People v. Muniz, s. 82SA297

• Decision Date: 22 August 1983
• Docket Number: Nos. 82SA297,82SA251,s. 82SA297
• Citation: 667 P.2d 1377
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Waldo Paul MUNIZ, Defendant-Appellee. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas Joseph MONTOYA, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 1377

667 P.2d 1377

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Waldo Paul MUNIZ, Defendant-Appellee.

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas Joseph MONTOYA, Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 82SA297, 82SA251.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

Aug. 22, 1983.

Dale Tooley, Dist. Atty., O. Otto Moore, Asst. Dist. Atty., Brooke Wunnicke, Chief Appellate Deputy Dist. Atty., Denver, for plaintiff-appellant.

David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Brian Holland, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for defendant-appellee Muniz.

Jeralyn E. Merritt, Denver, for defendant-appellee Montoya.

QUINN, Justice.

In this consolidated appeal ¹ the People, pursuant to C.A.R. 4(b), appeal from separate judgments entered by the district court in postconviction proceedings under Crim.P. 35. The court vacated the 1964 convictions of two defendants, Waldo Paul Muniz and Thomas Joseph Montoya, resulting from their guilty pleas to the crime of conspiracy to commit burglary. Because the pleas were accepted in contravention of the requirements of the 1964 version of Crim.P. 11, we affirm.

I.

On October 15, 1964, an information was filed in the Denver District Court charging the defendants with burglary, ² conspiracy to commit burglary, ³ larceny, ⁴ conspiracy to commit larceny, ⁵ receiving stolen property, ⁶ and conspiracy to receive stolen property. ⁷ Attorneys were appointed for each of the defendants. On October 28, 1964, the defendants first appeared before the Denver District Court for a joint arraignment. ⁸ The court commenced the arraignment by asking Montoya's attorney whether he would waive the reading of the information. The attorney responded "Yes," and indicated that his client would plead guilty to the charge of conspiracy to commit burglary in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining counts. The attorney for Muniz also waived the reading of the information and concurred in the proposed disposition. The court then jointly advised the defendants that they had a right to a trial, to have witnesses testify on their behalf, and to the assistance of counsel. The court also informed the defendants of the potential sentence for the charge. After receiving negative responses from both defendants as to whether anyone was forcing them to plead guilty and whether they had any questions of the court, the court accepted the guilty pleas. At no time did the court inquire of the defendants as to their understanding of the crime, nor did it endeavor to explain the nature of the crime to them. On December 14, 1964, the court sentenced each defendant to an indeterminate term at the state reformatory.

Subsequently, after having served their sentences, each defendant filed a Crim.P. 35(c) motion requesting that the court vacate the guilty pleas. Among the grounds set forth in Muniz' motion, filed on April 2, 1982, was that the court accepted his guilty plea without explaining to him the nature or the elements of conspiracy to commit burglary. Montoya's motion, which was filed in 1980, also asserted that the court, at the 1964 providency hearing, failed to ascertain whether he understood the elements and nature of this crime. A hearing was held on Muniz' motion on May 21, 1982. The court inquired of the public defender representing Muniz as to Muniz' standing to bring the action. The public defender responded that the 1964 conviction was about to be used against Muniz in a sentencing hearing on an independent matter, and also that it would likely constitute the basis of a habitual criminal charge yet to be filed in Adams County. The court concluded that Muniz indeed had "standing" to challenge the guilty plea and vacated the plea because of the failure of the court "to explain the elements of the offense" during the providency hearing. Relying on its earlier ruling on Muniz' motion, the court also vacated Montoya's guilty plea after a hearing held on June 11, 1982. The record of that hearing indicates that Montoya's 1964 conviction was used as a predicate for a habitual criminal charge in a subsequent prosecution which resulted in a conviction and sentence which Montoya was then serving. ⁹ The People appealed each of the orders vacating the guilty pleas.

II.

Although the principal issue in this case is whether the court complied with the controlling legal standards for accepting guilty pleas, we first address a preliminary contention of the People. The tenor of this contention is that the defendants' Crim.P. 35 claims were barred by their failure to challenge the convictions earlier. We find no merit in the People's position.

