Mitola v. Johns Hopkins Univ. Applied Physics Lab.

• Decision Date: 03 December 1993
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. MJG-91-3010.
• Citation: 839 F. Supp. 351
• Parties: Dan J. MITOLA, Plaintiff, v. JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY APPLIED PHYSICS LABORATORY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

839 F. Supp. 351

Dan J. MITOLA, Plaintiff, v. JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY APPLIED PHYSICS LABORATORY, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. MJG-91-3010.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

December 3, 1993.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Robert M. Schwartzman, Resnick & Abraham, Baltimore, MD, for plaintiff.

James A. Johnson, Semmes, Bowen & Semmes, Warren B. Daly, Jr., James Warwick, Asst. U.S. Atty. Baltimore, MD, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GARBIS, District Judge.

The Court has before it (1) Defendant's Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory ("JHU/APL") Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff Dan J. Mitola ("Plaintiff" or "Mitola"), (2) Defendant's Alpha Marine Services, Inc. ("Alpha") Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff Mitola, and (3) JHU/APL's and Alpha's Cross Motions for Summary Judgment on Alpha's Cross Claim. The Court has considered the legal memoranda submitted by the parties and has held a hearing.

I. INTRODUCTION

JHU/APL is an educational and research facility that also conducts classified missions for the Navy. Beginning in June 1988, JHU/APL chartered the R/V AMY CHOUEST ("the Vessel") from Alpha for the purpose of conducting underwater acoustical research involving the measurement of acoustical wave propagation through the ocean. Plaintiff Mitola, an employee of JHU/APL for 20 years, was stationed aboard the Vessel as the Supervisor of Marine Operations during a voyage that began on November 17, 1988. Mitola's responsibilities included the deployment and recovery of a towed underwater sensor involved in the acoustical research. On November 24, 1988, the Vessel ran into heavy weather several hundred miles off the coast of Bermuda. Mitola was injured when, while out on the Vessel's aft-deck, he was knocked down by a large wave.

Mitola has sued JHU/APL and Alpha for negligence under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.App. §§ 688. Mitola also brought actions against JHU/APL and Alpha for the alleged unseaworthiness of the Vessel and for maintenance and cure. In response, Alpha has filed a Cross Claim against JHU/APL, seeking indemnification and/or contribution should it be held liable for any of Plaintiff's injuries. JHU/APL and Alpha have filed Motions for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff, and Cross Motions for Summary Judgment against each other on Alpha's Cross Claim.

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court concludes that:

1. Even assuming Mitola was a "seaman" under general maritime law principles, his Jones Act claim is barred by the Oceanographic Research Vessel Act.

2. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Mitola's claim of unseaworthiness.

3. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Mitola's claim for maintenance and care.

4. Alpha is entitled to summary judgment against JHU/APL on its indemnity claim.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment must be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. As stated in Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1012 (4th Cir.1991):

Summary judgment is not appropriate when there is an issue of fact for a jury to determine at trial, which is the case when there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party upon which a jury can return a verdict for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The Supreme Court has explained that summary judgment is appropriate when a party, after adequate time for discovery, "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Failure of proof of an essential element of the case "necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.

Therefore, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, although realistically. The essential question is whether a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party or whether the movant would at trial be entitled to a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding a verdict for the non-movant.

III. PLAINTIFF'S JONES ACT CLAIMS

Under federal law, a "seaman" is entitled to sue his employer, and only the single entity determined to be his employer, for negligence pursuant to the Jones Act. 42 U.S.C.App. § 688; see also Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 791, 69 S.Ct. 1317, 1321-22, 93 L.Ed. 1692, reh'g denied, 338 U.S. 839, 70 S.Ct. 32, 94 L.Ed. 513 (1949); Fitzgerald v. A.L. Burbank & Co., 451 F.2d 670, 674 (2nd Cir.1971).

The Supreme Court has recently redefined the term "seaman" solely in terms of the employee's connection to a vessel in navigation. McDermott Int'l., Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 111 S.Ct. 807, 112 L.Ed.2d 866 (1991). An individual does not have to "aid in navigation" to qualify as a seaman, but his "duties must `contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission'" in order for him to achieve seaman status. Id. at 355, 111 S.Ct. at 817 (citation omitted).

