Moland v. People, 86SC173
| Decision Date | 06 June 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 86SC173,86SC173 |
| Citation | 757 P.2d 137 |
| Parties | Gerald Reed MOLAND, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Haddon, Morgan & Foreman, P.C., Norman R. Mueller, Denver, for petitioner.
Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., Curt Kriksciun, Benjamin I. Sachs, Asst. Attys. Gen., Denver, for respondent.
Following a jury trial in 1975, the Denver District Court entered judgment convicting the defendant, Gerald Reed Moland, of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery. Seven years later, after he had served the sentences imposed, the defendant filed a motion under Crim.P. 35(c) seeking to vacate the judgment of conviction. The trial court held a hearing and thereafter denied the motion. The Colorado Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, reversed the trial court's ruling because of lack of sufficient findings and conclusions, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Following a rehearing, the trial court again denied the motion, holding, among other things, that the defendant had not demonstrated a present need for postconviction relief. The defendant again appealed to the court of appeals. The court held that while present need for postconviction relief had existed at the time the defendant originally filed his motion, the defendant's motion had become moot because the need had dissipated. The court of appeals accordingly dismissed the appeal. The defendant then sought review by writ of certiorari to this court. We granted certiorari and now reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
On February 13, 1975, a Denver District Court jury found the defendant guilty of robbery, § 18-4-301, 8 C.R.S. (1973), and conspiracy to commit robbery, § 18-2-201, 8 C.R.S. (1973), and thereafter the court sentenced him to probation. The defendant did not appeal from the judgment of conviction. On June 2, 1977, the defendant's probation was revoked and he was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of ten years for robbery and five years for conspiracy to commit robbery.
On July 28, 1982, after he had completed service of his sentences, the defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Crim.P. 35(c), seeking to vacate the robbery and conspiracy convictions. At the time the defendant sought postconviction relief, he faced habitual criminal charges in a separate case, and the judgment of conviction he sought to vacate was alleged as a predicate offense for adjudication of the defendant as an habitual criminal. A hearing was held on the defendant's motion on August 18, 1982, after which the trial court took the matter under advisement. The trial court denied the motion, after further argument, on September 14, 1982. On that same day, the habitual criminal charges were dismissed.
The defendant appealed the trial court's denial of his postconviction relief motion to the court of appeals. On appeal, the prosecution argued that no present need for postconviction relief existed because the defendant had fully served the sentences for the 1975 conviction and the habitual criminal charges in the second case had been dismissed. The court of appeals, in an unpublished opinion, held that because the habitual criminal charges were pending when the defendant's motion was filed, present need existed when relief was sought. Moreover, the court stated, the prosecution had raised the present need issue for the first time on appeal. The court implied that the prosecution had thereby waived appellate consideration of present need. The court, however, remanded the case to the trial court for findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the merits of the defendant's Crim.P. 35(c) motion since the trial court's ruling lacked sufficient detail to permit appellate review.
On remand, the trial court held that the defendant did not have a present need for relief. The court then ruled on the merits of the defendant's motion, holding that there was no error justifying postconviction relief. The defendant appealed the ruling to the court of appeals. In its second opinion, the court of appeals held that even though the defendant had a present need when his motion for postconviction relief was filed, the dismissal of the habitual criminal charge made his motion and his appeal moot. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal without addressing the merits. People v. Moland, 721 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Colo.App.1986). We granted certiorari to review the issues of mootness and present need.
The court of appeals held that while the defendant had a present need at the time he filed his Crim.P. 35(c) motion, the dismissal of the habitual criminal charge rendered his appeal from the denial of the Crim.P. 35(c) motion moot. The defendant argues that the court of appeals erred in applying the mootness doctrine to this case. We agree that the case is not moot.
In Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1900, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968), the United States Supreme Court stated that "a criminal case is moot only if it is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction." In Sibron, the two appellants were convicted of crimes in New York state courts on the basis of evidence seized from their persons by police officers. By the time their appeal had reached the United States Supreme Court, one of the appellants had completed his sentence and New York argued that his case therefore had become moot. In concluding that the case was not moot, the Court stated its reasons as follows:
The question of the validity of a criminal conviction can arise in many contexts ... and the sooner the issue is fully litigated the better for all concerned. It is always preferable to litigate a matter when it is directly and principally in dispute, rather than in a proceeding where it is collateral to the central controversy. Moreover litigation is better conducted when the dispute is fresh and additional facts may, if necessary, be taken without a substantial risk that witnesses will die or memories fade. And it is far better to eliminate the source of a potential legal disability than to require the citizen to suffer the possibly unjustified consequences of the disability itself for an indefinite period of time before he can secure adjudication of the State's right to impose it on the basis of some past action.
Sibron, 392 U.S. at 56-57, 88 S.Ct. at 1899 (citation omitted). The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed Sibron's mootness holding in Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391 n. 4, 105 S.Ct. 830, 833 n. 4, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985) ().
