Wallace v. State

• Decision Date: 17 November 2016
• Docket Number: No. CR–03–713,CR–03–713
• Citation: 503 S.W.3d 754,2016 Ark. 400
• Parties: Tereginald WALLACE, Appellant v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

2016 Ark. 400

503 S.W.3d 754

Tereginald WALLACE, Appellant

v.STATE of Arkansas, Appellee

No. CR–03–713

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Opinion Delivered November 17, 2016

PER CURIAM

In 2002, a jury found petitioner Tereginald Wallace guilty of murder in the first degree and sentenced him as a habitual offender to 480 months' imprisonment. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed. Wallace v. State (Wallace I) , CR–03–713, 2004 WL 1059787 (Ark. App. May 12, 2004) (unpublished) (original docket no. CACR 03–713).

Now before us is Wallace's third pro se petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court in the case to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis. For an understanding of Wallace's claims for the writ in the instant petition, it is necessary to summarize the facts of the case and the issues already raised by Wallace at trial, on direct appeal, and in his first and second coram-nobis petitions.

In 2002, the body of Lorenzo Petties was discovered near the Arkansas River. His hands and feet were bound, and a wire coat hanger was twisted around his neck. At trial, the State presented an eyewitness, Sam Thomas. Thomas claimed that he had observed Wallace, along with Bryan Salley and Kevin Brown, beat and strangle Petties to death. A tape recording was admitted into evidence at trial that Petties had made prior to his death in which he stated that Wallace had threatened to kill him and that he was "scared to death."

The essence of Wallace's defense was that someone else killed Petties. After the victim was found, the police questioned Thomas about the murder. Thomas implicated Wallace, Salley, and Brown, all of whom were subsequently arrested and charged with the murder. During the interview, Thomas also stated that he had told someone called "Tatum" about what he had seen and that he had gotten a ride that night from someone called "Big Six." Wallace's defense counsel said that Wallace told him that Tatum was Demetrius Spencer and that Big Six was Kenneth Jordan. Jordan was located by the defense in the same cell block as Wallace in the Pulaski County jail. Ultimately, Jordan testified at Wallace's trial that Thomas had told him that Thomas and Petties were "getting high in Salley's truck and he got to tripping and I grabbed the push-wire and I wrapped it around his neck." Jordan said that he immediately told Thomas that he did not want to hear any further details.

Demetrius Spencer was not located prior to trial. On the first day of Wallace's trial, Spencer was shot in the chest. At the hospital, he gave a statement in which he denied that Thomas ever came to him and told him about the murder. He also claimed that someone known as "Blue Boy" told him that Thomas had told him where Petties's body was located.

After the trial ended and the judgment-and-commitment order was entered, Wallace's trial counsel learned of Spencer's statement. Counsel moved for a new trial, alleging that the failure to disclose Spencer's statement constituted a violation of Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The motion was denied.

A Brady violation is established when material evidence favorable to the defense is wrongfully withheld by the State. Pitts v. State , 336 Ark. 580, 986 S.W.2d 407 (1999) (per curiam). In Strickler v. Greene , 527 U.S. 263, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999), the Supreme Court revisited Brady and declared that, when the petitioner contends that material evidence was not disclosed to the defense, the petitioner must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickler , 527 U.S. at 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (quoting United States v. Bagley , 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) ).

In Strickler , the Court also set out the three elements of a true Brady violation: (1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; (2) the evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice must have ensued. Strickler , 527 U.S. 263, 119 S.Ct. 1936 ; see Howard , 2012 Ark. 177, 403 S.W.3d 38. Impeachment evidence that is material, as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule. Bagley , 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375.