In this case, looking solely at the Jones Act and general maritime law principles, Mitola can avoid summary judgment on the issue of his status as a "seaman." Indeed, it can be assumed for purposes of this discussion that on the foregoing criteria, he would be a "seaman." However, the foregoing are not the sole criteria to be utilized.

The Oceanographic Research Vessel Act ("ORVA"), 46 U.S.C.App. §§ 441-444, precludes scientific personnel from recovering under certain statutory provisions, including the Jones Act. Section 444 of ORVA reads:

Scientific personnel on an oceanographic research vessel shall not be considered seamen under the provisions of title 53 of the Revised Statutes and Act sic amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto.¹

Section 441(2) of ORVA defines "scientific personnel" as "persons who are aboard a vessel solely for the purpose of engaging in scientific research, instructing or receiving instruction, in oceanography or limnology."

In applying ORVA, courts have held that one vessel may carry both a regular crew not covered by ORVA and a scientific team covered by ORVA. In Sennett v. Shell Oil Co., 325 F.Supp. 1, 3 (E.D.La.1971), the court reviewed the purpose and legislative history of ORVA and held: "Vessels engaged in oceanographic research are operated by a crew that performs the duties usually assigned to seamen. These vessels also carry a complement of scientific personnel who are engaged in research and have nothing to do with the navigation or maintenance of the vessel."

When determining an individual's status then, the essential inquiry concerns the individual's basic purpose on board the vessel. Id. at 6. Performance of seamen's functions or other manual tasks, if incidental to one's primary scientific research duties, will not change an individual's designation from scientific personnel to seaman. In Sennett, the court catalogued the plaintiff's duties, finding that

Albert Sennett worked primarily with the instrument group, reading, maintaining and operating the computers and other instruments that recorded the research information. In addition, Sennett assisted in loading supplies aboard the R/V NIOBE, maintained the stern of the vessel and his living quarters and painted equipment.

325 F.Supp. at 6. Despite the seaman-like nature of some of the plaintiff's tasks, the Sennett court held that

the affidavits and depositions filed make it clear that Sennett was aboard the R/V NIOBE for the purpose solely of engaging in scientific research. He may incidentally have done other things but these were not the purpose of his engagement or presence aboard ship. Accordingly, he must be classified as "scientific personnel."

Id.; see also Presley v. Vessel CARRIBEAN SEAL, 709 F.2d 406 (5th Cir.1983) (compressor mechanic classified as scientific personnel).

This Court is aware that ordinarily, where there is evidence supporting seaman status, the determination of whether an injured employee is a seaman covered by the Jones Act is a question of fact for the jury. McDermott, 498 U.S. at 355, 111 S.Ct. at 817. However, the McDermott Court made clear that "the court must not abdicate its duty to determine if there is a reasonable basis to support the jury's conclusion.... Summary judgment or a directed verdict is mandated where the facts and the law will reasonably support only one conclusion." Id. at 356, 111 S.Ct. at 818.

In this case, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to Mitola's status. He was one of the scientific personnel aboard the vessel and thus not a "seaman" for Jones Act purposes by virtue of ORVA.

Here, the evidence undisputedly establishes that Mitola was a member of the scientific research team, not the Vessel's crew. Mitola has admitted that Alpha's crew was responsible for the transportation and other routine functions of the Vessel, and that the scientific team, including Mitola, was responsible for the testing operations on the back deck. (Mitola Dep. at 28-30; Mitola Aff. ¶ 10.) Mitola testified that he did not handle the ship's lines and had no role in the navigation of the vessel. (Mitola Dep. at 61, 98-99; see also Thompson Aff. ¶ 13 ("At no time did Mitola's duties involve the operation, maintenance or provisioning of the vessel R/V AMY CHOUEST.")) His activities confined to the rear deck and laboratory, Mitola had no discernible role in the everyday functioning of the Vessel. That was left to Alpha's Captain and crew. In accordance with this division of duties, the test plan, which distinguished the Vessel's crew from the scientific...