Mitrano v. Houser

• Decision Date: 16 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. M2005-02287-COA-R3-CV.,M2005-02287-COA-R3-CV.
• Parties: Peter Paul MITRANO v. Matthan HOUSER.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

240 S.W.3d 854

Peter Paul MITRANO v. Matthan HOUSER.

No. M2005-02287-COA-R3-CV.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, at Nashville.

Assigned on Briefs April 2, 2007.

May 16, 2007.

Permission to Appeal Denied by Supreme Court September 17, 2007.

Peter Paul Mitrano, Merrifield, Virginia, pro se Appellant.

Michael R. Giaimo, Livingston, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Matthan Houser.

OPINION

SHARON G. LEE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which HERSCHEL P. FRANKS, P.J., and CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., J., joined.

The trial court dismissed this action for unpaid rent pursuant to the res judicata doctrine, holding that all claims and issues raised by the complaint were or could have been previously litigated in the New Hampshire court system and were resolved in the Defendant tenant's favor. The trial court also granted the Defendant's motion for sanctions under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 and ordered the Plaintiff to pay $1,500 of Defendant's attorney's fees. We hold that under applicable New Hampshire law, the judgment entered by a New Hampshire Superior Court dismissing Plaintiff's previous action for unpaid rent against the same Defendant because of Plaintiff's repeated discovery abuses and flagrant disregard of court orders is a judgment on the merits for purposes of the res judicata doctrine. We therefore affirm the trial court's dismissal of this action. However, because we find that the procedural "safe harbor" provisions of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11.03 were not complied with in this case, we reverse the trial court's award of attorney's fees as sanctions.

I. Background

Peter Paul Mitrano brought this pro se¹ action against Matthan Houser, one of several tenants under a residential lease agreement for the rental of a house in Hanover, New Hampshire. Mr. Houser answered, alleging as an affirmative defense that Mr. Mitrano's claims had already been litigated to his detriment in New Hampshire, and that the court previously hearing his claims had found the lease at issue to be illegal and invalid under New Hampshire law. Mr. Houser further alleged that the New Hampshire court had ruled that Mr. Mitrano violated the implied covenants of habitability and of quiet enjoyment, as well as the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act. Mr. Houser argued that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel precluded Mr. Mitrano's claims in the present action, and they should be dismissed.

Mr. Houser filed a motion styled "Motion to Dismiss and For Sanctions" along with his answer. Attached to his motion, among other things, were copies of two orders of the Superior Court of Grafton County, New Hampshire in a prior lawsuit where Mr. Mitrano sued several tenants, including Mr. Houser, for unpaid rent under the same lease as is involved in this case. Because the findings of the New Hampshire court provide important background to the present action and the court's rulings are germane to the res judicata issue presented here, we reproduce the New Hampshire court's order at some length in pertinent part as follows:

The plaintiff [Mr. Mitrano] prays the Court to grant his Motion to Continue ..., claiming that he is a practicing attorney involved in complex litigation that requires his attention in other jurisdictions. He also seeks to reschedule the taking of his deposition for the same reason. The defendants object to rescheduling the plaintiff's deposition, on the grounds that three previous extensions have already been granted since the date for the deposition was agreed [upon] in open court on December 6, 2002. The defendants contend that [Mr. Mitrano's] consistent failure to appear for his deposition continues a pattern of flagrant disregard of court orders that has characterized [his] behavior in this case since its commencement before this Court. The Court agrees. The plaintiff's Motion to Continue is DENIED. The defendants' Motion for Entry of Judgment is GRANTED.

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The defendants also counterclaimed that [Mr. Mitrano]:

(1) Knowingly and willingly leased his property, 6 Stevens Road, Hanover, to eight Dartmouth students, the three defendants and five others, on April 14, 2001, in violation of . . . the Town of Hanover Zoning Ordinance which strictly limits the rental of non-owner-occupied dwelling units to three unrelated persons.

(2) Obtained one copy of the lease with all, or most, of the eight signatures, and a second copy of the lease with only three signatures. It is the second copy of the lease that [Mr. Mitrano] attached to his Small Claim Complaint filed in Lebanon District Court.

(3) Refused to accept the defendants' response to the Zoning Administrator's October 22, 2001 letter, from which the defendants had first learned of the zoning violation, and refused to accept the defendants' notification that they intended to vacate the property as of December 31, 2001, due to the violation of the Zoning Ordinance and the illegality of the lease.

