State v. Walker

Decision Date12 November 1998
Docket NumberNo. 65912-5,65912-5
Citation136 Wn.2d 767,966 P.2d 883
PartiesThe STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Timothy Todd WALKER, Petitioner.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Timothy T. Walker, Airway Heights, Eleanor M. Coute, Longview, for Petitioner.

Jim Stonier, Cowlitz County Prosecutor, Lisa Tabbut, Deputy, Kelso, for Respondent.

DOLLIVER, J.

Timothy Todd Walker (Defendant) was tried and convicted of second degree murder for fatally stabbing a neighbor in a fight. Defendant challenges the trial court's refusal to present to the jury Defendant's requested self-defense instructions. We affirm Defendant's conviction.

Defendant became acquainted with Roger Shepardson around Christmas 1992. Shepardson lived across the street, and two houses down, from Defendant. Defendant and his wife, Mrs. Michelle Walker, socialized with Shepardson on numerous occasions.

On the evening before Mother's Day 1993, Defendant and Mrs. Walker saw Shepardson go into his house accompanied by another woman. This observation upset Mrs. Walker, at which point she admitted to Defendant that she had been having an affair with Shepardson. Defendant was hurt and upset, but he and his wife apparently came to an agreement that she would no longer talk to Shepardson.

The description of the following events is based on Defendant's own account, and conflicting testimony from other witnesses will not be discussed. On the evening of May 18, 1993, Defendant and Mrs. Walker were at their home and numerous friends were over drinking beer. At some point in time, Defendant noticed his wife had disappeared, so he went to go see where she was. He found her outside, across the street, talking to Shepardson.

Defendant went across the street and walked up to Mrs. Walker and Shepardson to see what was going on. Shepardson and Defendant exchanged words. Defendant told Shepardson he knew of the affair and said the affair was over and Shepardson should leave Defendant and his wife alone. Shepardson became verbally abusive, stating he should "kick [Defendant's] ass" and taunting that, if Defendant was a man, Defendant would do something about it. 3 Verbatim Report of Proceedings at 424. Shepardson began pushing Defendant back with his stomach and "head-butting" Defendant. Id. Defendant "felt that [Shepardson] was trying to get me to swing so we would fight, and I wasn't about to swing. I started walking back and going away from [Shepardson], and I kept repeating it was over with and to leave us alone." 3 Verbatim Report of Proceedings at 425.

Defendant then broke off contact, and he and Mrs. Walker returned to their house. Once inside, Defendant asked Mrs. Walker why she was talking to Shepardson, and she replied that she could talk to Shepardson any time she wanted. Defendant became upset and said, " 'I want to end it.' " 3 Verbatim Report of Proceedings at 426. By this, he claims he meant he "wanted [Shepardson] to leave us alone. That's all I ever wanted was him to leave us alone." Id.

Defendant grabbed from a kitchen drawer a large hunting knife with a fixed five-inch blade and put it in his back pocket. He went back outside because "I wanted to tell [Shepardson] to stay away from us and leave us alone." Id. He took the knife with him because "I thought he would kill me if I got in a fight with him." 3 Verbatim Report of Proceedings at 426-27. This claimed fear was partially based upon Defendant's being of smaller stature than Shepardson and Defendant's having a permanent back injury which caused him pain and allegedly limited his movements. Defendant was afraid of Shepardson and claims he did not intend to fight. He merely "intended to argue with him to tell him to leave us alone; just stay away from us and leave us alone." 3 Verbatim Report of Proceedings at 427. On cross-examination, he admitted knowing a fight could possibly occur.

When Defendant came out of his house and onto the porch, Shepardson shouted to him from the street, " 'Come on. Let's do it.' " Id. In response to this, Defendant left his porch, went through the front gate, and out into the street.

Defendant claims he went forth in response to Shepardson's invitation because he "thought it was going to be a yelling match." 3 Verbatim Report of Proceedings at 428. Instead, when Defendant went out toward the street, Shepardson came to meet him and immediately began swinging his fists. Defendant claims Shepardson continuously punched Defendant, backing him up and pushing him back against a car. Defendant tried to hit back, but could not "get past [Shepardson's] arm." Id. Once Defendant had been pushed back up against a car, he claims he feared Shepardson was going to kill him. Defendant took the knife out of his pocket and tried to hit Shepardson in his shoulder to get him off. Shepardson continued punching Defendant. Defendant claims he struck out about three times with the knife. Finally, Shepardson fell over backward, pulling Defendant down on top of him. Defendant pulled himself away, and Shepardson slid to the ground. The State's medical witness testified Shepardson died from a knife wound to his aorta.

