Mitchell v. State
| Decision Date | 16 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 79292-0-I,79292-0-I |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | RONALD HENRY MITCHELL, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent. |
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO AMEND CASE CAPTION
Respondent, the State of Washington, filed a motion to amend the case caption to correctly reflect the case title State v. Mitchell.
The court has taken the matter under consideration and has determined that the motion should be granted. Now, therefore, it is
ORDERED that the motion to amend the caption is granted. It is further
ORDERED that the case caption will be amended and the case title will be changed to State v. Mitchell.
FOR THE COURT:
/s/_________
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MANN, C.J. — Ronald Mitchell appeals his conviction for murder in the second degree. Mitchell argues: (1) that the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree, (2) that the trial court violated his constitutional right to present a defense by not allowing him to introduce evidence of the victim's prior theft, (3) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, (4) that the prosecution violated his Fifth Amendment rights by commenting on his prior arrest silence, (5) that there was cumulative error depriving him of a fair trial, and (6) that the court erred in requiring him to pay the cost of postrelease supervision as a condition to his community custody. We agree that the trial court erred in requiring Mitchell to pay the cost of postrelease supervision as a condition to his communitycustody, and remand to strike this cost from the judgment and sentence. We otherwise affirm.
The events in this matter occurred in early 2016 at an abandoned house at 21615 29th Ave. S., in Des Moines. The house played host to a variety of individuals and, aside from providing shelter, served as a location for the sale and use of drugs.
Residing in the house were spouses Raymond "Lucky" Carmona and Cristina Perez. Across the hall lived Walter Hester and, occasionally, Jennifer "Froggy" Reitan. Elsewhere in the house, George "GQ" Brown was fixing up a room for himself and his girlfriend, Hazel Jones. Many of the residents used drugs, including heroin and methamphetamine. Not residing in the house, but relevant to these events, were Kali Phillips-Means, Vanessa Martinez, and Ronald "Shorty" Mitchell, all of whom were friends or acquaintances of some of the house's residents.
Early morning on January 7, 2016, Perez and Phillips-Means went out to the local 7-Eleven. While there, the two encountered Mitchell. Mitchell was a heroin dealer, who had sold to Perez in the past. Perez returned to the house alone. When he returned, only Carmona and Brown were at the house. Shortly thereafter, Martinez showed up in a minivan. Brown let Martinez in and she began to prepare drugs for him because he was dopesick1.
Shortly after, Mitchell arrived and knocked on the plywood covering one of the front windows. Brown answered the door to find Mitchell and began chastising him forknocking too loudly. Perez explained to Brown that Mitchell was there to sell drugs, which calmed Brown down. Mitchell entered the house and joined the others drinking while passing out sample packs of drugs.
According to Carmona, Brown and Mitchell began arguing about respect. Carmona heard the argument escalate, so he stepped away towards the door of the room. Carmona then heard a loud bang that sounded like a gunshot. Carmona walked away from the room, not looking back to see what transpired. As Mitchell left, he told Carmona and Martinez (who had entered the house to investigate the noise) to "be quiet." Everyone left the house, with Brown deceased on the futon in Carmona and Perez's room.
Mitchell testified to a different version of these events. According to Mitchell, he was selling heroin and storing the cash proceeds in his shoe. Brown asked to purchase $120 of heroin. While Mitchell was weighing out the heroin, Brown grabbed Mitchell's bag of drugs and struck him in the face with a pistol. Brown told Mitchell to take his shoes off (presumably to steal Mitchell's drug proceeds). After tussling, Mitchell rushed Brown, struck him over the head with a liquor bottle, and dislodged the pistol from his hands. Mitchell gained control of the pistol. Mitchell testified:
Mitchell left the house.
After a lengthy investigation, Mitchell was charged by information in October 2016 with murder in the second degree and unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree.
Following trial, a jury found Mitchell guilty of murder in the second degree and unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree. He was sentenced to 457months. Mitchell appeals.
Mitchell argues first that the trial court erred in denying his request for jury instructions on the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree. We disagree.
A lesser included offense instruction is warranted if (1) each of the elements of the lesser offense is a necessary element of the offense charged (legal prong), and (2) the evidence in the case supports an inference that the lesser crime was committed (factual prong). State v. Tamalini, 134 Wn.2d 725, 728-29, 953 P.2d 450 (1998) (citing State v. Workman, 90 Wn.2d 443, 447-48, 584 P.2d 382 (1978)). We review a trial court's refusal to give an instruction based on the legal prong de novo, and based on the factual prong for an abuse of discretion. State v. Walker, 136 Wn.2d 767, 771-72, 966 P.2d 883 (1998).
Here, the legal prong asks if each of the elements of manslaughter in the second degree are necessary elements of murder in the second degree; the parties concede they are. "A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when, with criminal negligence, he or she causes the death of another person." RCW 9A.32.070(1). "A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when: (a) with intent to cause the death of another person but without premeditation, he or she causes the death of such person or of a third person." RCW 9A.32.050. Because each of the elements of manslaughter in the second degree are necessary elements of murder in the second degree, we continue to the factual prong.
We review the supporting evidence at trial in the light most favorable to the party that requested the instruction. State v. Fernandez-Medina, 141 Wn.2d 448, 455-56, 6 P.3d 1150 (2000). The lesser included instruction "should be administered if the evidence would permit a jury to rationally find a defendant guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater." Fernandez-Medina, 141 Wn.2d at 456. However, the "evidence must affirmatively establish the defendant's theory of the case—it is not enough that the jury might disbelieve the evidence pointing to guilt." Fernandez-Medina, 141 Wn.2d at 456.
A person is found guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when "with criminal negligence, he or she causes the death of another person." RCW 9A.32.070 (emphasis added). A person acts with negligence when "he or she fails to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her failure to be aware of a substantial risk includes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation." RCW 9A.08.010(1)(d).
Alternatively, a person is found guilty of murder in the second degree when "with intent to cause the death of another person but without premeditation, he or she causes the death of such person or of a third person." RCW 9A.32.050(1)(a) (emphasis added). A person acts with intent "when he or she acts with the objective or purpose to accomplish a result which constitutes a crime." RCW 9A.08.010(1)(a).
Here, the trial court found that the evidence in the case did not support an instruction for manslaughter in the second degree. It based this finding on Mitchell's own testimony. Mitchell testified it was an accident and that the gun must have had a "hair trigger," and that it just "went off" or, alternatively, that he shot Brown in self-defense. Mitchell also said that, "I thought to just shoot him." The trial court determined that, based on these statements, Mitchell did not act recklessly or negligently, but perhaps accidentally or in self-defense. As such, the court found that the lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter in the second degree was not warranted.
Mitchell's case is similar to State v. Huff, 76 Wn.2d 577, 458 P.2d 180 (1969). There, the defendant testified that upon entering her husband's bedroom, he had a gun in his hand. Huff, 76 Wn.2d at 578. She grabbed the gun to attempt to get it away from him and the gun went off. Huff, 76 Wn.2d at 578. The gunshot killed the husband and Huff was charged with murder in the first degree. Huff, 76 Wn.2d at 578. Huff appealed the trial court's denial of her request for a lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter. Huff, 76 Wn.2d at 580.
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the instruction, holding that an accidental shooting is not manslaughter. In doing so, they stated:
The jury must conclude from the evidence either that the appellant...
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