Monroe v. Astrue

• Decision Date: 19 September 2011
• Docket Number: Civil No. 10–3739 (MJD/JSM).
• Citation: 848 F.Supp.2d 961
• Parties: Kayla M. MONROE, Plaintiff, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

848 F.Supp.2d 961

Kayla M. MONROE, Plaintiff,

v.Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

Civil No. 10–3739 (MJD/JSM).

United States District Court,

D. Minnesota.

Sept. 19, 2011.

Paul E.W. Mundt, Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, Winona, MN, for Plaintiff.

Lonnie F. Bryan, United States Attorney's Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

MICHAEL J. DAVIS, District Judge.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court upon the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Janie S. Mayeron dated August 4, 2011. No objections have been filed to that Report and Recommendation in the time period permitted.

Based upon the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, and all of the files, records and proceedings herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 8] is GRANTED; and

2. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 17] is DENIED.

3. This case is remanded to the Commissioner with instructions to award benefits to Plaintiff.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

JANIE S. MAYERON, United States Magistrate Judge.

The above matter is before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge on plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 8] and defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 17]. This matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation by the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.1(c).

For the reasons discussed below, it is recommended that plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED and that defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Kayla Monroe (“Monroe”) was initially awarded supplemental social security benefits as child on March 1, 1995, when she was five years old, on the basis that she was retarded and suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). Tr. 26. When Monroe attained the age of 18, she underwent a reevaluation for the eligibility of disability benefits under the disability criteria for adults. Tr. 90. The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) concluded that Monroe was no longer disabled as of April 1, 2008. Tr. 56–59, 90–94. The redetermination was upheld upon reconsideration. Tr. 89, 95–109. Monroe, who was represented by a non-attorney representative, received a hearing before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) David B. Washington on May 1, 2009. Tr. 16, 398. Testimony was taken at the hearing from Monroe, German Benetiz (“Benetiz”) who is Monroe's boyfriend, and neutral vocational expert (“VE”) Mitchell Norman. Id. On June 23, 2009, the ALJ issued a decision denying Monroe benefits, finding that her disability ended on April 1, 2008, and that she has not become disabled again since that date. Tr. 24. The Appeals Council denied Monroe's request for review and upheld the ALJ's decision denying benefits to Monroe, making the ALJ's findings the final decision of defendant. Tr. 4–6. See42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Monroe sought review of the ALJ's decision by filing the instant action with this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The matter is now before the Court on plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 8] and defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 17].

II. PROCESS FOR REVIEW

Congress has prescribed the standards by which Social Security disability benefits may be awarded. “The Social Security program provides benefits to people who are aged, blind, or who suffer from a physical or mental disability.” Locher v. Sullivan, 968 F.2d 725, 727 (8th Cir.1992); 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a). The Social Security Administration shall find a person disabled if the claimant “is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The claimant's impairments must be “of such severity that [the claimant] is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). The impairment must last for a continuous period of at least twelve months or be expected to result in death. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 416.909.

A. Administrative Law Judge Hearing's Five–Step Analysis

If a claimant's initial application for benefits is denied, he or she may request reconsideration of the decision. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.907–09, 416.1407–09. A claimant who is dissatisfied with the reconsidered decision may obtain administrative review by an ALJ. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(b)(1), 1383(c)(1); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.929, 416.1429. To determine the existence and extent of a claimant's disability, the ALJ must follow a five-step sequential analysis, requiring the ALJ to make a series of factual findings regarding the claimant's work history, impairment, residual functional capacity, past work, age, education and work experience. See20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Locher, 968 F.2d at 727. The Eighth Circuit described this five-step process as follows:

The Commissioner of Social Security must evaluate: (1) whether the claimant is presently engaged in a substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3) whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment listed in the regulations; (4) whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform his or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform.

Dixon v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir.2003).

B. Appeals Council Review

If the claimant is dissatisfied with the ALJ's decision, he or she may request review by the Appeals Council, though review is not automatic. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967–404.982, 416.1467–1482. The decision of the Appeals Council (or of the ALJ, if the request for review is denied) is final and binding upon the claimant unless the matter is appealed to Federal District Court within sixty days after notice of the Appeals Council's action. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.

C. Judicial Review

Judicial review of the administrative decision generally proceeds by considering the decision of the ALJ at each of the five steps. The Court is required to review the administrative record as a whole and to consider:

1. The credibility findings made by the ALJ.

2. The plaintiff's vocational factors.

3. The medical evidence from treating and consulting physicians.

4. The plaintiff's subjective complaints relating to exertional and nonexertional activities and impairments.

5. Any corroboration by third parties of plaintiff's impairments.

6. The testimony of vocational experts, when required, which is based upon a proper hypothetical question which sets forth plaintiff's impairment.

Cruse v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1183, 1185 (8th Cir.1989) (citing Brand v. Secretary of HEW, 623 F.2d 523, 527 (8th Cir.1980)).

The review by this Court is limited to a determination of whether the decision of the ALJ is supported by substantial evidencein the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Bradley v. Astrue, 528 F.3d 1113, 1115 (8th Cir.2008); Johnston v. Apfel, 210 F.3d 870, 874 (8th Cir.2000); Clark v. Chater, 75 F.3d 414, 416 (8th Cir.1996). “We may reverse and remand findings of the Commissioner only when such findings are not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Buckner v. Apfel, 213 F.3d 1006, 1012 (8th Cir.2000) (citation omitted).

Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)); see also Culbertson v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir.1994). “Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's conclusion.” Buckner, 213 F.3d at 1012 (quoting Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir.2000)); see also Slusser v. Astrue, 557 F.3d 923, 925 (8th Cir.2009) (citing Gonzales v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 890, 894 (8th Cir.2006)) (same); Cox v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1206–07 (8th Cir.1998) (same).

In reviewing the record for substantial evidence, the Court may not substitute its own judgment or findings of fact for that of the ALJ. Hilkemeyer v. Barnhart, 380 F.3d 441, 445 (8th Cir.2004); Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir.1993). The possibility that the Court could draw two inconsistent conclusions from the same record does not prevent a particular finding from being supported by substantial evidence. Culbertson, 30 F.3d at 939. The Court should not reverse the Commissioner's finding merely because evidence may exist to support the opposite conclusion. Buckner, 213 F.3d at 1011;Mitchell v. Shalala, 25 F.3d 712, 714 (8th Cir.1994); see also Woolf, 3 F.3d at 1213 (the ALJ's determination must be affirmed, even if substantial evidence would support the opposite finding). Instead, the Court must consider “the weight of the evidence in the record and apply a balancing test to evidence which is contradictory.” Gavin v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1195, 1199 (8th Cir.1987); see also Heino v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 873, 878 (8th Cir.2009) (quoting Jackson v. Bowen, 873 F.2d 1111, 1113 (8th Cir.1989)) (same).

The claimant bears the burden of proving his or her entitlement to disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. See20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(a), 416.912(a); Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 260 (8th Cir.1991). Once the claimant...