Monje v. Spin Master Inc.
| Decision Date | 30 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-09-1713-PHX-GMS,CV-09-1713-PHX-GMS |
| Parties | Mark Monje and Beth Monje, husband and wife, individually and on behalf of their minor son; and RM, minor son, Plaintiffs, v. Spin Master Inc., a Delaware corporation; Spin Master Limited, a Canadian company; Toys "R" US-Delaware Inc.; and Moose Enterprises Proprietary Limited, an Australian company, Defendants. Spin Master, Inc., a Delaware corporation; Spin Master, LTD., a Canadian company, Third-Party Plaintiffs, v. Bureau Veritas S.A.; Bureau Veritas Consumer Products Services, Inc.; Eurofins Scientific SE, and Product Safety Labs, Inc., Third-Party Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Third Party Defendants Eurofins Scientific SE ("ESSE") and Product Safety Labs, Inc. ("PSL") have moved to be dismissed from Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Spin Master, Inc.'s Amended Third Party Complaint (the "Complaint") (Doc. 108) for lack of personal jurisdiction, moved to strike Spin Master's designation of ESSE and PSL asnonparties at fault in its Amended Answer, and, in the alternative, moved to stay this litigation. (Doc. 126.) Third-Party Defendant Bureau Veritas S.A. ("BVSA") has likewise moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Doc. 131.) Third-Party Defendant Bureau Veritas Consumer Products Services, Inc. ("BVCPS") has moved to dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 130.) Finally, Spin Master filed a Motion, (Doc. 160), requesting that the Court order certain Parties to meet and confer again regarding the Motion to Strike, (Doc. 126). The Court grants the Motions to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, grants the Motion to Strike, denies the Motion to Stay as moot, denies the Motion to Dismiss under 12(b)(6), and denies Spin Master's Motion. The claim against BVCPS remains.1
The underlying case involves a toy called "Bindeez", which was designed by Defendant Moose Enterprises, Ltd., and which Spin Master marketed and sold in the United States as "Aqua Dots." Aqua Dots are small, colorful beads that children could use to make various crafts. (Id. ¶ 16.) Aqua Dots arrived on the shelves of United States retailers on April 1, 2007. (Id. ¶ 20.) Spin Master distributed around four million packages of Aqua Dots in the United States. (Doc. 106-1, Ex. 15.)
In June 2007, Spin Master commissioned BVCPS to conduct acute oral ingestion toxicity testing on a sample of Aqua Dots. (Doc. 108 ¶ 12.) BVCPS is a Massachusetts corporation with its principal place of business in Buffalo, New York. (Id. ¶ 4.) It is a subsidiary of BVSA, which is a French company headquartered in Neuilly-sur-Seine, France. (Doc. 131-1, Ex. 1 ¶ 3.) The Bureau Veritas group "offers a wide range ofservices to ensure a safety-assurance process and asset availability performance whatever the industry." (Doc. 142-2, Ex. B.)
BVCPS subcontracted with PSL to perform the oral toxicity testing. PSL is a Delaware company whose offices are located in New Jersey. (Doc. 127 (Wnorowski Decl.) ¶ 2.) It is a member of the Eurofins group of companies, which is owned by ESSE, a Luxembourg holding company. (Doc. 128 (Vaussy Decl.) ¶ 3.) Like the other members of the Eurofins Group, PSL performs laboratory testing of various products. (Doc. 108 ¶ 13.)
BVCPS and its subcontractor, PSL, understood that Spin Master marketed and sold Aqua Dots to children and that the testing was to ensure that the product would not endanger a child who ingested the dots. (Id.) Nevertheless, according to the allegations of the Third-Party Complaint, PSL unnecessarily delayed the testing and then did not administer the proper dosage to the test animals. (Id. ¶ 14-15.)
