Monahan v. Board of Trustees of Elementary School Dist. No. 9, Fremont County
| Decision Date | 02 July 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 3882,3882 |
| Citation | 486 P.2d 235 |
| Parties | Dale I. MONAHAN, Appellant (Appellant below), v. The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 9, In the COUNTY OF FREMONT, State of Wyoming, Appellee (Appellee below). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Charles E. Graves, and Graves & Smyth, Cheyenne, for appellant.
W. J. Nicholas and Ralph Thomas, Lander, for appellee.
Before McINTYRE, C. J., and PARKER, McEWAN, and GRAY, JJ.
The teaching contract of Dale I. Monahan, a continuing contract teacher in School District No. 9, Fremont County, Wyoming, was terminated by the Board of Trustees of such school district. According to Section 21.1-152(b), W.S.1957, 1969 Cum.Supp. (part of the Wyoming Teacher Employment Law), a continuing contract teacher is: (i) Any initial contract teacher who has been employed by the same school district in the State of Wyoming for a period of three consecutive school years, including the time before and after passage of the act, and has had his contract renewed for a fourth consecutive school year; or (ii) A teacher who, either before or after passage of the act has achieved continuing contract status in one district, and who has taught two consecutive school years and has had his contract renewed for a third consecutive school year by the employing school district.
The teacher, claiming to have tenure and claiming that he had not been given a fair and impartial hearing, appealed to the district court for review of the Board's action. The district court upheld the action of the school district board and the matter is now before us on the further appeal of Monahan.
It is clear from the record and from argument before us that counsel for the school district trustees, throughout all proceedings and still on appeal, have been committed to the proposition that a continuing contract teacher does not have tenure under Wyoming law. The Board accepted and following this theory, and the decision of the district court appears to be largely predicated on substantially the same theory.
Our past history has been such that it is difficult for some of us to accept legislation which, in school affairs, eliminates the principle that a school board as employer can hire and discharge teachers as it sees fit. Some seek to justify old concepts by saying a court should not substitute its judgment for that of the school board.
If meaning is to be given to the Wyoming Teachers Employment Act, however, we must accept decisions of the legislature and see that its enactments are carried out. Insofar as there are those who then remain in disagreement, we can only say their remedy is with the legislature and not with the courts.
Our interpretation of the Wyoming Teachers Employment Act is that it does give tenure to a continuing contract teacher. Insofar as the school board and its attorneys and the district court have held otherwise, they will have to be reversed. Of course there will be the question as to whether Monahan's hearing was proper and sufficient regardless of the tenure question. We will deal with that after we have first explained our holding that Monahan did have tenure.
Section 21.1-154, W.S.157, 1969 Cum.Supp., provides:
'A continuing contract teacher shall be employed by each school district on a continuing basis from year to year without annual contract renewal at a salary determined by the board of trustees of each district, said salary subject to increases from time to time as provided for in the salary provisions adopted by the board.'
It is pointed out, and parties agree, there is a distinction between 'dismissal' and 'termination.' Subsection (c) of § 21.1-152, W.S.1957, 1969 Cum.Supp., defines dismissal, in the case of a continuing contract teacher, as cancellation of his contract at any time other than at the end of a school year where proper notice has been given. Subsection (h) of this section defines termination as the failure of the board to reemploy a teacher at the end of a school year in any given year.
Regarding dismissal of a teacher, § 21.1-160, W.S.1957, 1969 Cum.Supp., specifies that a board may suspend or dismiss any teacher for incompetency, neglect of duty, immorality, insubordination, or any other good or just cause. The section then sets out specific provisions, in a dismissal case, for notice, the necessity for a hearing, conduct of the hearing, rights of the teacher, and decision of the board.
The basis for the claim that a continuing contract teacher does not have tenure is that the legislature clearly distinguished in its definitions between 'dismissal' and 'termination.' Them, in § 21.1-160 it set out the grounds for dismissal. It did not, however, spell out any grounds for termination. Appellee reasons from this that there need not be grounds or cause for termination, and that the board can terminate at will without regard to grounds.
