Mobil Oil Corp. v. Town of Huntington

• Decision Date: 07 November 1975
• Citation: 380 N.Y.S.2d 466,85 Misc.2d 800
• Parties: MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. The TOWN OF HUNTINGTON and the State of New York, Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 466

380 N.Y.S.2d 466

85 Misc.2d 800

MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. The TOWN OF HUNTINGTON and the State of New York, Defendants.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Suffolk County, Part I.

Nov. 7, 1975.

Anthony R. Corso, Town Atty., Town of Huntington, for defendants; Frank J. Mack, Huntington, of counsel.

Corwin & Matthews, Huntington, for plaintiff.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., State of New York, for State; Thomas F. Harrison, New York City, of counsel.

LEON D. LAZER, Justice.

In 1971, the Town of Huntington (the 'Town') enacted a local law (Code of the Town of Huntington, Chapter 60, Section 60--30 et seq.) entitled the Oil Spillage Ordinance. An action to declare the law invalid was thereafter commenced by the Mobil Oil Corporation ('Mobil') which operates a waterfront oil distribution terminal in the Town and the state then entered the litigation by intervening as a party defendant. Mobil first sought preliminary injunctive relief, but when that was withheld it moved for summary judgment. Although Mobil's arguments relative to the claimed invalidity of the spillage law were rejected, the motion actually was denied on the ground that a fact issue existed (see Mobil Oil Corporation v. Town of Huntington, 72 Misc.2d 530, 339 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1972)). The fact issue has evaporated as a consequence of subsequent decisional law and the defendants now have moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, for dismissal of each of the ten causes of action contained in Mobil's complaint.

Huntington's oil spillage law prohibits the transfer of liquid fuel or oil in excess of 600 gallons for the purpose of storage or use without a permit issued by the oil spillage control board, an agency created by the same law. Grant of a transfer permit (for which the annual fee is $100) is predicated upon the installation of specified safety equipment. In addition, under pain of possible sanction, the owners or operators of vessels or onshore and offshore facilities are required to notify the oil spillage control board of any spills which take place.

The critical section of the spillage law provides for the creation of a $100,000 fund to be used to prevent spills and to clean up those which do occur. The fund is financed by imposition of a fee of one mill for every five gallons of fuel transferred by the operators of the three waterfront terminals in the Town. Upon the accumulation of $100,000, collection of further fees is suspended until expenditures have reduced the fund to $80,000. The onus of spill removal is assumed by the Town which has resort to the fund for defrayal of costs, but the spillage law contains no provision either for ascertaining the cause of spills or requiring the polluter to remove the spill or make restitution for the cost thereof.

In its complaint Mobil avers that the spillage law is void and unconstitutional because it 1) imposes an undue burden upon interstate commerce, 2) purports to regulate the transfer of fuel or oil from vessels upon navigable waters and is therefore beyond the Town's statutory authority to enact, 3) is vague and indefinite, 4) violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, 5) is an impost or duty on imports and exports, 6) is an illegally excessive exercise of the police power, 7) is an improper revenue-raising measure, 8) is inconsistent with the federal Water Quality Improvement Act (33 U.S.C.A. § 1151 et seq.) which is predicated on a concept of fault and 9) was not adopted in accordance with statutory procedural requirements. A tenth cause of action relating to conflict with the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 and Executive Order No. 11615 has not been urged on this motion and must be deemed moot in light of the suspension of wage and price controls. In its brief Mobil further asserts that the spillage law infringes upon the maritime jurisdiction of the federal government.

Although the denial of summary relief to either party on Mobil's earlier motion was predicated upon the existence of a fact issue as to whether Mobil's operation was within the purview of interstate commerce, that question has been resolved in the defendants' favor by the holding in Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental Im. Com'n, Me., 307 A.2d 1 app. dism. for lack of subst. fed. question, 414 U.S. 1035, 94 S.Ct. 532, 38 L.Ed.2d 326 (1973) that the regulation of coastal operations involving transfer of oil does not conflict with the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Whether the rationale of the previous rejection of Mobil's attack on the validity of the spillage law now entitles the defendants to summary judgment on the theory of law of the case is a threshold question.