After hearing all of the witnesses and reviewing all the evidence, the trial judge heard argument from counsel regarding what instructions should be given to the jury. The court ruled Defendant could not present any self-defense instructions to the jury. Defendant's claim to self-defense rested solely upon the assertion that, as a result of the beating he was receiving from Shepardson, he began to fear for his life and used the knife. The judge found no evidence supporting Defendant's claimed belief that he was in serious danger of being killed or grievously injured by Shepardson. There was no physical evidence that Defendant "really suffered any kind of injury." 3 Verbatim Report of Proceedings at 478. The judge quoted from State v. Griffith, 91 Wash.2d 572, 589 P.2d 799 (1979) and stated a simple assault or ordinary battery could not justify the taking of a human life.

The jury was instructed on the offenses of first degree murder, second degree murder, and first degree manslaughter. The jury found Defendant guilty of second degree murder. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, and one of the issues raised was the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on self-defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in an unpublished opinion. See State v. Walker, 81 Wash.App. 1035 (1996).

This court granted review and simply remanded the case to the Court of Appeals in light of this court's decision in State v. Walden, 131 Wash.2d 469, 932 P.2d 1237 (1997). On remand, the Court of Appeals adhered to its initial decision. This court again granted review.

The standard for review applied to this appeal depends on whether the trial court's refusal to grant the jury instructions was based upon a matter of law or of fact. A trial court's refusal to give instructions to a jury, if based on a factual dispute, is reviewable only for abuse of discretion. State v. Lucky, 128 Wash.2d 727, 731, 912 P.2d 483 (1996), overruled on other grounds by State v. Berlin, 133 Wash.2d 541, 544, 947 P.2d 700 (1997). The trial court's refusal to give an instruction based upon a ruling of law is reviewed de novo. Id.

A summation of the law on self-defense is necessary. A defendant cannot present a self-defense instruction to the jury without first "producing some evidence which tends to prove that the killing occurred in circumstances amounting to self-defense." State v. Janes, 121 Wash.2d 220, 237, 850 P.2d 495, 22 A.L.R.5th 921 (1993) (citing State v. Acosta, 101 Wash.2d 612, 619, 683 P.2d 1069 (1984); State v. McCullum, 98 Wash.2d 484, 488, 656 P.2d 1064 (1983) (plurality by Williams, J.)). One of the elements of self-defense is the person relying on the self-defense claim must have had a reasonable apprehension of great bodily harm. Janes, 121 Wash.2d at 237, 850 P.2d 495 (citing RCW 9A.16.050).

In determining whether a defendant has produced sufficient evidence to show reasonable apprehension of harm, the trial court must apply a mixed subjective and objective analysis. The subjective aspect of the inquiry requires the trial court to place itself in the defendant's shoes and view the defendant's acts in light of all the facts and circumstances known to the defendant. Janes, 121 Wash.2d at 238, 850 P.2d 495. The objective aspect requires the court to determine what a reasonable person in the defendant's situation would have done. Id. The imminent threat of great bodily harm does not actually have to be present, so long as a reasonable person in the defendant's situation could have believed that such threat was present. See State v. LeFaber, 128 Wash.2d 896, 900-01, 913 P.2d 369 (1996).

The importance of the objective portion of the inquiry cannot be underestimated. Absent the reference point of a reasonably prudent person, a defendant's subjective beliefs would always justify the homicide. Janes, 121 Wash.2d at 239, 850 P.2d 495. "Applying a purely subjective standard in all cases would give free rein to the short-tempered, the pugnacious and the foolhardy who see threats of harm where the rest of us would not...." Janes, 121 Wash.2d at 240, 850 P.2d 495 (quoting Susan Estrich, Defending Women, 88 Mich. L.Rev. 1430, 1435 (1990)); see also State v. Hill, 76 Wash.2d 557, 566, 458 P.2d 171 (1969) (If defendant were the sole judge as to the existence of the peril of great bodily harm confronting him and the amount of force necessary to protect himself against it, then "there would be no limit to the amount of force which a person could use in defending himself against such alleged peril."). The objective part of the standard "keeps self-defense firmly rooted in the narrow concept of necessity." Janes, 121 Wash.2d at 240, 850 P.2d 495.

With both subjective and objective aspects taken into account, the trial judge must determine whether the...

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