Quezada v. Hart

• Decision Date: 03 March 1977
• Citation: 136 Cal.Rptr. 815,67 Cal.App.3d 754
• Parties: Rosemary QUEZADA et al., Plaintiffs, Respondents, and Cross-Appellants, v. Edward P. HART and Joy Gibson, Defendants, Appellants, and Cross-Respondents. Civ. 48118.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 815

136 Cal.Rptr. 815

67 Cal.App.3d 754

Rosemary QUEZADA et al., Plaintiffs, Respondents, and Cross-Appellants, v. Edward P. HART and Joy Gibson, Defendants, Appellants, and Cross-Respondents.

Civ. 48118.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

March 3, 1977.

La Follette, Johnson & Schroeter, Daren T. Johnson, Los Angeles, and Law Offices of Edward L. Lascher, Edward L. Lascher, Ventura, for appellants.

Rudolph Pearl, Los Angeles, for respondents.

FLEMING, Associate Justice.

Appeal by defendants and cross-appeal by plaintiffs from a judgment for damages for legal malpractice. The two attorney defendants (Attorneys) stipulated to their negligence in not bringing plaintiffs' quiet title action (underlying action) to trial within five years, and the only issues litigated were whether plaintiffs would have prevailed in the underlying action, and if so, what they would have recovered. The trial court, sitting without a jury, found plaintiffs would have prevailed in the underlying action to quiet title against plaintiffs' elder brother, and entered judgment for plaintiffs for the value of the property they would have acquired, plus attorneys' fees and costs that plaintiffs incurred when their elder brother evicted them from the property after dismissal of the underlying action. The court refused to consider plaintiffs' claim for damages for emotional suffering as a result of the loss of the property. Defendants appeal the judgment, and plaintiffs cross-appeal the court's refusal to consider damages for emotional suffering.

The trial court found the underlying action between Raul Munoz and five of his younger brothers and sisters, plaintiffs herein, involved title to their family home purchased in February 1956 after the father of the family had died. At that time plaintiffs were minors and Raul was just over 21. The widowed mother of the family, Julia Munoz (now deceased), had given Raul money consisting of her widow's Social Security benefits and Social Security benefits on account of her five minor children, with the request that he locate and purchase a home for the family. Raul located property consisting of two houses on a lot, the front house vacant and the rear house rented to a Julia and Raul orally agreed that title to the property should be taken in joint tenancy, so that if something happened to Raul, Julia would have a roof over her head; that after Julia's death the rear house would belong to Raul and the front house to Julia's younger children. The property was taken in the joint names of Julia and Raul Munoz; and thereafter the entire family lived in the front house. The family maintained a bureau drawer in which it put all income coming into the family--Raul's earnings, rent from the rear house, Julia's Social Security benefits for herself and her minor children, and the minor children's earnings from odd jobs. From these revenues various family members paid the family's living expenses, and Raul made the mortgage and property tax payments. Sometimes Raul demanded trust deed and tax payments from the family members, ostensibly for the front house, but in fact for the entire property. In late 1959 or early 1960 the tenant vacated the rear house, and Raul commenced to live there with his own family while Julia and the younger children remained in the front house. Julia died in January 1964, and thereafter Raul, as surviving joint tenant, cleared title in himself to the entire property. However, plaintiffs continued to reside in the front house and made payments on property taxes and trust deeds on the property, relying on Raul's representations that the front house was theirs.

Raul first openly asserted a claim to the entire property in 1967, when plaintiff Martin Munoz attempted to discuss selling the property. Plaintiffs then consulted Attorneys, who prepared and filed on their behalf a complaint to quiet title to the front house in favor of plaintiffs and against Raul. This action was dismissed five years later because of Attorneys' negligent lack of prosecution. Immediately following dismissal of the quiet title action, Raul successfully evicted plaintiffs by an action in ejectment, which plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempted by defend by filing a cross-complaint asserting an interest in the front house. ¹ After their eviction, plaintiffs brought the present malpractice action against attorneys, claiming damages in the underlying action for the loss of property worth $30,000 and damages for emotional distress as a result of the loss of their family home.

