Mohasco Corp., Dixiana Mill Div. v. Rising

• Decision Date: 27 January 1986
• Docket Number: No. 0667,0667
• Citation: 289 S.C. 130,345 S.E.2d 249
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: MOHASCO CORPORATION, DIXIANA MILL DIVISION, Employer, and Twin City Fire Insurance Company, Carrier, Petitioners, v. Mable Hayes RISING, Employee and Margaret Louise Page, Employee, Respondents. Appeal of MOHASCO CORPORATION, DIXIANA MILL DIVISION. . Heard

Page 249

345 S.E.2d 249

289 S.C. 130

MOHASCO CORPORATION, DIXIANA MILL DIVISION, Employer, and Twin City Fire Insurance Company, Carrier, Petitioners, v. Mable Hayes RISING, Employee and Margaret Louise Page Employee, Respondents Appeal of MOHASCO CORPORATION, DIXIANA MILL DIVISION.

No. 0667.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard Jan. 27, 1986.

Decided March 31, 1986.

Reheard May 19, 1986.

Coleman, Aiken & Chase, Florence, Constangy, Brooks & Smith, and R.W. Dibble, Jr., of McNair, Glenn, Konduros, Corley, Singletary, Porter & Dibble, Columbia, for appellant.

Kenneth M. Suggs, Columbia, and James E. Lockemy, of Green, Lockemy & Bailey, Dillon, for respondent.

GOOLSBY, Judge.

In these consolidated worker's compensation cases, Mohasco Corporation appeals awards of total disability benefits made by the South Carolina Industrial Commission to two former Mohasco employees, the Rising, a smoker, and Page, a nonsmoker, began working at Mohasco's Dixiana Mill in Dillon, South Carolina, in 1954 within months of each other. They worked in the same area of the textile mill and performed similar jobs.

                claimants Mable Hayes Rising and Margaret Louise Page.   The Industrial Commission in an evenly divided vote affirmed the Hearing Commissioner's findings that both claimants were totally and permanently disabled as the result of an occupational disease within the meaning of the Occupational Disease Act.   See South Carolina Code of Laws §§ 42-11-10 et seq.  (1976).  The circuit court affirmed the Industrial Commission.   We reverse and remand each case for further proceedings
                

From 1954 until approximately 1960, Dixiana Mill manufactured carpet using pure cotton or cotton and synthetic blends. Since 1960, however, the mill has used only synthetic fibers, nylon and rayon, to manufacture carpet.

Throughout the period of their employment at Dixiana Mill, textile dust and lint were continuously visible in the air at the claimants' work stations during the carpet manufacturing process and were particularly evident when their machines were "blown off." Dust and lint frequently got into their hair and clothing.

Each claimant has lived in a rural setting her entire life unexposed to any extraordinary dust, lint, and chemicals, except at Dixiana Mill.

Neither claimant suffered any respiratory problem until she went to work at Dixiana Mill. In the years that followed, each claimant began experiencing breathing difficulties while at work. They were able to obtain relief only by breathing outside air. Their breathing problems worsened over the years.

Both claimants worked continuously at the mill for 26 years until lung problems forced them to quit in May, 1980. Neither claimant has worked since then.

After leaving Mohasco's employ, each worker applied for worker's compensation benefits claiming in an amended Form 50 she was entitled to compensation under the Occupational Disease Act.

The Industrial Commission found that both claimants suffer from chronic obstructive lung disease and are totally and permanently disabled.

On appeal, Mohasco questions the Industrial Commission's findings that each claimant's disease is an "occupational disease," as that term is defined by Section 42-11-10.

Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has construed the first paragraph of Section 42-11-10. This paragraph defines the term "occupational disease" to mean

a disease arising out of and in the course of employment which is due to hazards in excess of those ordinarily incident to employment and is peculiar to the occupation in which the employee is engaged. A disease shall be deemed an occupational disease only if caused by a hazard recognized as peculiar to a particular trade, process, occupation or employment as a direct result of continuous exposure to the normal working conditions thereof.

A claimant, then, must prove the following elements to receive worker's compensation benefits for having contracted an occupational disease:

1. A disease;

2. The disease must arise out of and in the course of the claimant's employment;

3. The disease must be due to hazards in excess of those hazards that are ordinarily incident to employment;

4. The disease must be peculiar to the occupation in which the claimant was engaged;

5. The hazard causing the disease must be one recognized as peculiar to a particular trade, process, occupation, or employment; and

6. The disease must directly result from the claimant's continuous exposure to the normal working conditions of the particular trade, process, occupation, or employment.