We addressed the doctrine of mootness as it relates to postconviction proceedings in People v. Bucci, 184 Colo. 367, 520 P.2d 580 (1974). In Bucci, the defendant brought a Crim.P. 35(b) 1 proceeding to vacate a judgment of conviction for forgery twenty-two years after entry of the judgment. At the time he sought postconviction relief, the defendant had long since served his sentence. Citing Sibron, we noted that while the defendant's appeal was not technically moot, its consequence had been diminished by the passage of time and by the defendant's subsequent felony conviction for forgery. Id. at 370, 520 P.2d at 581. We addressed the issue of the showing required of a defendant as a condition to postconviction relief, and adopted the present need test set forth in the ABA Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies § 2.4(c) (1968). The standards, now set forth in IV ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 22-2.4 (2d ed. 1986) (ABA Standards), are essentially the same and provide:
(c) Where an applicant has completed service of a challenged sentence and belatedly seeks postconviction relief, he or she can be charged with the burden of showing present need for such relief. A sufficient showing of present need is made where:
(i) an applicant is facing prosecution or has been convicted and the challenged conviction or sentence may be, or has been, a factor in sentencing for the current offense;
(ii) an applicant may be disadvantaged in obtaining parole under a later sentence; or
(iii) an applicant is under a civil disability resulting from the challenged conviction and preventing the applicant from a desired and otherwise feasible action or activity.
We held that under the circumstances of the case, "where the defendant has long since served his sentence, time has dimmed memories, and court records are misplaced or unavailable, ... the defendant has the burden of demonstrating a present need for Crim.P. 35(b) relief." Bucci, 184 Colo. at 372, 520 P.2d at 582. 2 Thus, under Bucci, the viability of stale or delayed claims for postconviction relief is analyzed in terms of present need, rather than traditional mootness principles. Accord People v. Muniz, 667 P.2d 1377, 1381 (Colo.1983). The court of appeals therefore erred in dismissing the defendant's claim for postconviction relief on the ground of mootness. We must next determine, however, whether the dismissal can be sustained on the basis of absence of present need for relief.
The defendant argues that the prosecution, by failing to raise the issue of present need at the initial Crim.P. 35(c) hearing, waived any future requirement that the defendant demonstrate present need. A review of the record reveals that the prosecution did not object to the defendant's failure to show present need at the first hearing. As a result, the People lost the right to require that the defendant show present need, at least for purposes of the first appeal. Cf. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Wiedemer
...Crim.P. 35(c) motions for postconviction relief but found it unnecessary to resolve the issue to decide that case. In Moland v. People, 757 P.2d 137, 144 n. 5 (Colo.1988), however, we assumed in dictum that the statute does apply to such motions. See also People v. Shearer, 181 Colo. 237, 2......
-
E.C. v. Virginia Dep't of Juvenile Justice, Record No. 110523.
...State, 504 P.2d 855, 856 (Alaska 1972); People v. Villa, 45 Cal.4th 1063, 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 344, 202 P.3d 427, 432 (2009); Moland v. People, 757 P.2d 137, 139 (Colo.1988); Lebron v. Comm'r of Corr., 274 Conn. 507, 876 A.2d 1178, 1193 (2005); Gural v. State, 251 A.2d 344, 344–45 (Del.1969); Gar......
-
Childs v. Zavaras, 98-WM-2148.
...General Assembly to divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction to consider defendant's contentions.") (citing Moland v. People, 757 P.2d 137, n. 5 (Colo.1988)). The court is not persuaded that COLO.REV.STAT. § 16-5-402(1) is a bar to the filing of Petitioner's third state post-co......
-
S.O.V. v. People in Interest of M.C.
...become the law of the case." Super Valu Stores v. District Court of Weld County, 906 P.2d 72, 78-79 (Colo.1995); Moland v. People, 757 P.2d 137, 141 (Colo.1988); People v. Roybal, 672 P.2d 1003, 1005 (Colo.1983). The law of the case must be followed on remand in subsequent proceedings in th......
-
Colorado's Revived Collateral Attack Statute
...supra, note 13 at 1101 n.17; Watkins v. People, 655 P.2d 834 (Colo. 1982). 19. Fultz, supra, note 13 at 244. 20. See, Moland v. People, 757 P.2d 137 (Colo. 1988); City and County of Denver v. Rhinehart, 742 P.2d 948 (Colo.App. 1987). 21. See, Wilson v. People, 742 P.2d 322 (Colo. 1987) (whe......
-
Crim. P. 35(c): Colorado Law Regarding Postconviction Relief
...Grenemyer, 827 P.2d 603 (Colo.App. 1992). 36. People v. Holmes, 819 P.2d 541 (Colo. App. 1991). 37. Supra, note 19. 38. Moland v. People, 757 P.2d 137 (Colo. 1988) at n.5. 39. Hampton, supra, note 3. 40. Germany, supra, note 2; CRS § 16-5-402(2). 41. Moland, supra, note 38; People v. Muniz,......