During the trial of the malpractice action, certain plaintiffs testified that the original understanding among Julia, Raul, and the minor children was that on Julia's death the minor children would receive title to the entire property, not merely the front house. At that point plaintiffs' counsel moved to amend the malpractice complaint to allege that Attorneys had been negligent in the underlying action, not only in failing to bring it to trial, but also in not demanding the entire property rather than merely the front house; counsel further requested an amendment to plead that if plaintiffs had successfully prosecuted the underlying action, they would have obtained title to the entire property. Because plaintiffs had claimed only the front house, both in the underlying action and in their cross-complaint to the ejectment action, the trial court was reluctant to permit the amendment, but ultimately it did so after counsel for Attorneys stated he did not need further time to prepare. At the end of the trial the court found that the agreement among the family members was, as originally stated, for plaintiffs to receive the front house only; that the value of the entire property was $25,000 and of the front house $15,000. The court entered judgment for plaintiffs, for $15,847, the value of the front house, plus attorneys' fees and costs in the ejectment action.

I

Attorneys claim the trial court erred in allowing plaintiffs to recover judgment for the value of the front house when their amended complaint sought the value of the entire property. They also challenge the court's findings and conclusions of law that construed the family agreement as being, alternatively, either an express trust or a constructive trust.

Inconsistency in a trial court's findings is immaterial if substantial evidence supports the judgment on any theory. (See discussion in 4 Witkin, Trial, § 345, p. 3146; Martinez v. Martinez (1953)41 Cal.2d 704, 263 P.2d 617.) Only where findings essential to the judgment conflict on material issues and contradict undisputed evidence will a reviewing court reverse a judgment for inconsistent findings. (See Stiefel v. McKee (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 263, 81 Cal.Rptr. 565.) The issue is whether the findings and the record support judgment for plaintiffs on any theory. (Sears v. Rule (1945) 27 Cal.2d 131, 140--141, 163 P.2d 443, cert. denied, 328 U.S. 843, 66 S.Ct. 1022, 90 L.Ed. 1617 (1945); Seabury v. Costello (1962)209 Cal.App.2d 640, 646, 26 Cal.Rptr. 248.) We agree with Attorneys the record does not support a finding of express trust, ² but the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of constructive trust. The court's alternative conclusion of law No. 2 states:

'That Raul Munoz acquired title to the front portion of the property by fraud or mistake and therefore a constructive trust was created by operation of law, to avoid the unjust enrichment of Raul Munoz, . . .'

Although Raul's promise to convey real property to his brothers and sisters was oral and thus within the statute of frauds, California courts enforce such a promise on a theory of constructive trust. (Orella v. Johnson (1952) 38 Cal.2d 693, 696--697, 242 P.2d 5; Day v. Greene (1963) 59 Cal.2d 404, 410, 29 Cal.Rptr. 785, 380 P.2d 385; see full discussion in Steinberger v. Steinberger (1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 116, 119--120, 140 P.2d 31.) The general rule has been to require a finding of either (1) fraud, duress, or undue influence; (2) a confidential relationship violated by repudiation of the oral promise; or (3) a transfer in contemplation of death. (See ALI Restat., Restitution (1937) § 183, pp. 737--738.) In this case, the motor-and-son relationship and entrustment by the mother to the son of the money, the negotiation, and the purchase provide ample evidence to sustain a finding of confidential relationship. (See, e.g., Steinberger v. Steinberger, supra, at 122, 140 P.2d 31; Dieckmann v. Merkh (1912) 20 Cal.App. 655, 660, 130 P. 27; Novak v. Novak (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 438, 57 Cal.Rptr. 564.) Further, a breach of agency can also be inferred, which would likewise support imposition of a constructive trust. (See Stromerson v. Averill (1943) 22 Cal.2d 808, 815, 141 P.2d 732; see also, Monica v. Pelicas (1955) 131 Cal.App.2d 700, 703--704, 281 P.2d 269.) The essence of constructive trust in California is that one person has reposed trust and confidence in another and conveyed property or supplied the consideration therefor on the basis of an oral promise to hold the property in trust or reconvey it according to the conveyor's direction. (See Lauricella v. Lauricella (1911) 161 Cal. 61, 65, 118 P. 430.) Such a violation of trust supports a conclusion of unjust enrichment. (Monica v. Pelicas, supra, 131 Cal.App.2d at 704, 281 P.2d 269; see also Steinberger, supra, 60 Cal.App.2d at 122, 140 P.2d 31; and, O'Neil v. Spillane (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 147, 153, 119 Cal.Rptr. 245.) The findings that plaintiffs contributed to the trust deed and property tax payments in reliance on Raul's representations they would own the front house after Julia's death and that plaintiffs at that time were in possession of the property, also support the conclusion of constructive trust. (Jose v. Pacific Tile & Porcelain Co. (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 141, 144--145, 58 Cal.Rptr. 880; see also, Adams v. Young (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 145, 156, 62 Cal.Rptr. 877.)

Finally, the...