The Hearing Commissioner, as we read his orders, found that each claimant proved the first and second elements ("the employee is totally and permanently disabled as a result of chronic obstructive lung disease ... caused by her exposure to environmental dust, lint, and pollutants, including cotton dust, during the course of her employment with [Mohasco] from 1954 through May of 1980"); the third element ("the ... disease [was] due to hazards greater than those ordinarily incident to normal employment"); the fourth element ("the ... disease ... [was] peculiar to her occupational environmental exposures"); and the sixth element ("the ... disease ... [was] the result of the [claimant's] continuous exposure to her working conditions [at Dixiana Mill]." He nowhere determined, however, whether each claimant either proved or failed to prove the fifth element, i.e., whether the disease suffered by each claimant either was or was not "caused by a hazard recognized as peculiar to a particular trade, process, occupation or employment."

I.

Mohasco maintains the record contains "no evidence" to prove each claimant's chronic obstructive lung disease is peculiar to the occupation in which each claimant was engaged.

Section 42-11-10 uses, as indicated above, the phrase "peculiar to the occupation" in defining the term "occupational disease." This phrase does not mean that the disease must either originate exclusively from or be unique to the particular kind of employment in which the employee is engaged before it can be considered an "occupational disease." Bowman v. Twin Falls Construction Co., 99 Idaho 312, 581 P.2d 770 (1978); Glodenis v. American Brass Co., 118 Conn. 29, 170 A. 146 (1934). The phrase also does not mean that the disease must be one not otherwise found among the general public. Bowman v. Twin Falls Construction Co., supra. Rather, a disease "is peculiar to the occupation in which the employee is engaged" if the disease is either directly caused by, especially incident to, or the natural consequence of the work in question. See Booker v. Duke Medical Center, 297 N.C. 458, 472-73, 256 S.E.2d 189, 199 (1979); 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 169b at 566 (1958).

Here, the record contains evidence that each claimant's lung disease was caused by and was incident to her employment as a textile worker and therefore was "peculiar to the occupation" in which she was engaged.

Dr. Ira Barth, Rising's family physician and a plant physician for other textile mills in the Pee Dee area, testified that Rising's lung disease resulted from her "always [being] a mill worker." Dr. Emmett W. Flynn, a surgeon, testified Rising's lung disease most probably was caused by her work environment and smoking.

Page's lung disease, according to Dr. Barth, resulted from her exposure to dust in her work environment. Dr. Flynn believed her lung disease was "probably related to her occupation."

Moreover, the medical evidence shows Rising's and Page's diseases paralleled each other. Indeed, they manifested similar symptoms.

II.

Mohasco next questions the Industrial Commission's findings that each claimant's employment at its Dixiana Mill greatly increased her risk of contracting lung disease. It contends "no evidence" supports these findings.

Before a disease can be considered an "occupational disease," the disease, Section 42-11-10 prescribes, must be "due to hazards in excess of those ordinarily incident to employment." In other words, the disease must be caused by the worker's exposure to hazards greater than those involved in ordinary occupations. See Glodenis v. American Brass Co., 118 Conn. at 40, 170 A. at 150; Young v. City of Huntsville, Ala., 342 So.2d 918, 922 (Ala.Civ.App.1976) Here, the record reflects evidence supporting the Industrial Commission's findings that each claimant was exposed to "hazards in excess of those ordinarily incident to employment."

cert. denied, 342 So.2d 924 (Ala.1977); 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 169b at 567 (1958).

The record shows the claimants were continuously exposed in their work areas to high concentrations of environmental dust and lint, much of it airborne.

The observations made by the Hearing Commissioner at Mohasco's request of the claimants' work environment confirmed the presence of dust and lint in large amounts. He saw accumulations of "material that looked like snow or cotton" and "a light film of [a] dusty type material" on the frames of a textile machine like that operated by each claimant. The Hearing Commissioner also saw "white, stringy looking things varying in length from one to three inches" and "a good bit of airborne dust or lint." Cf. Dykes v. Daniel Construction Co., 262 S.C. 98, 202 S.E.2d 646 (1974) (Commission's observations of injured employee not considered as evidence but may be used by reviewing court to determine propriety of award).

III.

Mohasco also argues the record contains "no evidence" to support the Industrial Commission's findings that the employment conditions of each claimant caused her lung disease.

As in all worker's compensation cases, the burden is upon the claimant in an occupational disease case to prove such facts as will entitle the claimant to compensation. Alatex, Inc. v. Couch, 449 So.2d 1254 (Ala.Civ.App.1984); see Kennedy v. Williamsburg County, 242 S.C. 477, 131 S.E.2d 512 (1963). The claimant must show a causal...