Monohan v. Burdman, No. 42992
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
| Writing for the Court | HAMILTON; HALE |
| Citation | 530 P.2d 334,84 Wn.2d 922 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus of Philip MONOHAN, Petitioner, v. Milton BURDMAN, Secretary of the State of Washington Department of Social and Health Services, Respondent. |
| Decision Date | 07 January 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 42992 |
Page 922
of Philip MONOHAN, Petitioner,
v.
Milton BURDMAN, Secretary of the State of Washington
Department of Social and Health Services, Respondent.
Rehearing Denied March 13, 1975.
[530 P.2d 335] Richard D. Emery, Allen Ressler, Prison Legal Services Project, Seattle, for petitioner.
Slade Gorton, Atty. Gen., Thomas A. Prediletto, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for respondent.
Page 923
HAMILTON, Associate Justice.
Petitioner, Philip Monohan, seeks a writ of habeas corpus. The essence of his petition rests upon his contention that a tentative parole release date, accorded him while an inmate of the Washington State Corrections Center, was cancelled without appropriate notice and an adjudicatory hearing. Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that he was entitled to minimal due process requirements of a notice and hearing. Accordingly, we refer the matter to respondent for appropriate proceedings.
The operative circumstances are these. In 1968, petitioner was convicted of two separate felonies. He was sentenced on each to be confined in a correctional facility. [530 P.2d 336] In due course the minimum term for each offense was set, the respective terms to run consecutively.
On May 25, 1973, the petitioner met with a panel of the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles for his annual progress conference. At this time, it was determined that he had performed so well that the panel ordered a parole on his first offense and reduced his minimum sentence on the second offense to the end that a tentative parole release date was established as of August 30, 1973. Actual release on the specified date was conditioned upon development of an acceptable parole rehabilitation plan.
Initially, an interstate parole plan was considered. However, it appeared that certain difficulties arose with respect to the interstate plan, as a result of which petitioner was granted a furlough, pursuant to RCW 72.66, to undertake development of a parole plan in his home community of Vancouver, Washington. Petitioner arrived at his home in Vancouver on August 1, 1973.
On August 2, 1973, petitioner was arrested by the Clark County Sheriff and charged with disorderly conduct. The charge arose out of his alleged participation in a drug-oriented party. After notification to petitioner's supervising parole officer, he was returned on August 3, 1973, to the corrections center by Clark County authorities. On the same day, the Clark County Prosecuting Attorney's office
Page 924
advised the corrections center authorities that all charges against petitioner had been dismissed.Upon arrival at the corrections facility, petitioner was placed in segregation for a period of time following which he appeared for interview before the institution's classification committee. He was not given any written notice as to what allegations of misconduct the committee would be considering. As a result of the interview, the committee concluded from written reports of the arrest incident that petitioner had violated his furlough conditions and that he was then unsuitable for parole. The committee recommended that the parole board reconsider the matter of his pending parole. During the interview, petitioner denied any misconduct during his furlough and asserted his innocence of the disorderly conduct charge.
Pursuant to the recommendation of the classification committee, a panel of the parole board conducted a hearing on August 30, 1973. Although orally advised of the reasons for the hearing, petitioner was not given written notification of the issues to be considered, nor was he accorded the opportunity to confront his accusers, cross-examine them, or call witnesses on his own behalf. Following the hearing and despite petitioner's protestations of innocence, the panel accepted the conclusions and recommendation of the classification committee, cancelled petitioner's tentative release date, and extended his minimum term for 9 months.
Petitioner again met with a panel of the parole board in December 1973. It was then determined that he had again performed well at the institution, good time was granted, and a tentative parole release date of March 29, 1974, was established. His release date was reached after filing of his petition, but prior to oral argument before this court on the petition.
Although not briefed by either party, a threshold question raised during oral argument concerns the propriety of our considering the issues raised by petitioner in view of his intervening release on parole. In short, has his release
Page 925
rendered moot the issues he propounds regarding the summary cancellation of his August 30, 1973 tentative parole release date? We think not.In the first place, the restrictions, limitations, and condtions attached to the usual parole status constitute a form of 'custody' falling within the reach of habeas corpus relief. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285, 92 A.L.R.2d 675 (1963). This is so because a parolee, unlike the ordinary citizen, is subject to supervision by his parole officer, limited in his mode, manner, and place [530 P.2d 337] of living and travel, restricted as to his associates and type of employment, and subject to reincarceration in the event of a breach of any conditions of his parole. Thus, he is not a free man in the commonly accepted sense.
In the second place, the potentially adverse effects of petitioner's tentative parole release date cancellation are sufficiently significant 'collateral consequences' to retrieve his petition from the 'limbo of mootness,' 1 although he is no longer physically incarcerated by virtue of that release date revocation. Scarpelli v. Gagnon, 317 F.Supp. 72 (E.D.Wis. 1970), aff'd sub nom., Gunsolus v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1971), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom., Gagnon v. Scarpelli,411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973); See also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968); Carafas v. La Vallee, 391 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968); Hahn v. Burke,430 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1970); and, Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969). It is not...
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In re Grantham, No. 82194-1.
...33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); and Monohan v. Burdman, 84 Wash.2d 922, 530 P.2d 334 (1975). (2) There is no constitutional requirement in probation or parole revocation hearings that in all cases indigent prisoners must be prov......
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In re Lain, No. 87109–4.
...620 A.2d 917 (1993) (finding liberty interest flowed from order of parole, prior to release); Monohan v. Burdman, 84 Wash.2d 922, 929, 530 P.2d 334 (1975) (holding that “once parole or a promise of parole has been granted in the form of a tentative release date, we are satisfied that the pr......
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Born v. Thompson, No. 74126-3.
...whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of the restraint."13 In Monohan v. Burdman, 84 Wash.2d 922, 925, 530 P.2d 334 (1975),14 the court determined that potential adverse consequences of canceling a tentative parole release date were "sufficiently signific......
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E.C. v. Virginia Dep't of Juvenile Justice, Record No. 110523.
...parte Guzman, 551 S.W.2d 387, 388 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1981); Monohan v. Burdman, 84 Wash.2d 922, 530 P.2d 334, 336–37 (1975); State v. Theoharopoulos, 72 Wis.2d 327, 240 N.W.2d 635, 637–38 (1976). We have not previously been asked to consider whether ......
-
In re Grantham, No. 82194-1.
...33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); and Monohan v. Burdman, 84 Wash.2d 922, 530 P.2d 334 (1975). (2) There is no constitutional requirement in probation or parole revocation hearings that in all cases indigent prisoners must be prov......
-
In re Lain, No. 87109–4.
...620 A.2d 917 (1993) (finding liberty interest flowed from order of parole, prior to release); Monohan v. Burdman, 84 Wash.2d 922, 929, 530 P.2d 334 (1975) (holding that “once parole or a promise of parole has been granted in the form of a tentative release date, we are satisfied that the pr......
-
Born v. Thompson, No. 74126-3.
...whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of the restraint."13 In Monohan v. Burdman, 84 Wash.2d 922, 925, 530 P.2d 334 (1975),14 the court determined that potential adverse consequences of canceling a tentative parole release date were "sufficiently signific......
-
E.C. v. Virginia Dep't of Juvenile Justice, Record No. 110523.
...parte Guzman, 551 S.W.2d 387, 388 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1981); Monohan v. Burdman, 84 Wash.2d 922, 530 P.2d 334, 336–37 (1975); State v. Theoharopoulos, 72 Wis.2d 327, 240 N.W.2d 635, 637–38 (1976). We have not previously been asked to consider whether ......