Molzahn v. Allstate Ins. Co., A4-02-40.
Decision Date | 20 February 2004 |
Docket Number | No. A4-02-40.,A4-02-40. |
Citation | 305 F.Supp.2d 1113 |
Parties | Marlene MOLZAHN, Plaintiff, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, d/b/a Deerbrook Insurance Company, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of North Dakota |
Lee J. Balerud, Minot, ND, for plaintiff.
Michael J. Morley, Grand Forks, ND, for defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This action arises out of damages allegedly sustained by the plaintiff, Marlene Molzahn, in an automobile accident in the state of Indiana. On March 7, 2002, Molzahn initiated the above-entitled action against the defendant, Allstate Insurance Company, d/b/a Deerbrook Insurance Company, in state district court of Ward County, North Dakota. Allstate Insurance Company subsequently removed the action to this Court and, on January 14, 2004, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. No response has been served to date by Molzahn. Under Local Rule 7.1(C), Molzahn's failure to file a response may be deemed that the motion is well taken. Nevertheless, for the reasons stated below, the motion is granted.
On September 10, 1999, a motor vehicle accident occurred when cars driven by Marlon Yoder and Corinne Avery collided near Shipshewana, Indiana. Apparently, Avery had stopped at an intersection and was waiting to make a left-hand-turn when she was struck by Yoder. The plaintiff, Marlene Molzahn, was a passenger in Avery's car. Molzahn sustained leg, neck, and back injuries in the collision. At the time of the accident, Molzahn and Avery were both insured under separate policies issued by State Farm Insurance Company while Allstate Insurance Company insured the car driven by Yoder. At the time of the accident Molzahn was a North Dakota resident and Yoder was a resident of Indiana. Allstate Insurance Company is an Indiana corporation.
On March 7, 2002, Molzahn filed an action against Allstate Insurance Company in state district court of Ward County, North Dakota. She alleged that Yoder was negligent and that Allstate Insurance Company had engaged in bad faith, fraud, and unfair insurance claims practices under North Dakota law. According to Molzahn, Allstate Insurance Company had duped her into not seeking legal recourse until after the applicable statute of limitations had expired.
On March 28, 2003, Allstate Insurance Company filed a Notice of Removal. Allstate Insurance Company filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on January 14, 2003. The basis for Allstate Insurance Company's motion is that it owed no duty to Molzahn; that Molzahn's action is time-barred; and that Molzahn is precluded under either Indiana or North Dakota law from directly suing an insurer.
It is well-established that summary judgment is appropriate when, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Graning v. Sherburne County, 172 F.3d 611, 614 (8th Cir.1999). A fact is "material" if it might effect the outcome of the case and a factual dispute is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
The basic inquiry for purposes of summary judgment is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 90 F.3d 1372, 1376 (8th Cir.1996). The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating to the Court that there are no genuine issues of material fact. If the moving party has met this burden, the non-moving party cannot simply rest on the mere denials or allegations in the pleadings. Instead, the non-moving party must set forth specific facts showing that there are genuine issues for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). A mere trace of evidence supporting the non-movant's position is insufficient. Instead, the facts must generate evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
The Court's exercise of jurisdiction over this dispute is predicated upon the parties diversity of citizenship. Consequently, to determine whether North Dakota or Indiana substantive law applies, the Court must apply North Dakota's choice of laws rules. See Perkins v. Clark Equip. Co., 823 F.2d 207, 208 (8th Cir.1987) ().
In determining which state law applies, North Dakota courts employ the "significant contacts test." Id.; see Daley v. American States Preferred Ins. Co., 587 N.W.2d 159, 161 (N.D.1998). "The significant contacts test authorizes a court to look at all of the significant factors which might logically influence it in deciding which law to apply and choose the law of the state that has the greatest contacts with the case." Daley v. American States Preferred Ins. Co., 587 N.W.2d 159, 161 (N.D.1998). The specific contacts to be considered in tort cases are:
the place where the injury occurred; the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; the domicile, nationality, residence, place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties; and the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
In this case, the application of the "significant contacts tests" weighs in favor of Indiana. The accident giving rise to the present lawsuit occurred in Indiana. Marlon Yoder, the driver responsible for the accident, is a resident of Indiana. Allstate Insurance Company is incorporated in Indiana and has its principal place of business in Indiana. Although Allstate Insurance Company is admittedly licensed to do business in North Dakota, its connection to North Dakota bears little relevance to the present litigation. Allstate Insurance Company's relationship with Yoder is centered in Indiana and the insurer issued the policy in question pursuant to Indiana law. Aside from its contact with Molzahn following the accident, Allstate Insurance Company has no ties to Molzahn.
The Court has reviewed the record and finds that North Dakota lacks sufficient or significant contacts with this litigation to warrant the application of North Dakota substantive law. Rather, given the facts underlying this dispute, it is clear that Indiana substantive law should control.
The parties agree that Indiana has a two-year statute of limitations for the commencement of a personal injury action arising out of the automobile accident caused by Yoder. See Joint Final Pretrial Statement (Docket No. 15), ¶ 6(d); see also Ind.Code Ann. § 34-11-2-4 (). It is clear and undisputed that Molzhan's cause of action accrued on September 10, 1999. Under Indiana law, the statute of limitations required that Molzhan commence an action within two years or on or before September 10, 2001. Molzahn did not initiate a lawsuit against Marlon Yoder or Allstate Insurance Company until March 2002. Thus, it is clear that the action would be considered untimely under Indiana law.
The Court notes that Molzhan has acknowledged that she did not institute an action against Allstate Insurance Company until after Indiana's 2-year statute of limitations had expired. Nevertheless, Molzahn contends that Allstate Insurance Company acted in bad faith, committed fraud, and engaged in unfair insurance claims practices under North Dakota law. Specifically, she contends that Allstate Insurance Company had "lulled her into complacency" during settlement negotiations and "trick[ed] her into not taking further action to protect her legal rights until [Allstate Insurance Company] could raise the statute of limits defense." See Complaint (Docket No. 1).
Although Allstate Insurance Company's alleged misconduct raises some red flags, it was not beholden to Molzahn. Menefee v. Schurr, 751 N.E.2d 757, 760 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) ( ). The law in the State of Indiana is clear:
A claimant has no standing to sue the defendant's insurer for handling a claim negligently or in bad faith. There is no duty running from the insurer to the...
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