Monica v. Pelicas
| Decision Date | 22 March 1955 |
| Docket Number | No. 16205,16205 |
| Citation | 281 P.2d 269,131 Cal.App.2d 700 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | John Maria MONICA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Manuel PELICAS, Defendant, and Arminda Pelicas, also known as Irma Pelicas and Mrs. Irma Pelicas, Defendant and Appellant. |
Standley Walter, san Francisco, for appellant.
Wagener & Brailsford, Oakland, for respondents.
The judgment declares that plaintiff is and ever since February 27, 1948, has been the equitable owner of an undivided fractional interest in a house and lot which defendants Manuel and Arminda Pelicas as joint tenants acquired on that date.
Defendant-appellant Arminda Pelicas claims the evidence does not support the findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which the judgment is based.
The principal findings are these: Plaintiff can neither read nor write. He speaks English only slightly and with considerable difficulty. He and Arminda opened a savings account in joint tenancy. At all times the money deposited was the sole money of plaintiff. The account stood in their names for purposes of convenience only, without intention at any time of passing ownership or title thereto to Arminda. Plaintiff at no time gave Arminda permission to use the funds on deposit in the account for the purpose of purchasing a house and lot in the name of herself and her former husband, defendant Manuel Pelicas; nor to take title in her name alone. On February 24, 1948, the sum of $6,448 was withdrawn from the account, without plaintiff's knowledge or consent, and immediately applied by Manuel and Arminda to the $15,125 purchase price of a house and lot, Manuel and Arminda taking title as grantees in joint tenancy. Later, Manuel and Arminda were divorced and the divorce decree awarded the house and lot to Arminda as her sole and separate property, whereupon Arminda filed a declaration of homestead upon the property. On July 9, 1948, Manuel and Arminda executed and delivered to plaintiff a promissory note in the principal sum of $6,000 with interest at one percent per annum. The note was made at the suggestion of the defendants in order that plaintiff might have some written evidence of their obligation to him. It is not true that the parties reached an agreement whereby it was determined that the defendants owed plaintiff the sum of $6,000 evidenced by said promissory note.
The trial court concluded that plaintiff was entitled to a judgment declaring that he is equitable owner of an undivided 6448/15125ths interest in the house and lot.
Defendant Arminda Pelicas 1 challenges (1) the finding that plaintiff at no time gave her permission to use the funds in the bank account for the purpose of purchasing a house and lot in her name alone or in her name and that of her former husband Manuel, (2) the finding that the money was withdrawn from the account without plaintiff's knowledge and consent; and (3) the finding concerning the $6,000 note. 2
We have examined the record and are convinced that all of the findings, including the challenged findings, are amply supported by the evidence. A summary of some of the significant portions of the supporting testimony follows. Plaintiff testified that he told Manuel that Manuel could use the money to buy a house; that if Manuel ever saw a house that he liked and wanted Manuel could use the money in this account. Asked if he had not told Arminda's father that Arminda could use the money in the savings account whenever she needed it, plaintiff said: 'No, sir, Manuel Pelicas is all' and 'I said I told Manuel Pelicas that he could use my money to buy a house whenever he saw fit, but no one else.' Asked if he ever told Arminda Pelicas she could withdraw $6,448 on February 24, 1948, plaintiff replied: 'To her, no * * * I never gave her the authority to take the money, but I did tell her husband he could take the money.' Asked if Arminda was to use the money in this account to buy a house in plaintiff's name, plaintiff replied: 'I did not say my name, just to help him buy a hosue.' Arminda's mother said plaintiff discussed this savings account with her many times. Asked why plaintiff would speak about his account, the mother said: 'I told you he got so much money in the bank, to help Manuel Pelicas.' Asked what plaintiff said, she replied: 'Mr. Monica say he like to help Mr. Pelicas to boy the home for himself.'
Arminda testified that her husband told her to withdraw the money and that the whole $6,448 went into the house.
The $6,448 was withdrawn February 24, 1948, while plaintiff was at sea. He went to sea January 26 and returned June 27, 1948.
When plaintiff returned from sea, Manuel informed him they had taken the money from the bank to buy a house. Asked if there was any conversation between plaintiff and Manuel as to how Manuel was to withdraw the money, plaintiff said:
Manuel told plaintiff he was going to make out a paper to show that he owed plaintiff the money; in case Manuel ever had an accident he wanted plaintiff to know that his money was secure; plaintiff did not ask Manuel for the note; it was Manuel's idea. Arminda also testified the giving of the note was Manuel's wish.
It is true that plaintiff seemed a little uncertain whether, upon his return from the sea, Manuel told plaintiff that 'I' (Manuel) or 'we' (Manuel and Arminda) had used the money to buy a home, but, whichever way Manuel said it, plaintiff was not thereby informed that title was taken as joint tenants instead of solely in the name of Manuel. Accordingly, plaintiff's acquiescence in the transaction at that time (he had said it was all right, he had no objection to it) did not necessarily amount to ratification of the transaction, nor did it necessarily indicate that he had previously authorized such a transaction. That, doubtless, is the way the trial judge viewed it, considered in the light of the findings which he made. As held in Stromerson v. Averill, 22 Cal.2d 808, 814-815, 141 P.2d 732, 736: ...
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