Mitchell v. State
| Decision Date | 04 May 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. CR–93–173,CR–93–173 |
| Citation | 518 S.W.3d 659 |
| Parties | Denver MITCHELL, Jr., Petitioner v. STATE of Arkansas, Respondent |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
In 1992, petitioner Denver Mitchell, Jr., was found guilty by a jury of first-degree murder in the beating death of Willard Williamson and sentenced to life imprisonment. We affirmed. Mitchell v. State , 314 Ark. 343, 862 S.W.2d 254 (1993).
On February 21, 2017, Mitchell filed in this court a pro se petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the case and motions for appointment of counsel and to proceed in forma pauperis. He subsequently filed a second motion seeking appointment of counsel and for leave to file a supplemental petition for writ of error coram nobis. We deny the petition. Accordingly, the motions are moot.
The petition for leave to proceed in the trial court is necessary because the trial court can entertain a petition for writ of error coram nobis after a judgment has been affirmed on appeal only after we grant permission. Newman v. State , 2009 Ark. 539, 354 S.W.3d 61. A writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinarily rare remedy. State v. Larimore , 341 Ark. 397, 17 S.W.3d 87 (2000). Coram nobis proceedings are attended by a strong presumption that the judgment of conviction is valid. Green v. State , 2016 Ark. 386, 502 S.W.3d 524 ; Westerman v. State , 2015 Ark. 69, at 4, 456 S.W.3d 374, 376 ; Roberts v. State , 2013 Ark. 56, 425 S.W.3d 771. The function of the writ is to secure relief from a judgment rendered while there existed some fact that would have prevented its rendition if it had been known to the trial court and which, through no negligence or fault of the defendant, was not brought forward before rendition of the judgment. Newman , 2009 Ark. 539, 354 S.W.3d 61. The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a fundamental error of fact extrinsic to the record. Roberts , 2013 Ark. 56, 425 S.W.3d 771.
The writ is allowed only under compelling circumstances to achieve justice and to address errors of the most fundamental nature. Id. A writ of error coram nobis is available for addressing certain errors that are found in one of four categories: (1) insanity at the time of trial, (2) a coerced guilty plea, (3) material evidence withheld by the prosecutor, or (4) a third-party confession to the crime during the time between conviction and appeal. Howard v. State , 2012 Ark. 177, 403 S.W.3d 38. We are not required to accept the allegations in a petition for writ of error coram nobis at face value. Smith v. State , 2015 Ark. 188, at 4, 461 S.W.3d 345, 349 (per curiam).
As one ground for issuance of the writ, Mitchell contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at his trial and on direct appeal. The claim is not cognizable in a petition for the writ. This court has repeatedly held that ineffective-assistance-of-counsel allegations are not within the purview of the writ. Green , 2016 Ark. 386, 502 S.W.3d 524 ; White v. State , 2015 Ark. 151, 460 S.W.3d 285. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are properly raised in a timely petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 (2016). Mason v. State , 2014 Ark. 288, 436 S.W.3d 469 (per curiam). A petition for writ of error coram nobis is not a substitute for raising an issue under Rule 37.1. Travis v. State , 2014 Ark. 82, 2014 WL 689056 (per curiam).
Mitchell also argues that he is actually innocent of the offense of which he was convicted and that the writ should issue because the trial court made errors in his trial and the evidence adduced at trial was contradictory and insufficient to sustain the judgment. As with Mitchell's claims that he was not afforded effective counsel, the assertions do not establish a ground for the writ because they constitute a direct attack on the judgment. See Wallace v. State , 2016 Ark. 400, at 12–13, 503 S.W.3d 754, 761 (per curiam) ().
By its very nature, an issue concerning a trial court's rulings at trial could have been settled in the trial court and on the record on direct appeal. Accordingly, the allegation that the trial court made some mistake in its rulings is not cognizable in a coram nobis proceeding. Mason , 2014 Ark. 288, 436 S.W.3d 469. Likewise, a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is not within the scope of a coram nobis proceeding because the question of the sufficiency of the evidence is to be settled at trial and on the record on direct appeal. Philyaw v. State , 2014 Ark. 130 (per curiam).