Crim.P. 35(c)(2) expressly recognizes that "[n]otwithstanding the fact that no review of a conviction of crime was sought by appeal ... or that a judgment of conviction was affirmed upon appeal, every person convicted of a crime is entitled as a matter of right to make application for post-conviction review upon the grounds hereinafter set forth." Included within the "grounds hereinafter set forth" is a claim that the conviction was obtained "in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state." Crim.P. 35(c)(2)(I). We have held that as long as a postconviction motion states a claim cognizable under Crim.P. 35 and the claim has not been fully and finally resolved in a prior judicial proceeding, the defendant is entitled to judicial review of the asserted error. See, e.g., People v. Billips, 652 P.2d 1060 (Colo.1982); People v. Bradley, 169 Colo. 262, 455 P.2d 199 (1969). Each defendant has stated a cognizable claim under Crim.P. 35(c) in that their respective motions assert facts which, if true, would invalidate their previously entered guilty pleas. ¹⁰ Also, the record shows that the defendants' claims were not resolved at a prior postconviction or appellate proceeding.

Although there can be no real dispute about the defendants' compliance with the facial requirements of Crim.P. 35(c), the People nonetheless argue that the defendants' claims should have been dismissed as "stale." In resolving issues relating to the timeliness of postconviction claims, we have generally relied on the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Postconviction Remedies. See People v. Hampton, 187 Colo. 131, 528 P.2d 1311 (1974); People v. Bucci, 184 Colo. 367, 520 P.2d 580 (1974); People v. Hubbard, 184 Colo. 243, 519 P.2d 945 (1974). These standards provide that when a defendant has completed service of a sentence and belatedly seeks postconviction relief, he may be charged with the burden of showing a present need for such relief. Standards Relating to Postconviction Remedies § 22-2.4(c) (1978). A sufficient showing is made when the defendant establishes that he is "facing prosecution or has been convicted and the challenged conviction or sentence may be, or has been, a factor in sentencing for the current offense." Standards Relating to Postconviction Remedies § 22-2.4(c)(i) (1978). Here, Muniz established to the court's satisfaction that his challenged conviction was currently being considered as a basis for enhanced sentencing in a pending case and as the predicate for a habitual criminal charge in a prosecution in another county. Montoya likewise demonstrated at the Crim.P. 35 hearing that he was serving a habitual criminal sentence based in part on the 1964 guilty plea which he was then challenging. Under these circumstances we cannot say that the trial court erred in concluding that the defendants had shown a "present need" for the relief sought. We therefore reject the People's argument that the defendant's postconviction claims should have been barred as untimely.

III.

We turn to the crux of the People's argument, namely, that the district court erred in granting the defendants' motions for postconviction relief. Crim.P. 35(c)(2) authorizes postconviction relief when "the conviction was obtained or sentence imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state." ¹¹ We need not examine in this case whether the defendants' convictions were obtained in violation of the United States or Colorado Constitutions because, in our view, the convictions were obtained in violation of controlling state law at the time the guilty pleas were entered. ¹²

In 1964 the legal standard by which pleas of guilty were to be measured was Crim.P. 11(a). This rule went into effect on November 1, 1961, and stated as follows:

"A defendant personally or by counsel orally may plead guilty, not guilty, or, with the consent of the court, nolo contendere. The court shall not accept the plea of guilty without first:

(1) determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge, and

(2) explaining fully to the defendant his right to trial by jury, his right to counsel, and the possible penalty provided by statute for the offense charged." (Emphasis added.)

No prescribed ritual was required in 1964 for the acceptance of a guilty plea. E.g., People v. Edwards, 186 Colo. 129, 526 P.2d 144 (1974); Ward v. People, 172 Colo. 244, 472 P.2d 673 (1970). However, compliance with Crim.P. 11 did require, as it does now, ¹³ that there be an adequate basis in the record to support a determination by the court that the defendant understands the nature of the charge to which he is pleading guilty. See e.g. People v. Mason, Jr., 176 Colo. 544, 491 P.2d 1383 (1971); People v. Randolph, 175 Colo. 454, 488 P.2d 203 (1971).

Although at first blush there might appear to be some tension in our decisions with respect to whether the mere reading of a charge is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Crim.P. 11(a)(1), a close examination of these cases discloses that the central consideration is the degree to which the charge itself is readily understandable to a person of ordinary intelligence from a mere reading of the information without further explanation by the...