(4) Sued the defendants for the December 2001 rent despite the fraudulent lease and the fact that the defendants had already paid the last month of rent as a security deposit before they were allowed to enter the property.

(5) Rented 6 Stevens Road to the defendants when it failed to meet the minimum standards for health and safety set forth in RSA 48-A and local codes and ordinances, in that it was rat and fungi infested, without functional fire alarms, plumbing, water, electrical wires or adequate plaster on the walls.

(6) Neglected and failed to respond to repeated requests for specific repairs from defendants and their parents in August, September, October and November of 2001.

To support their allegations, the defendants requested the following discovery from [Mr. Mitrano]: [listing requested documents].

In an Order dated March 28, 2002 . . . this Court GRANTED the defendants' Motion to Compel these documents. On June 19, 2002, the Court found the plaintiff in contempt for not having complied with the March 28, 2002 Court Order, awarded attorney's fees and costs to the defendants for having to file repeated Motions for Contempt, and ordered the production of all documents on or before July 1, 2002... The Court subsequently received no fewer than six Motions to Extend Time for [Mr. Mitrano] to comply with the Court's June 19, 2002 Order. The Court denied the sixth Motion to Extend Time on September 3, 2002. In between the Motions to Extend Time were repeated Motions from [Mr. Mitrano] to Strike and to Dismiss.

In their first Motion for Entry of Judgment against [Mr. Mitrano] ... the defendants cite the repeated and continuing discovery violations as reason for the sanction. This was reiterated in a Renewed Motion for Entry of Judgment on October 12, 2002, which came before the Court for a hearing on December 6, 2002. Though the Court at that time declined to order the sanction of an entry of judgment, the Court ruled:

"[Mr. Mitrano's] delay in providing reasonably necessary discovery materials to the defendants in this matter is inexcusable and the product of neglect. [Mr. Mitrano's] initial disregard of and protracted delay in compliance with legitimate discovery orders in this case demonstrates bad faith."

The Court awarded the defendants attorney's fees and costs. It was at this hearing that the date of January 6, 2003, was agreed on between the parties and the Court for [Mr. Mitrano's] deposition. The deposition, at [Mr. Mitrano's] request, was rescheduled for February 10, 2003; March 19, 2003; and April 11, 2003. [Mr. Mitrano] did not show up at the April 11, 2003 date, and instead filed a Motion to Reschedule the Deposition and Continue Trial on April 10, 2002. The defendants countered with the Second Renewal for Entry of Judgment against [Mr. Mitrano] and a Motion to Attach.

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The Court rules that [Mr. Mitrano] has abused the process of litigation by repeated discovery violations. Despite clear and repeated orders from this Court to comply with discovery requests, and generous grants from the Court on Motions to Extend, [Mr. Mitrano] has refused to cooperate in any way. In fact, [he] has used the court system, designed to ensure due process to litigants, to procrastinate, delay and obfuscate the causes of justice. When the resources of the court have been mistreated in this fashion, an entry of judgment is an appropriate sanction ...

Notice was given and a hearing held to ensure due process to [Mr. Mitrano] prior to this entry of judgment against him ... The defendants' Renewed Motion for Entry of Judgment against [Mr. Mitrano] is GRANTED. Judgment against [Mr. Mitrano] on [his] writ and for the defendants on their counterclaim.

After entry of this order, the New Hampshire court conducted a hearing to determine the appropriate amount of damages on the tenants' counterclaim. Mr. Mitrano was present at the hearing, and both sides were given opportunity to present arguments and supporting proof. The New Hampshire court then entered an order making the following factual findings and conclusions after considering the proof presented:

This matter is before the Court on defendants' request for an assessment of damages. A hearing was held on December 12, 2003 ... The plaintiff and cross-defendant, Peter Paul Mitrano, appeared pro se ... The hearing proceeded by offers of proof.

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The Court finds that the defendants are entitled to actual damages incurred as the result of the plaintiff Mitrano's willful breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment in violation of RSA 540-A:2.

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Thus, the civil remedies available under the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act, RSA 358-A:10, are applicable here, where the Court has entered judgment against plaintiff Mitrano on the defendants' counterclaim for breach of quiet enjoyment under RSA 540-A:2. RSA 358-A:10 provides for actual damages, and if the court finds that the act or practice was a willful or knowing violation, "it shall award as much as 3 times, but not less than 2 times, such amount."

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