Mohammadi v. Kinslow

• Decision Date: 08 September 2022
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals No. 21CA0109
• Citation: 521 P.3d 1057,2022 COA 103
• Parties: Daniala MOHAMMADI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mark KINSLOW, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

521 P.3d 1057

2022 COA 103

Daniala MOHAMMADI, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Mark KINSLOW, Defendant-Appellee.

Court of Appeals No. 21CA0109

Colorado Court of Appeals, Division V.

Announced September 8, 2022

The Viorst Law Offices, P.C., Anthony Viorst, David Chambers, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Jeremy R. Maline & Associates, Kevin R. Kennedy, Andrew M. LaFontaine, Westminster, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee

Opinion by JUDGE YUN

¶ 1 In this car-bicycle accident case, the plaintiff, Daniala Mohammadi, a minor at the time of the accident, appeals the district court's judgment dismissing her complaint against the defendant, Mark Kinslow, as time barred.

¶ 2 Section 13-81-103(1)(c), C.R.S. 2021, provides that when "the disability of any person is terminated"—e.g., when, as here, a minor turns eighteen—"such person shall be allowed to take action within the period fixed by the applicable statute of limitations or within two years after the removal of the disability, whichever period expires later." No published Colorado opinion has addressed the application of section 13-81-103(1)(c) to the situation presented here, in which Mohammadi turned eighteen before the applicable statute of limitations expired.

¶ 3 The district court ruled that the three-year statute of limitations was not tolled¹ because Mohammadi's disability was terminated—because she turned eighteen—before the limitations period expired. Thus, the court explained, Mohammadi had either three years from the date of the accident or two years from the date she turned eighteen, whichever was later, to bring her lawsuit. Because Mohammadi did not meet the later deadline, the district court granted Kinslow's motion to dismiss.

¶ 4 We reverse and remand for the district court to reinstate Mohammadi's complaint. We conclude that we are bound by supreme court precedent holding that the applicable statute of limitations is tolled during a plaintiff's period of disability and "begins to run when the minor reaches the age of eighteen." Rudnicki v. Bianco , 2021 CO 80, ¶ 16, 501 P.3d 776 (quoting Elgin v. Bartlett , 994 P.2d 411, 414 (Colo. 1999), overruled on other grounds by Rudnicki , 2021 CO 80, 501 P.3d 776 )). We further conclude that the supreme court has not recognized any exception to this rule when the disability ends before the statute of limitations expires.

I. Background

¶ 5 On November 6, 2015, Mohammadi, then sixteen years old, was injured when Kinslow hit her bicycle with his car. At the time of the accident, Kinslow was making a right turn while Mohammadi was crossing the intersection. Mohammadi turned eighteen on January 1, 2017, and sued Kinslow almost three years later, on December 30, 2019, alleging negligence and negligence per se.

¶ 6 Kinslow moved to dismiss the lawsuit as untimely. He argued that, because Mohammadi was a minor at the time of the accident, section 13-81-103(1)(c) applied to her case. Under that section, he argued, Mohammadi had to bring her action either within the applicable three-year limitations period (that is, by November 6, 2018) or within two years after she turned eighteen (that is, by January 1, 2019), whichever was later.

¶ 7 In response, Mohammadi agreed that section 13-81-103(1)(c) applied but argued that, under that section, the three-year limitations period was tolled and did not begin to run until her eighteenth birthday. Accordingly, she argued, she did not need to bring her action until three years after she turned eighteen (that is, by January 1, 2020). Mohammadi further advised the district court that a factually similar case was pending on appeal and asked the court to stay this case "so that the dispositive issue [of the interpretation of section 13-81-103(1)(c) ] can be resolved by the Colorado Court of Appeals."

¶ 8 Later, in Roske v. Estate of Anderson , slip op. at ¶¶ 2, 20–21, 2020 WL 5494490 (Colo. App. No. 19CA0484, Sept. 10, 2020) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e) ), a division of this court held that, because the plaintiff was a minor at the time of her accident but turned eighteen before the three-year limitations period expired, section 13-81-103(1)(c) required her to file suit "within three years from the date of the collision, or two years from the date she turned eighteen, whichever was later."

