Mole v. University of Massachusetts
| Decision Date | 08 May 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-P-735.,00-P-735. |
| Citation | 787 N.E.2d 1098,58 Mass. App. Ct. 29 |
| Parties | John E. MOLE v. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS & others.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
John Foskett, Boston, for the plaintiff.
Christopher J. Campbell, Boston, for the defendants.
Present: GREENBERG, LENK, & COWIN, JJ.
The plaintiff, formerly a tenured professor at the University of Massachusetts Medical Center, brought proceedings against the University of Massachusetts (University) and various University employees in which he alleged that his support of his wife's sexual harassment complaint against a department head inspired unlawful retaliation resulting first in reductions in his salary, then in termination of his appointment. Following pretrial rulings that narrowed the issues (and from which there have been no appeals), the case was tried to a jury for six days. At the close of the plaintiffs case, the judge directed verdicts in favor of the defendants Michael A. Bratt and Michael P. Czech. At the close of all the evidence, the judge directed verdicts in favor of the remaining defendants Frank J. Chlapowski and the University. Following the entry of judgments in accordance with the directed verdicts, the plaintiff appealed. Applying the standard applicable to directed verdicts, see Beaupre v. Cliff Smith & Assocs., 50 Mass.App.Ct. 480, 488 n. 14, 738 N.E.2d 753 (2000), we conclude that there was sufficient evidence both of a prima facie case and of pretext on the part of the defendants to require submission of the case to the jury, and we accordingly reverse.
1. Prior proceedings. On May 2, 1993, the plaintiff filed with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination a complaint of unlawful retaliation for engaging in a protected activity, i.e., supporting his wife's sexual harassment complaint. Following the required waiting period, see G.L. c. 151B, § 9, the plaintiff sought relief in the Superior Court under various civil rights statutes, specifically: (1) G.L. c. 151B, §§ 4(4), 4(4A) and 4(5); (2) Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000); and (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). He also sued for breach of contract and declaratory relief. Each of his statutory claims was asserted against all of the defendants: Michael P. Czech, former chair of the biochemistry and molecular biology department; Frank P. Chlapowski, acting chair; Michael A. Bratt, provost of the medical center; and the University itself. A judge of the Superior Court ruled that the "continuing violation" doctrine was inapplicable and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on those portions of the G.L. c. 151B claim that sought redress for conduct occurring prior to November 2, 1992 (the then applicable limitation of six months prior to the filing of the plaintiffs complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination).2 Like wise, the judge granted the defendants summary judgment with respect to the plaintiffs allegations under Title VII of conduct occurring prior to September 2, 1992 (240 days prior to the filing with that commission, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5[5]). The judge, in addition, granted summary judgment for the University on the plaintiffs § 1983 claim, ruling that the University was not a "person" subject to liability thereunder. Finally, the judge allowed the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs claims for breach of contract and declaratory judgment.3 The remaining claims went to trial, resulting in the directed verdicts in question.4
2. Material facts. "The question before us [in reviewing such a ruling] is ... whether `anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived, any combination of circumstances could be found from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the plaintiff[].'" Beaupre v. Cliff Smith & Assocs., 50 Mass. App.Ct. at 488 n. 14, 738 N.E.2d 753, quoting from Rolanti v. Boston Edison Corp., 33 Mass.App.Ct. 516, 520, 603 N.E.2d 211 (1992). Therefore, we state what the jury could have found, treating the evidence, as well as the reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff and his wife, Jacqueline Anderson-Mole, each the holder of a doctoral degree in biochemistry, were engaged in research at the University of Alabama at Birmingham when they accepted an offer from the defendant Czech to join the biochemistry and molecular biology department (department) at the University of Massachusetts Medical Center (medical center). The plaintiff joined as an associate professor, was subsequently granted tenure, and thereafter was granted a full professorship. Anderson-Mole joined the department on a nontenure track. They brought with them valuable equipment and supplies as well as grants that they used to support their research work and salaries over the next several years. At the medical center, they founded and operated as co-directors the Protein Chemistry Core Facility (PCF), a research facility that, among other things, isolated and sequenced proteins and amino acids for other researchers at the medical center and other institutions. For several years, the PCF was funded in part by the Diabetes and Endocrinology Research Center (DERC), an organization of scientists at the medical center (of which Czech was a member), that in turn received grants awarded by the National Institutes of Health. The plaintiff also received funding from the Scientific Council, a group of scientists composed of one representative from each medical center department.
