Albany Area Builders Ass'n v. Town of Guilderland

• Decision Date: 10 November 1988
• Citation: 141 A.D.2d 293,534 N.Y.S.2d 791
• Parties: ALBANY AREA BUILDERS ASSOCIATION, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TOWN OF GUILDERLAND, Defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 791

534 N.Y.S.2d 791

141 A.D.2d 293

ALBANY AREA BUILDERS ASSOCIATION, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TOWN OF GUILDERLAND, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

Nov. 10, 1988.

De Graff, Foy, Conway, Holt-Harris & Mealey (James T. Potter, of counsel), Albany, for plaintiffs.

Kenneth D. Runion, Delmar, for defendant.

Before WEISS, P.J., and YESAWICH, LEVINE, HARVEY and MERCURE, JJ.

MERCURE, Justice.

On June 2, 1987 defendant, the Town of Guilderland in Albany County (hereinafter the Town), purportedly acting pursuant to its authority under Municipal Home Rule Law §§ 10 and 11, adopted a local law entitled the Transportation Impact Fee Law (hereinafter TIFL). Under this law, all applicants for building permits who seek "to make an improvement to land or change use of land which will generate additional traffic" are required to pay a transportation impact fee at the time the permit is issued (TIFL §§ 5, 7). The amount of the fee is determined by a fee schedule set forth in the law. For example, the fee is $937 for a single-family detached dwelling and $375 for a three-story or greater multifamily dwelling. TIFL also established a Transportation Impact Fee Trust Fund and explicitly provides that these funds are to be used for the purpose of capital improvements to and expansion of the Town, County and State roadway network and transportation facilities within the Town. No funds are to be used for periodic or routine maintenance.

Plaintiffs, Albany Area Builders Association, Home Builders Association of Schenectady, Inc., D & M Swift Builders, Inc., Masullo Builders, Inc. and Traditional Builders, Ltd., commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the Town's authority to enact TIFL, stipulated to the adjournment of that proceeding and brought a direct action to this court by submission of the controversy upon an agreed statement of facts pursuant to CPLR 3222 and 22 NYCRR 800.21. The controversy submitted for decision is whether the Town had the statutory and constitutional authority to adopt TIFL or whether TIFL is invalid for lack of such authority.

Municipal Home Rule Law § 10 confers upon local governments the power to adopt local laws dealing with specified matters. This power is in large measure codified in the home rule provisions of the State Constitution (see, N.Y. Const., art. IX, § 2[c] ). "The theory behind home rule is verysimple: it is the thought that local problems, in which the State has no concern, can best be handled locally" (Baldwin v. City of Buffalo, 6 N.Y.2d 168, 172, 189 N.Y.S.2d 129, 160 N.E.2d 443).

Preliminarily, local governments do not have inherent power to adopt local laws, but may only exercise those powers expressly granted to them by the State Constitution or the Legislature (see, e.g., 41 Kew Gardens Rd. Assocs. v. Tyburski, 70 N.Y.2d 325, 332, 520 N.Y.S.2d 544, 514 N.E.2d 1114; County Sec. v. Seacord, 278 N.Y. 34, 37, 15 N.E.2d 179; City of New York v. Village of Lawrence, 250 N.Y. 429, 437, 165 N.E. 836). When a local government acts beyond the scope of its authority, its actions are plainly unconstitutional. Given that the nature of plaintiffs' challenge is essentially to the constitutionality of TIFL, it is important to bear in mind that this law is clothed with the same presumption of constitutionality that applies to State statutes generally (see, 41 Kew Gardens Rd. Assocs. v. Tyburski, supra, 70 N.Y.2d at 333, 520 N.Y.S.2d 544, 514 N.E.2d 1114; Lighthouse Shores v. Town of Islip, 41 N.Y.2d 7, 11, 390 N.Y.S.2d 827, 359 N.E.2d 337). While this presumption is rebuttable, the burden is upon plaintiffs to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that TIFL is unconstitutional (see, Lighthouse Shores v. Town of Islip, supra, at 11, 390 N.Y.S.2d 827, 359 N.E.2d 337; Kessel v. Purcell, 119 Misc.2d 449, 450, 463 N.Y.S.2d 384). With this principle in mind, we turn to the substance of plaintiffs' argument.

I

Plaintiffs first contend that Municipal Home Rule Law § 10(1)(i), which permits local governments to adopt laws relating generally to their own "property, affairs or government", does not authorize TIFL because of TIFL's far-reaching implications. We agree. Plaintiffs correctly note that the terms "property, affairs or government", as used in the context of home rule provisions, have a limited meaning (see, Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 473, 167 N.E. 705) and do not encompass matters of substantial State concern even though they also touch upon concerns of the locality (see, Hotel Dorset Co. v. Trust for Cultural Resources of City of N.Y., 46 N.Y.2d 358, 373, 413 N.Y.S.2d 357, 385 N.E.2d 1284; County Sec. v. Seacord, 278 N.Y. 34, 38, 15 N.E.2d 179, supra; Matter of Sherman v. Frazier, 84 A.D.2d 401, 409, 446 N.Y.S.2d 372; County of Orange v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 71 Misc.2d 691, 703, 337 N.Y.S.2d 178, affd. 39 A.D.2d 839, 332 N.Y.S.2d 420) or even deal directly with the affairs of a municipality (Hotel Dorset Co. v. Trust for Cultural Resources of City of N.Y., supra). The Court of Appeals in Baldwin v. City of Buffalo, 6 N.Y.2d 168, 173, 189 N.Y.S.2d 129, 160 N.E.2d 443, supra) held a local statute altering ward boundaries to be within the constitutional home rule provisions upon finding that "such legislation affects only the property, affairs or government of the municipality involved" (emphasis supplied).

