Mizner v. North River Homes, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 May 1995
• Docket Number: No. 66983,66983
• Citation: 913 S.W.2d 23
• Parties: Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,272 Gale, Wanda, Travis and Canin MIZNER, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. NORTH RIVER HOMES, INC. and Cape Mobile Home Mart, Inc., d/b/a Champion Homes of America, Defendants/Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 23

913 S.W.2d 23

Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,272

Gale, Wanda, Travis and Canin MIZNER, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. NORTH RIVER HOMES, INC. and Cape Mobile Home Mart, Inc., d/b/a Champion Homes of America, Defendants/Respondents.

No. 66983.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Eastern District,

Division Two.

May 30, 1995.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to

Supreme Court Denied July 27, 1995.

Case Transferred to Supreme Court

Sept. 19, 1995.

Case Retransferred to Court of Appeals

Jan. 23, 1996.

Original Opinion Reinstated

Feb. 5, 1996.

Walters Bender & Strohbehn, P.C., Kip D. Richards, Kansas City, for appellants.

Phillips & Phillips, Patrick J. Phillips, Don V. Kelly, St. Louis, for North River Homes, Inc.

Anderson & Gilbert, Joel D. Monson, St. Louis, for Cape Mobile Home Mart, Inc.

PUDLOWSKI, Judge.

This is an appeal from a dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for damages in strict products liability and negligence for injuries resulting from their exposure to formaldehyde gas in their mobile home. The motion court dismissed plaintiffs' state law claims on the basis that a regulation issued by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) preempted them. We reverse and remand because Congress expressed a clear intent that such regulations should not affect common law damage suits.

Plaintiffs purchased a mobile home from defendant Cape Mobile Home Mart, Inc., in Cape Girardeau, Missouri, in June of 1990. This mobile home was manufactured in Alabama by defendant North River Homes, Inc. Plaintiffs moved the mobile home from the dealership in Cape Girardeau to Franklin County, Missouri. Plaintiffs, a family of four, lived in the mobile home as their permanent residence from June of 1990 through April of 1993.

Plaintiffs allege that the particle board, cabinets, paneling, carpeting, carpet padding, and insulation contained urea-formaldehyde resins, adhesives, and bonding agents which emitted toxic formaldehyde gas into the interior of their mobile home. They allege that this gas caused nausea, headaches, vomiting, breathing difficulties, and other effects upon their neurological, respiratory, and immune systems. They brought suit in the St. Louis City Circuit Court, alleging numerous grounds for relief. Prior to the hearing on defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' first amended petition, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed all counts except three: Count II, strict liability for manufacturing and selling an unreasonably dangerous and defective product; Count IV, strict liability for failure to warn of the dangerous condition; and Count VI, negligence for failure to use reasonable care in the design, manufacture, testing, and inspection of the mobile home and its components.

The circuit court dismissed the remaining three counts on the basis that they were preempted by federal law. The sole question on appeal is whether state law damage claims for strict liability and negligence are preempted by HUD regulations promulgated under 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5401--5426 (1983), the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974 (Manufactured Home Act). 24 CFR § 3280.308 establishes maximum formaldehyde emission levels for plywood and particleboard materials in manufactured homes. 24 CFR § 3280.309 requires manufacturers to place a health notice about formaldehyde in every manufactured home's kitchen.

The intent of Congress is the primary issue in determining the preemptive effect of federal law. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 515, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992). Federal law does not preempt areas of traditional state law unless that is " 'the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' " CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 1737, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993), quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947). The best evidence of Congress' intent is the plain wording of any express preemption clause in the statute. CSX, 507 U.S. at 664, 113 S.Ct. at 1737. If an express provision is present, the language of that provision usually controls, yet implied preemption is still possible if an actual conflict with state law is demonstrated. Freightliner Corporation v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, ---- - ----, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 1487-88, 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995).

In the instant case, the Manufactured Home Act contains two preemption provisions. ¹ The first, § 5403(d), indicates that state law standards which differ from federal standards are generally preempted:

Whenever a Federal manufactured home construction and safety standard established under this chapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any manufactured home covered, any standard regarding construction or safety applicable to the same aspect of performance of such manufactured home which is not identical to the Federal manufactured home construction and safety standard.

42 U.S.C.A. § 5403(d) (1983). However, the second preemption provision, § 5409(c), indicates that compliance with federal standards does not affect common law:

Compliance with any Federal manufactured home construction or safety standard issued under this chapter does not exempt any person from any liability under common law.

42 U.S.C.A. § 5409(c). To interpret the effect of these provisions, we must construe them narrowly in light of the presumption against preemption of state police powers. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517, 112 S.Ct. at 2618. If the express language does not clearly preempt state law, then we must ascertain whether plaintiffs' common law actions actually conflict with federal law and whether plaintiffs' lawsuit frustrates the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. Freightliner, supra at ---- - ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1487-88.

The Western District of this court recently interpreted two preemption clauses, with essentially identical language, in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. (Motor Vehicle Act). Section 1392(d) of the Motor Vehicle Act provided:

Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard ... is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle ... any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle ... which is not identical to the Federal Standard.

Loulos v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 882 S.W.2d 149, 150 (Mo.App.W.D.1994). Section 1397(k) of the Motor Vehicle Act provided:

Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard ... does not exempt any person from any liability under common law.

Id.

The Loulos court found that the latter clause made it unmistakably clear that Congress did not wish to preempt common law damage suits. Loulos, 882 S.W.2d at 151-52. The United States Supreme Court recently affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's decision, relied upon by Loulos, that these two clauses of the Motor Vehicle Act, read together, do not expressly preempt state common law claims. Freightliner Corporation v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995), affirming Myrick v. Freuhauf Corp., 13 F.3d 1516 (11th Cir.1994).

A federal district court reached the same result with respect to the instant Manufactured Home Act and the formaldehyde regulations. In Shorter v. Champion Home Builders Co., 776 F.Supp. 333 (N.D. Ohio 1991), the court found: "Thus, while the state of Ohio may not institute its own safety standards, state law claims may still be brought." Id. at 338. We believe that the Shorter court's holding best reconciles the two preemption clauses at issue. The first preemption clause prohibits state "standards," which we interpret to mean legislative or administrative standards, while the second clearly leaves the common law unaffected.

Defendants cite four principal cases in opposition to the Shorter and Loulos result. Woolridge v. Redman Homes, Inc., 792 F.Supp. 1469 (N.D.Tex.1991), is inapplicable. Woolridge found that a Texas act explicitly adopted the federal standards, and thus there was no conflict with state law. Id. at 1471. Therefore, Woolridge did not reach the question of what would happen had state law differed from the federal law. Liberty Homes, Inc. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 125 Wis.2d 492, 374 N.W.2d 142, 153 (App.1985), aff'd., 136 Wis.2d 368, 401 N.W.2d 805 (1987), and Scurlock v. City of Lynn Haven, Fla., 858 F.2d 1521 (11th Cir.1988), are inapposite because they addressed the preemptive effect of the Manufactured Home Act upon state and local regulations, rather...