Mitchell v. State

• Decision Date: 10 February 2020
• Docket Number: S19A1147
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Parties: MITCHELL v. The STATE.

307 Ga. 855

838 S.E.2d 847

MITCHELL

v.The STATE.

S19A1147

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: February 10, 2020

David S. West, for appellant.

Julia F. Slater, District Attorney, Alonza Whitaker, Benjamin E. Gephardt, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Katherine D. Emerson, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Warren, Justice.

Sandy Mitchell, Jr., was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Byron Brown.¹ On appeal, Mitchell contends that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to certain trial testimony from a detective in this case on the grounds that it was improper expert opinion, and that other testimony offered by the same detective was admitted in violation of Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Mitchell also contends that the trial court erred in permitting the detective to testify about the alleged Brady violation evidence and in admitting a particular autopsy photograph into evidence. For the reasons that follow, we disagree and affirm Mitchell's convictions.

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdicts, the evidence presented at Mitchell's trial showed the following. In the early morning hours of September 23, 2012, after spending time with a friend who was staying at a Motel 6 in Columbus, Mitchell had an employee of the motel call a taxi. Brown was the taxi driver who picked Mitchell up from the motel at approximately 2:00 a.m. According to Mitchell's later statement to police, he had Brown drive him toward Mitchell's home and then drop him off at the intersection of Munson Drive and Shelby Street, which was near Mitchell's home. The taxi company's policy required drivers to radio in when they dropped off a passenger. Brown radioed in after picking Mitchell up, but did not radio in again that night. Less than an hour later, Brown was found slumped over in his taxi at the intersection of Munson Drive and Shelby Street, dead from a gunshot wound

to the back of the head.

At trial, one of Mitchell's neighbors testified that at approximately 2:30 a.m., he saw a taxi sitting at the intersection of Munson Drive and Shelby Street, approached the taxi, and saw Brown slumped over in the front seat. Shortly thereafter, while he was standing outside his home, the neighbor saw an African-American man wearing a white shirt walk around the front of the taxi and then run away. The neighbor then called police.

When police arrived, they found Brown unresponsive with a gunshot wound

to the head. The taxi was still running and the lights were still on. Police discovered gunpowder residue on the back of the hat that Brown was wearing and a shell casing underneath Brown's seat.

Based on call logs from the cab company, investigators determined that Brown's last pickup was at the Motel 6 and that the request for a taxi was made on behalf of a person from Room 234. Police discovered that Room 234 was rented to Mitchell's friend, so they went to the Motel 6 and questioned him. The friend informed police that he had spent time with Mitchell earlier that night and told them where Mitchell lived. Police also questioned the Motel 6 employee who called the taxi for Mitchell, and he identified Mitchell from a photographic lineup as the man who requested the taxi.

Police arrived at Mitchell's home at 6:30 that morning. Mitchell was not home, but police spoke with his wife, who said that she had not seen Mitchell since 10:00 the night before. Police left but returned later that afternoon, and Mitchell's wife consented to a search of the property, which uncovered a .380 handgun under the air conditioning unit in the backyard, along with a rolled up white t-shirt and a black nylon cap. Later, ballistics and forensic testing confirmed that the handgun was the murder weapon, and that the cap matched fibers found in Brown's taxi. Police obtained a warrant for Mitchell's arrest, and Mitchell was later arrested at nearby Fort Benning.

After being advised of rights under Miranda ,² Mitchell consented to a custodial interview in which he admitted to taking a taxi ride from the Motel 6 to the intersection of Munson Drive and Shelby Street, but he denied shooting Brown. He also claimed that he discovered that Brown had been shot when, after he was dropped off, he saw the taxi's lights from his backyard and walked back to the taxi to see why it was still there.³ According to Mitchell, he then left and "snuck" onto Fort Benning with the help of a friend. When questioned about the gun found in his backyard, Mitchell said, "someone must have dropped it" there. But he admitted that he was wearing a white t-shirt and a nylon cap when he rode in Brown's taxi. In addition, Mitchell's stepbrother received a text message from Mitchell two days before the shooting stating that Mitchell wanted to rob someone.

Mitchell does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Nevertheless, consistent with this Court's general practice in murder cases, we have reviewed the record and conclude that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mitchell was guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 318-319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. Mitchell argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for (a) failing to object to certain testimony Detective Amanda Hogan offered on behalf of the State, on the theory that it was improper expert opinion testimony and (b) failing to object or move for a mistrial, on Brady grounds, because of other testimony Detective Hogan offered at trial.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant generally must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant. Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687-695, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ; Wesley v. State , 286 Ga. 355, 356, 689 S.E.2d 280 (2010). To satisfy the deficiency prong, a defendant must demonstrate that his attorney "performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms."

Romer v. State , 293 Ga. 339, 344, 745 S.E.2d 637 (2013) ; see also Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687-688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. This requires a defendant to overcome the "strong presumption" that trial counsel's performance was adequate. Marshall v. State , 297 Ga. 445, 448, 774 S.E.2d 675 (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted). To satisfy the prejudice prong, a defendant must establish a reasonable probability that, in the absence of counsel's deficient performance, the result of the trial would have been different. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. "If an appellant fails to meet his or her burden of proving either prong of the Strickland test, the reviewing court does not have to examine the other prong." Lawrence v. State , 286 Ga. 533, 533-534, 690 S.E.2d 801 (2010). We conclude that Mitchell has failed to show that any of his trial counsel's alleged failures were deficient.

(a) Expert Opinion Testimony .

Mitchell's first claim stems from Detective Hogan's testimony about the crime scene, and specifically that there was gunpowder residue on Brown's hat; that the gunshot "was at a close range inside the vehicle"; and that the bullet entered the back of Brown's head and exited from his left eye. She also testified about how and in which direction the gunshot casing would have been ejected from the gun, and about the location in the vehicle where that casing was found. According to Mitchell, Detective Hogan provided expert ballistic, forensic, and firearm testimony outside the ken of the average juror, thus requiring the State to lay a foundation for Detective Hogan's expertise in those areas—yet the State failed to lay the requisite foundation.

Mitchell acknowledges that his trial counsel objected to the complained-of testimony, but contends that his trial counsel merely voiced a generalized objection and that he was ineffective for failing to object specifically that Detective Hogan's testimony was "improper expert testimony." But a closer review of the transcript reveals that trial counsel did object on the grounds that Mitchell urges on appeal, and, as a result, counsel was not deficient in this respect.

Indeed, when the State asked Detective Hogan, "from your experience where do you think that the shot came from that – that killed Mr. Brown?" defense counsel said "I object. I'm not sure she would be qualified. That would be a ballistics question I would think." The trial court then asked whether the prosecutor could "lay a foundation." As the prosecutor sought to do so, Detective Hogan's answers veered back into what she observed in this case, and defense counsel objected again because "[t]his isn't laying a foundation anymore." The Court agreed, directing the prosecutor to "[i]nquire of the witness's experience and training in the area that you're examining." Despite the prosecutor's effort to do so, Detective Hogan again turned to the facts of this case, prompting defense counsel to complain, "again, we're back now to testifying about this case. I think if we could voir dire expertise, not – not to elicit facts about this particular matter."

The trial court then held a sidebar with the attorneys, telling the prosecutor, "what I wanted you to do was voir dire her on her expertise and – as a foundation for her giving an opinion, not have her testify to what you had prepared her to testify until she is accepted as an expert in that area." The prosecutor respond...