The sole claim in Mitchell's coram nobis petition that is cognizable as a basis for the writ is his allegation that the State, through the conduct of the police, suppressed exculpatory evidence. The wrongful withholding of material exculpatory evidence from the defense is a violation of Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and a ground for granting the writ. Hooper v. State , 2015 Ark. 108, 458 S.W.3d 229 (per curiam). The rule set out in Brady also encompasses evidence known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor. Howard , 2012 Ark. 177, at 10, 403 S.W.3d at 45.
The United States Supreme Court held in Brady that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady , 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. In Strickler v. Greene , 527 U.S. 263, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999), the Court revisited Brady and declared that evidence is material "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 527 U.S. at 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (quoting United States v. Bagley , 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) ). There are three elements of a Brady violation: (1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; (2) the evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; (3) prejudice must have ensued. Strickler , 527 U.S. 263, 119 S.Ct. 1936 ; Watts v. State , 2013 Ark. 485, 2013 WL 6157325 (per curiam).
To understand Mitchell's Brady claims, it is necessary to summarize the evidence adduced at trial, much of which comes from Mitchell's testimony. Mitchell testified that he was hitchhiking in Texas when Williamson offered him a ride. The two drove to Paragould where they stopped at Dan's Duck Inn on the night of Friday, August 17, 1990. One of the proprietors of the restaurant, Dan Langston, testified that he recalled the men's presence at the restaurant late on the night of Saturday, August 18, 1990, a few hours before the restaurant was set to close at 11:00 p.m. Langston's wife testified that she was unsure on which night the men were there, but another witness testified in agreement with Langston that it was August 18, 1990, because she remembered having written down that she was to attend a reception on the evening of Friday, August 17, 1990. A gas-station attendant testified that she recalled taking a check from Williamson and writing the date of August 18, 1990, on it, although she said on cross-examination that it was possible that she was mistaken.
Mitchell further testified that he and Williamson had been drinking alcohol and drove to a deserted area outside Paragould near a railroad trestle and continued drinking. Mitchell said that when Williamson exposed his genitals and made sexual advances to him, he pushed Williamson away, and Williamson swung at him with a tire tool. Mitchell admitted fighting with Williamson and leaving him bleeding and unconscious, but he disputed the severity of the beating. Mitchell testified that he took Williamson's truck and fled to Illinois, where he drove the truck to a swampy area and abandoned it. He subsequently gave a statement to a police investigator in Illinois in January 1992 in which he said that he had told his cousin that he beat a man in Arkansas "pretty bad" and kicked him in the face but that he did not intend to kill the man. A tape recording of the statement was admitted into evidence at Mitchell's trial. In his trial testimony, Mitchell admitted kicking Williamson in the face, slapping him twice, and hitting him with his fist twice, but he said that he did not recall striking him with the tire tool.
On the morning of Sunday, August 19, 1990, Williamson, severely beaten but still alive, was found in the area of the trestle by police officers using a search dog. Williamson's genitals were exposed. Beer cans and a tire tool were found in the area. Williamson was taken to a hospital where he died about twelve days later. A forensic pathologist testified that Williamson died of blunt-force injuries to the head that fractured his mandible and which could have been caused by kicking, stomping, or striking with a tire tool.
On August 18, 1990, at about 5:00 p.m., two boys, Lee Ward, aged thirteen, and Ed Rogers, aged fifteen, had reported to a friend of theirs, Jerry Montgomery, that they had seen a man dragging a dead woman across the trestle. Montgomery further testified that he had gone to the trestle to look around at about the time the sun was setting on August 18 but found nothing and could not recall seeing any beer cans. The boys' account of seeing the man with the woman was reported that evening to the Paragould police, who conducted a search of the area but also found nothing that night.
Williamson was found near the trestle on the morning of Sunday, August 19, 1990, and Ward subsequently told the police that Rogers had beaten...
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