At some point in 2007, Plaintiffs Mark and Beth Monje purchased Aqua Dots from a Toys "R" Us store in Maricopa County, Arizona. In July of 2007, Plaintiff RM, the Monjes' 18-month-old son, ate some Aqua Dots. (Id.) Unbeknownst to the Monjes, Aqua Dots contained 1,4-butanediol, a harmful toxin that, when metabolized, converts into GHB, also known as the "date rape" drug. (Id. ¶ 22.) RM experienced "significant seizures, continued vomiting, went into respiratory failure, required intubation, and slipped into a coma." (Id. ¶ 13.) He was air-evacuated to Phoenix Children's Hospital. (Id.) RM suffered severe and permanent injuries to his brain and central nervous system. (Id. ¶ 15.) Nurses found Aqua Dots in RM's vomit. (Id. ¶ 13.)
PSL eventually provided its analysis to BVCPS, which sent it to Spin Master. (Doc. 108 ¶ 16.) The report stated that the Aqua Dots sample was "not . . . toxic as defined in and tested per 16 CFR 1500.3(c)(2)(i)(A), 'Acute oral toxicity' (FHSA regulations)." 3 That report arrived on August 10, 2007, some timeafter RM had ingested the Aqua Dots and suffered his injuries.
On November 7, 2007, the United States Consumer Product Safety Commission ordered the recall of all Aqua Dots after several reports of injuries similar to those suffered by RM surfaced in the media. The Monjes bring a variety of product liability claims against Moose, Spin Master, and Toys "R" Us. Spin Master seeks common law and implied indemnification from ESSE, PSL, BVSA, and BVCPS.
Three of the four Third-Party Defendants challenge the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction over them. Because a jurisdictional challenge has been raised, the Court will consider those arguments before moving to question of whether Spin Master has stated a claim for common law immunity.
Spin Master, as the Third-Party Plaintiff, bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ziegler v. Indian River Cnty., 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1995). Once a defendant has moved to dismiss, "the plaintiff is obligated to come forward with facts, by affidavit or otherwise, supporting personal jurisdiction" over the defendant. Cummings v. W. Trial Lawyers Assoc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1151 (D. Ariz. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). "[M]ere allegations of a complaint, when contradicted by affidavits, are not enough to confer personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant." Chem Lab Prods., Inc. v. Stepanek, 554 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1977); Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977) () A court may look to affidavits submitted by the parties in its determination. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001). However, "conflicts between the facts contained in the parties' affidavits must be resolved in [plaintiffs'] favor for purposes of deciding whether a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction exists." AT&T v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996).
Because no statutory method for resolving the personal jurisdiction issue exists, the district court determines the method of its resolution. See Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1285 (citing Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 71-72 (1939)). A district court may, but is not required to, allow discovery to help determine whether it has personal jurisdiction over a defendant. See id. at 1285 n.1. In addition, a district court may, but is not required to, hear evidence at a preliminary hearing to determine its jurisdiction. See id. at 1285 n.2. If the district court does not hear testimony or make findings of fact and permits the parties to submit only written materials, then the plaintiff must only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to defeat the defendant's motion to dismiss. See Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 268 (9th Cir. 1995). Under this prima facie burden of proof, the plaintiff need only establish facts, through admissible evidence, that if true would support personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court has determined to proceed on the written materials submitted by the Parties and apply the lower prima facie standard.
To establish that personal jurisdiction over ESSE, PSL, and BVSA exists, Spin Master must demonstrate that (1) Arizona's long arm statute confers jurisdiction over those Parties, and (2) that "the exercise of jurisdiction comports with the constitutional principles of Due Process." See Rio Props. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). Because Arizona's long-arm statute extends jurisdiction "to the maximum extent permitted by the . . . Constitution of the United States," the personal jurisdiction inquiry collapses into a Due Process analysis. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a); Davis v. Metro Prod., Inc., 885 F.2d 515, 520 (9th Cir. 1989); Williams v. Lakeview Co., 199 Ariz. 1, 5, 13 P.3d 280, 282 (2000). Absenttraditional bases for personal jurisdiction (e.g., physical presence, domicile, and consent) the Due Process Clause requires that nonresident defendants have certain "minimum contacts" with the forum state such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
"In determining whether a defendant had minimum contacts with the forum state such that the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant would not offend the Due Process Clause, courts focus on 'the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.'" Brink v. First Credit Resources, 57 F. Supp. 2d 848, 860 (D. Ariz. 1999) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). If a defendant's contacts with the forum state are sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause, then the Court must exercise either "general" or "specific" jurisdiction over the defendant. See ...
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