge of these informants was established in procuring the warrant. Leake County Sheriff Greg Waggoner testified to having known one of the informants for "a couple of years." He further testified that the reliability of the informants had previously been established when tips they had given resulted in other arrests. Thus, it is likely that the judge issuing the warrant was satisfied with the informants' veracity and basis of knowledge. There was additionally testimony that officers patrolling the road on which Mitchell lived detected a strong chemical smell typically associated with methamphetamine production, and that the officers believed the smell was originating from the Mitchell residence. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we find that there was a substantial basis for the magistrate's determination of probable cause. We thus find Mitchell's assertions as to this issue to be without merit.
¶ 6. Mitchell neglected to object at trial to the neutrality and detachment of the judge issuing the search warrant. As such, he is procedurally barred from raising the issue for the first time on appeal. See Thorson v. State, 895 So.2d 85, 112(¶ 64) (Miss.2004). However, regardless of the procedural bar, this issue lacks merit.
¶ 7. It is well-settled that an individual issuing a warrant must be a detached and neutral magistrate. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948); McCommon v. State, 467 So.2d 940, 942 (Miss. 1985). The reasoning behind this requirement is that "the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate ... is a more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer `engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.'" United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913-14, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (quoting Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14, 68 S.Ct. 367). Furthermore, a magistrate must actually "`perform his `neutral and detached' function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police.'" Leon, 468 U.S. at 914, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (quoting Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964)). A magistrate failing to adhere to the detached and neutral standard, who is instead acting more as "an adjunct law enforcement officer" cannot validly authorize a search that would otherwise be unconstitutional. Id. Mitchell contends that Justice Court Judge Carolyn Wilcher-Thomas, the judge who issued the warrant, was not detached and neutral because her son is the Leake County Sheriff's Department's only investigator. Mitchell further points to testimony by Leake County Sheriff Greg Waggoner that he cannot recall Judge Wilcher-Thomas ever refusing to sign a search warrant he presented to her. Because the record holds nothing more to support Mitchell's argument as to this issue, we cannot say that Judge Wilcher-Thomas's detachment and neutrality is in question. Furthermore, as discussed above, there was a substantial basis in the record to support a finding of probable cause. Thus, the mere fact that Judge Wilcher-Thomas issued the warrant does not suggest that she was acting as "an adjunct law enforcement officer." Consequently, this issue lacks merit even if it were not procedurally barred.
¶ 8. The standard by which this Court reviews assertions of error "regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence is abuse of discretion." Yoste v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 822 So.2d 935, 936(¶ 7) (Miss. 2002). Mitchell asserts that the trial court erred by allowing the State to enter into evidence an oral confession made by Mitchell while en route to the Leake County Correctional Facility. Mitchell alleges that his trial counsel had no knowledge of the confession until the day of trial.
¶ 9. Rule 9.04(A) of the Uniform Circuit and County Court Rules ("URCCC") states, in pertinent part:
[T]he prosecution must disclose to each defendant or to defendant's attorney .. . the following which is in the possession, custody, or control of the State, the existence of which is known or by the exercise of due diligence may become known to the prosecution:
....
2. Copy of any written or recorded statement of the defendant and the substance of any oral statement made by the defendant.
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... ... "It is well-settled that an individual issuing a warrant must be a detached and neutral magistrate." Mitchell v. State , 931 So.2d 639, 642 ( 7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (first citing Johnson v. United States , 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948) ; then citing McCommon v. State , 467 So.2d 940, 942 (Miss. 1985) ). "On review of a challenge to the issuance of a search warrant, this Court ... ...