Issue finding and not issue determination is the key to summary judgment procedure (Sillman v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 395, 165 N.Y.S.2d 498, 144 N.E.2d 387) and it is generally held that a denial of a motion for summary judgment is not necessarily law of the case (Pugliese v. Pugliese, Sup., 220 N.Y.S.2d 67; Snelwar v. Snelwar, 27 Misc.2d 933, 212 N.Y.S.2d 882; Neivel Realty Corp. v. Prudence Bonds Corp., 151 Misc. 737, 271 N.Y.S. 209). Moreover, denial of a plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is not necessarily res judicata on defendants' subsequent motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action (Frederick v. Douglas Mobile Corp., 22 A.D.2d 972, 254 N.Y.S.2d 774). Even the existence of a fact issue is not law of the case to the trial court (Sackman-Gilliland Corp. v. Senator Holding, 43 A.D.2d 948, 351 N.Y.S.2d 733). A respected commentator has stated that denial of summary judgment establishes nothing except that the relief was not warranted (see Siegel, Practice Commentary 3212.21, p. 440, McKinney's Book 7--B, CPLR 3212). Telaro v. Telaro, 25 N.Y.2d 433, 306 N.Y.S.2d 920, 255 N.E.2d 158, which might appear to state a contrary proposition, is clearly distinguishable because in that case the prior determination deemed law of the case derived from an Affirmed denial of summary judgment which resolved a specific law issue (see Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Hofheimer, 170 Misc. 691, 10 N.Y.S.2d 1008, aff'd, 261 App.Div. 946, 27 N.Y.S.2d 445, rearg. den., 261 App.Div. 1074, 27 N.Y.S.2d 1014). Sound judicial policy militates against application of the law of the case doctrine to coordinate law determinations which flow explicitly or implicitly from denial of summary judgment motions. Should a contrary view prevail, the need to preserve issues for trial might compel immediate resort to appellate review by the unsuccessful movant and, sometimes, even his successful adversary.

Nevertheless, denial of its previous motion now precludes Mobil from obtaining summary judgment on the same facts either by a second motion or reliance on CPLR 3212(b) since the grant of such relief would have the effect of frustrating the earlier disposition. In addition, a summary judgment granted by a judge other than the one to whom the first motion was made would probably violate CPLR 2221 (Siegel, Practice Commentary 3212.21, p. 48, McKinney's Book 7B, CPLR 3212 (Supp.)). Current summary judgment is available solely to the defendants but only if they can establish the present rectitude of their position.

The arguments that the spillage law imposes an undue burden upon interstate commerce, that it is inconsistent with the federal Water Quality Improvement Act (33 U.S.C.A. § 1151 et seq.) and that it impermissibly infringes upon federal admiralty jurisdiction have been effectively refuted by the holdings in Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 93 S.Ct. 1590, 36 L.Ed.2d 280 and Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental Im. Com'n, supra. In Askew, the issue was the validity of the Florida Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act providing for state recovery of cleanup costs, on a strict liability basis, from the operators of waterfront facilities and from ships destined for and leaving such facilities. The Supreme Court held that the statute neither invaded a regulatory area preempted by federal statute nor intruded upon admiralty jurisdiction and that it was within the police power of the state to impose liability without fault. Portland Pipe Line involved Maine's Coastal Protection Fund which also is financed by imposition of transfer charges upon oil terminals but, in addition, the Maine statute required that, where fault can be ascertained, the polluter must reimburse the fund for cleanup costs. Inter alia, the Maine Court held that the state could hold terminal operators vicariously liable for spills caused by vessels en route to or departing from such terminals and that placing greater liability upon terminal operators was not a denial of equal protection. It also sustained the statute against challenges based upon the Commerce Clause. The first and eighth causes of action in Mobil's complaint therefore must be dismissed.

Portland Pipe Line also is dispositive of Mobil's claim that the spillage law constitutes a prohibited impost on imports and exports. The Maine Court held that the license fee in the state statute was not a tax on the imports themselves but on activity relative to their importation and that the overall effect of the act was the establishment of a regulatory scheme for controlling oil pollution. Since, with respect to transfer charges, the Maine statute scarcely differs from the Huntington local law, the fifth cause of action must fall as well.

The contention that the Town lacked statutory authority to enact a law affecting the transfer of oil from vessels upon navigable water to waterfront terminal facilities correctly was earlier rejected on the ground that Article IX, Sec. 2(c)(10) of the New York Constitution, Town Law § 130(15) and Municipal Home Rule Law § 10 afford ample police power to a municipality desiring to protect the health, safety and general welfare of the community. It also is apparent that the field has not been...