At the material times, faculty members at the medical center were evaluated on the basis of teaching, service and research. In 1983, Czech and the defendant Chlapowski, then an associate professor, gave the plaintiffs teaching strongly positive evaluations. In recommending tenure for the plaintiff with "great enthusiasm," Czech referred to him as an "exceptionally talented faculty member" and a "truly distinguished investigator," and remarked on his "solid teaching performance," "well respected research program," and "outstanding service" as PCF director. Following these reviews, the plaintiff was granted tenure in 1984. He was elevated to the rank of full professor in 1987, again following enthusiastic recommendations by Czech and Chlapowski and a unanimous vote by the department's personnel action committee.5
Between 1981 and 1989, the plaintiff's salary was consistently increased; he was appointed to various department committees by Czech, who confirmed that he was active and productive thereon; and he received no negative faculty evaluations regarding his performance. By 1989, the plaintiff carried the second highest teaching load in the department.6 In that year, Czech took a leave of absence from the position of chair of the department, his duties being assumed by Chlapowski in an acting capacity. Although on leave as chair, Czech continued to participate in faculty evaluations.
During budget hearings in 1989, the Scientific Council discussed a proposal to save money by merging the plaintiffs PCF with a neighboring peptide synthesis core facility. Various concerns regarding the operations of the PCF, including alleged difficulties encountered in working with the plaintiff, were expressed. A subcommittee was appointed to investigate and make a recommendation regarding continued funding of the PCF. On February 8, 1990, the subcommittee recommended consolidation of the two laboratories and a public search for a new director of the combined facility.
On February 28, 1990, Anderson-Mole submitted to James Wells, the medical center's equal employment opportunity compliance officer, an informal complaint of sexual harassment against Czech.7 The plaintiff supported8 his wife's complaint. During that academic year (September, 1989, to June, 1990), the plaintiff was relieved of the majority of his teaching duties, the stated reason for which was the need to give younger faculty members teaching experience. During the summer of 1990, both the plaintiff and Anderson-Mole sought appointment as head of the new combined PCF/peptide synthesis core facility. Neither was a finalist for the position. In August, 1990, Aaron Lazare, then chancellor of the medical center, informed Czech that a female faculty member had submitted an informal complaint of sexual harassment against him. There was some evidence that, at the time, Anderson-Mole was the only female faculty member of the department. Czech informed Chlapowski of the complaint, also indicating to Chlapowski that Czech was already aware of a rumor that such a complaint existed (notwithstanding that complaints of this nature were understood to be confidential).
On October 4, 1990, the plaintiff received, for the first time, a negative performance evaluation for the period July, 1989, to June, 1990, signed by Czech and Chlapowski. The evaluation reported that the plaintiff had been relieved of certain teaching assignments because of "consistently negative oral and written evaluations of his teaching efforts" by students. In addition, Chlapowski, in his capacity as acting department chair, now refused to appoint the plaintiff to membership on any department committees, despite the fact that the plaintiff asked to be included. By December, 1990, relations between the plaintiff and other faculty truly began to disintegrate, with the plaintiff, in the course of a faculty meeting, attacking Chlapowski's credentials and performance as acting chair and referring to him as "Czech's stooge."
In January, 1991, Anderson-Mole, again with the plaintiff's support, filed with the equal employment opportunity compliance officer a formal charge of sexual harassment against Czech.9 Despite the confidentiality that normally attends such complaints, the officer informed Chlapowski that Anderson-Mole had filed a formal charge of sexual and professional harassment....
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