¶ 9 While the district court noted that it could consider the unpublished Roske decision for its "persuasive value," see Patterson v. James , 2018 COA 173, ¶ 40, 454 P.3d 345, the court undertook its own textual analysis of section 13-81-103(1)(c). It ruled that, because Mohammadi turned eighteen before the three-year statute of limitations expired, she had either three years from the date of her accident or two years from the date she turned eighteen, whichever was later, to bring her lawsuit. Because she did not meet the later deadline, the court concluded that her suit was time barred.

II. Analysis

¶ 10 Mohammadi contends that the district court's interpretation of section 13-81-103(1)(c) is inconsistent with supreme court precedent. We agree.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 11 The district court's judgment granting Kinslow's C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss turns on its interpretation of section 13-81-103(1)(c). We review the court's interpretation of that statute de novo. Roberts v. Bruce , 2018 CO 58, ¶ 8, 420 P.3d 284.

B. Statutory Interpretation

¶ 12 When interpreting a statute, our task is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Klinger v. Adams Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 50 , 130 P.3d 1027, 1031 (Colo. 2006). In doing so, we look to the plain language of the statute as a whole and give "consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts." Roberts , ¶ 8.

¶ 13 In general, a person injured in a motor vehicle accident must bring suit within three years of the date of the accident. See §§ 13-80-101(1)(n)(I), - 108(1), C.R.S. 2021. At the time of her accident, however, Mohammadi was a minor and, therefore, a "person under disability." See § 13-81-101(3), C.R.S. 2021 (defining a minor under eighteen as a "[p]erson under disability"). Accordingly, she was entitled to take advantage of the provisions of section 13-81-103.

¶ 14 Section 13-81-103 states, in pertinent part:

(1) When ... a limitation is fixed upon the time within which a right of action ... may be asserted ... and the true owner of said right is a person under disability at the time such right accrues, then:

(a) If such person under disability is represented by a legal representative at the time the right accrues, or if a legal representative is appointed for such person under disability at any time after the right accrues and prior to the termination of such disability, the applicable statute of limitations shall run against such person under disability in the same manner, for the same period, and with the same effect as it runs against persons not under disability. Such legal representative, or his successor in trust, in any event shall be allowed not less than two years after his appointment within which to take action on behalf of such person under disability, even though the two-year period expires after the expiration of the period fixed by the applicable statute of limitations.

....

(c) If the disability of any person is terminated before the expiration of the period of limitation in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) and no legal representative has been appointed for him, such person shall be allowed to take action within the period fixed by the applicable statute of limitations or within two years after the removal of the disability, whichever period expires later.

¶ 15 In interpreting section 13-81-103(1)(c), the district court concluded the following:

• the phrase "before the expiration of the period of limitation in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1)" means before the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations;

• accordingly, section 13-81-103(1)(c) applies to someone who is a "person under disability" when her cause of action accrues but whose disability is "terminated" or "remov[ed]" before the applicable statute of limitations expires;

• because Mohammadi was a minor at the time of the accident but turned eighteen before the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations, section 13-81-103(1)(c) applied to her case;

• section 13-81-103(1)(c) unambiguously requires the calculation of two dates, and the later of the two determines the last day on which a plaintiff's claim may be filed;

• the first date is "within the period fixed by the applicable statute of limitations"—here, three years from the date of the accident, or November 6, 2018;

• the second date is "within two years after the removal of the disability"—here, two years from Mohammadi's eighteenth birthday, or January 1, 2019; and

• because Mohammadi did not bring her action on or before January 1, 2019, the later of the two dates, it was barred.

¶ 16 The federal district court's reading of the statute in McKinney v. Armco Recreational Products, Inc. , 419 F. Supp. 464, 465 (D. Colo. 1976), supports these conclusions. The McKinney court concluded that, when a plaintiff's disability is terminated before the applicable statute of limitations expires, "[p]ursuant to § 13-81-103(1)(c) [,] the applicable statute of limitations is not tolled, but rather continues to run. However, even if the period in which suit may be brought expires[,] a plaintiff still has two years [after the removal of the disability] in which to initiate an action." Id. The court then illustrated its interpretation of the statute as follows:

For example, if a cause of action accruing to a minor arises under a six-year statute of limitations, but the action is not actually brought until seven years later which is three years after the minor has reached the age of majority[,] the action would be barred under § 13-81-103(1)(c) since it would be more than six years after accrual and more than two years after reaching the age of majority.

Id.

¶ 17 We acknowledge that both the plain...