In the case at hand, it can hardly be disputed that TIFL has effects which go beyond the Town's boundaries. The imposition of a transportation impact fee certainly will inhibit new construction, particularly low-income housing, within the Town's boundaries and will thereby shift new development to surrounding localities. Inasmuch as increased development is an issue affecting localities throughout the State and is therefore a matter of State concern, TIFL obviously does not relate solely to the Town's "property, affairs or government". Consequently, we conclude that Municipal Home Rule Law § 10(1)(i) did not vest the Town with the authority to adopt this law.

II

Municipal Home Rule Law § 10(1)(ii) further empowers local governments to adopt and amend local laws "not inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution or not inconsistent with any general law, relating to [certain enumerated] subjects whether or not they relate to the property, affairs or government of such local government". Plaintiffs claim that the Town's adoption of TIFL was not authorized by either Municipal Home Rule Law § 10(1)(ii)(a)(6), as it does not relate to "[t]he acquisition, care, management and use of its highways, roads, streets, avenues and property", or Municipal Home Rule Law § 10(1)(ii)(a)(7), permitting laws relating to "[t]he acquisition of its transit facilities and the ownership and operation thereof". Subparagraph (6) merely permits municipalities to regulate the use of municipal roadways (see, Good Humor Corp. v. City of New York, 290 N.Y. 312, 317, 49 N.E.2d 153; Browne v. City of New York, 241 N.Y. 96, 124, 149 N.E. 211). In Browne v. City of New York, supra, at 124, 149 N.E. 211, Judge Cardozo wrote that this provision empowers localities "to regulate the burdens to which the streets shall be subjected * * * to place reasonable regulations upon traffic, its methods, forms or hours". This provision has never been interpreted to permit a municipality to create new taxes to fund highway improvements and we decline to do so now. Nor does subparagraph (7) provide authority for the impact fee. This provision grants localities the authority to acquire transit facilities, which are "any tangible means of moving people and things from place to place" (New York State School Bus Operators Assn. v. County of Nassau, 39 N.Y.2d 638, 640, 385 N.Y.S.2d 263, 350 N.E.2d 593); it does not explicitly or implicitly grant municipalities the authority to create new forms of taxation to support transit facilities.

Nor does Municipal Home Rule Law § 10(1)(ii)(a)(12), authorizing local governments to adopt laws relating to "[t]he government, protection, order, conduct, safety, health and well-being of persons or property therein", provide authority for the Town's adoption of TIFL. ^* In order for a local law to come within the police power of a municipality under that subparagraph, it must bear a reasonable relationship to the objective sought to be promoted, i.e., public safety, health or welfare (see, People v. Cook, 34 N.Y.2d 100, 106, 356 N.Y.S.2d 259, 312 N.E.2d 452; Good Humor Corp. v. City of New York, 290 N.Y. 312, 320, 49 N.E.2d 153, supra). The objective presumably sought to be promoted by TIFL is public safety. However, TIFL does not directly further this objective, but, rather, is aimed at raising revenues. Given the tenuous relationship between TIFL and public safety, health or welfare, we agree with plaintiffs that subparagraph (12) did not authorize the adoption of TIFL (see, Matter of Bon-Air Estates v. Building Inspector of Town of Ramapo, 31 A.D.2d 502, 298 N.Y.S.2d 763; People v. A & C Trucking Co., 88 Misc.2d 988, 390 N.Y.S.2d 987).

Plaintiffs next argue that the transportation impact fee provided for in TIFL is, in essence, an impermissible regressive tax, not authorized by Municipal Home Rule Law § 10(1)(ii)(a)(9-a) (see, N.Y. Const., art XVI, § 1; see also, County Sec. v. Seacord, 278 N.Y. 34, 37, 15 N.E.2d 179, supra; People v. Board of Managers of New City Condominiums, 123 Misc.2d 188, 195, 474 N.Y.S.2d 376; Mobil Oil Corp. v. Town of Huntington, 85 Misc.2d 800, 805-806, 380 N.Y.S.2d 466). The label which is attached to an assessment is not dispositive of its true nature (see, Matter of Joslin v. Regan, 63 A.D.2d 466, 470, 406 N.Y.S.2d 938, affd. 48 N.Y.2d 746, 422 N.Y.S.2d 662, 397 N.E.2d 1329). Taxes are imposed for the purpose of defraying the costs of government services generally (see, American Sugar Refining Co. of N.Y. v. Waterfront Commn. of N.Y. Harbor, 55 N.Y.2d 11, 26-27, 447 N.Y.S.2d 685, 432 N.E.2d 578, appeal...