We cannot accept this naive theory. Administrative officers and boards will not be permitted to act in an arbitrary, capricious or fraudulent manner, and courts will restrain such administrative agencies from becoming despotic. J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc. v. Hudson, Wyo., 348 P.2d 73, 75-76; Wyoming Department of Revenue v. Wilson, Wyo., 400 P.2d 144, 145, reh. den. 401 P.2d 960; Marathon Oil Co. v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., Wyo., 473 P.2d 575, 577.
On review of an agency action, the duty of the court is to ascertain whether findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, Wyo., 446 P.2d 550, 555. See also §§ 9-276.28 and 9-276.32(c), W.S.1957, 1969 Cum.Supp.
The rule is well established in our state that action of a board will be considered arbitrary when taken without the board having before it sufficient information upon which to make a proper decision. See Clear Creek Cattle Co. v. Davis, Wyo., 384 P.2d 719, 720; and School District No. 9, Fremont County v. District Boundary Board in and for Fremont County, Wyo.,351 P.2d 106, 113. As far as hearings under the Administrative Procedure Act are concerned, § 9-276.32(c) makes it clear a court's review includes a determination of whether the findings of fact in issue in a contested case are supported by substantial evidence.
It becomes clear then, from what we have said, that a hearing on termination of a continuing contract teacher involves the question of whether there is good cause for termination. There must not only be good cause but there must be substantial evidence before the board to show that there is good cause. Absent either, a decision on the part of the board to terminate will be arbitrary.
The superintendent of schools, W. R. Skelton, made it clear in his testimony that a meeting of the school board was held March 6, 1969 and that it was apparent Monahan would not be offered a contract. He told the board he would so inform Monahan and this he did. Then, according to the superintendent, at a meeting on March 13, the board voted to terminate Monahan; and on March 15 Skelton handed Monahan a 'Notice of Termination.'
On March 19, 1969, Monahan, through his attorney, requested a hearing. Although such a hearing was conducted April 10, 1969, it is clear from the record as a whole, from the statement of counsel at the hearing, and even from the admission of appellee's attorney in oral argument to us that Monahan did not have a bona fide hearing to determine whether there was just cause for his termination. Instead, the hearing was nothing more than an exercise engaged in for the sole purpose of making a record which could make legal and justifiable the decision which the board had already made prior to the hearing.
In oral argument before us, counsel for appellee explained that he and a former attorney for the school board, W. J. Nicholas, had proceeded with the hearing only because they might not be sustained on their theory that Monahan did not have tenure. He argued (arguendo) that even if Monahan is held to have tenure, he nevertheless had a fair and impartial hearing and there was substantial evidence to justify the termination.
The real and sole purpose of the hearing was made even more clear by a statement of Mr. Nicholas, at the time of the hearing. We can assume he was speaking for the board when he stated:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Board of Trustees, Laramie County School Dist. No. 1 v. Spiegel
...in Roush, supra, at page 542: '. . . but in any event we left no doubt (referring to Monahan v. Board of Trustees of Elementary School District No. 9, County of Fremont, Wyo., 486 P.2d 235, 236-237) that absent good cause to the contrary a continuing contract teacher has a reasonable expect......
-
Board of Trustees of Weston County School Dist. No. 1, Weston County v. Holso
...Powell v. Board of Trustees of Crook County School District No. 1, Wyo., 550 P.2d 1112, 1119. See, Monahan v. Board of Trustees of Elementary School District No. 9, Wyo., 486 P.2d 235, 237; and Roush v. Sweetwater County School District No. 1, Wyo., 497 P.2d 540, 542. In Board of Trustees, ......
-
Gardetto v. Mason
...v. Spiegel, 549 P.2d 1161 (Wyo.1976); O'Melia v. Sweetwater County School Dist. No. 1, 497 P.2d 540 (Wyo.1972); Monahan v. Board of Trustees, 486 P.2d 235 (Wyo.1971). As a result, the plaintiff would certainly have a protected property interest if the defendant had sought to deprive her of ......
-
Mekss v. Wyoming Girls' School, State of Wyo., 89-235
...(Wyo.1983). Radio Communications, Inc. v. Two-Way Radio Service, Inc., 718 P.2d 15, 20 (Wyo.1986); Monahan v. Board of Trustees, Elementary School District No. 9, 486 P.2d 235, 237 (Wyo.1971). The need for such strict compliance with statutory provisions relating to the content of the agenc......