On direct appeal, Wallace argued that the trial court erred in denying him an opportunity to cross-examine Thomas about how Thomas had entered into a plea bargain in 1994 wherein an attempted- murder charge in a case would be reduced to aggravated assault. Wallace claimed that cutting off his inquiry into the circumstances surrounding Thomas's plea agreement rose to the level of a "denial of confrontation" and prevented him from challenging Thomas's credibility as a witness. He further argued that, if the jury had heard that Thomas was once believed to have committed attempted murder, the testimony of prosecution witness Kenneth Jordan that Thomas had admitted the murder to him would take "on a whole new light." The court of appeals rejected the arguments, finding that Thomas could be impeached with his aggravated-assault conviction, but not the attempted-murder charge. Wallace I , slip op. at 7, 8.

Wallace also argued on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a continuance to find Demetrius Spencer. He claimed that he worked diligently to find witnesses to corroborate Jordan's testimony and to find Spencer, contending that Spencer's second statement directly contradicted Thomas's statement to police that he had talked to Tatum, which he asserted was "clearly exculpatory" because it undermined Thomas's credibility. The court of appeals found no error. Wallace I , slip op. at 5–6.

As his final point on appeal, Wallace argued that the denial of his motion for a new trial on the grounds of an alleged "Brady /Kyles / Strickler " violation was constitutional error. Wallace was referring to the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence pursuant to Brady , Kyles v. Whi t ley , 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995), and Strickler . Wallace asserted that Spencer was an important witness because his statement directly contradicted Thomas's claim that Thomas told him about the murder. He further claimed that Spencer gave the name of another person, Blue Boy, who told him that Thomas knew where the body was. The court of appeals declined to reverse the judgment, noting that Wallace had the burden of proving a Brady violation and that he did not establish that he was prejudiced based on the facts as presented in the case. That is, Wallace failed to demonstrate, in accordance with Lee v. State , 340 Ark. 504, 11 S.W.3d 553 (2000), that there was a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The court of appeals pointed to the fact that Wallace failed to show that there was any admissible evidence that Wallace could have gleaned from Spencer's testimony. Wallace I , slip op. at 8. Prejudice cannot be proved where the evidence cited as an alleged Brady violation would not have been admissible to impeach the credibility of a witness for the State. In Wallace's case, the court of appeals said that, while it is true that Spencer's statement seemed to contradict Thomas's statement to police that Thomas had told Spencer about the murder, it was clearly, as presented and argued in the case, a collateral matter, and therefore not admissible for cross-examination. The court of appeals further noted that retrial is not required where the newly discovered evidence is not admissible under our rules of evidence. Wallace I , slip op. at 8–9. Moreover, even if the evidence had been admissible, the evidence would have been useful only to raise minor defects in a witness's testimony and would not be sufficient to create a reasonable probability that the results of the proceeding would have been different. The court further noted that Wallace's impeachment evidence, i.e., that Thomas had related some information about the murder to Blue Boy rather than Spencer, was such a minor detail that it could not have given rise to a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different. Wallace I , slip op. at 9.

The balance of Spencer's potential testimony concerned admissions that Thomas allegedly made to Blue Boy. The court of appeals acknowledged that, had Blue Boy been able to testify as to such admissions, they would have been admissible as a statement against penal interest. Ark. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) (2015). However, Blue Boy's alleged statement to Spencer, which only concerned Thomas, was not subject to the statement-against-interest exception. Accordingly, the court of appeals could not conclude that Spencer's testimony would have had any effect on the outcome of the trial, much less that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. Wallace I , slip op. at 8.

In 2005, Wallace filed in this court his first pro se petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis. The petition for leave to proceed in the trial court was necessary because the trial court can entertain a petition for writ of error coram nobis after a judgment has been affirmed on appeal only after we grant permission. Newman v. State , 2009 Ark. 539, 354 S.W.3d 61. A writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinarily rare remedy. State v. Larimore , 341 Ark. 397, 17 S.W.3d 87 (2000). Coram-nobis proceedings are attended by a strong presumption that the judgment of conviction is valid. Id. The function of the writ is to secure relief from a judgment rendered while there existed some fact that would have prevented its rendition if it had been known to the trial court and which, through no negligence or fault of the defendant, was not brought forward before rendition of the judgment....