Monroe v. Cessna Aircraft Company
Decision Date | 17 February 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 2:05CV250.,2:05CV250. |
Citation | 417 F.Supp.2d 824 |
Parties | Jessica MONROE, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Andrew K. Monroe Deceased, and as Next Friend of K. Monroe and L. Monroe, Minors and Susan Braden Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael T. Braden, and Heather Braden Hatley, Lowell Braden, and Faye Braden, Individually Plaintiffs v. CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
William O'Neil Angelley, Kreindler & Kreindler, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.
Fred John Meier, Jr., Christopher Stephen Kilgore, Earl Glenn Thames, Jr., Potter Minton, Tyler, TX, for Defendant.
Before the Court is Defendant Cessna Aircraft Company's ("Cessna") Amended Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6) (Docket No. 10). For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES Cessna's motion.
On July 8, 2003, a Cessna 172S model aircraft, Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") registration number N166ME, crashed near McKinney, Texas killing the plane's two occupants, Andrew K. Monroe and Michael T. Braden. It is undisputed that a bird struck the aircraft about ten minutes after take off. According to Plaintiff Jessica Monroe ("Monroe"), the bird strike caused structural damage that in turn led to the crash of the aircraft. In August 2005, Monroe filed this wrongful death and survivor action claiming Cessna was negligent for not providing sufficient warnings with regard to bird strikes and in flight structural damage, for failing to design and manufacture the aircraft to reduce potential structural damage resulting from a bird strike, and for failing to design and manufacture the aircraft to mitigate the risk of landing with structural damage. Furthermore, Monroe alleges Cessna is liable under strict product liability for failing to adequately warn, failing to adequately instruct, and for inadequate design. Cessna filed this Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "on the grounds that Congress preempted the entire field of aviation safety and that, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs cannot make claims against Cessna based on state tort law."
Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate where a party fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court construes the complaint in favor of the plaintiff and all facts pleaded are taken to be true, no matter how improbable those facts. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989); Lowrey v. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir.1997). "[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). However, "in order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim ... a plaintiff must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations." Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir.2000). A court "will thus not accept as true conclusory allegations or unwarranted deductions of fact." Id.
"Consideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause `start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by . . . Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'" Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947)). Congressional intent is the paramount factor when analyzing federal preemption. See id. Congress's intent to preempt may be either expressed or implied. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 525, 112 S.Ct. 2608. Implied preemption includes two doctrines, field preemption and conflict preemption. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990).
Cessna does not contend that Monroe's state law claims are expressly preempted by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (the "Act"). Therefore, the Court will only consider whether Monroe's state law claims are impliedly preempted. With regard to implied preemption, the Fifth Circuit has stated,
We do not hesitate to find preemption when Congress has expressly stated its intent. But we have a general hesitancy to infer a preemptive intent. Especially as to state regulation of matters of health and safety, "we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the [federal law] unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."
Perry v. Mercedes Benz of N. Am., Inc., 957 F.2d 1257, 1261 (5th Cir.1992)(citing Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715, 105 S.Ct 2371, 85 L.Ed.2d 714)(quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146).
The doctrine of field preemption applies when a state law "regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively." English, 496 U.S. at 79, 110 S.Ct. 2270. Congress's intent to preempt an entire field can be inferred when a "`scheme of federal regulation ... [is] so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it,' or where an Act of Congress `touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.'" Id. (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146). However, the Supreme Court recently questioned the application of field preemption stating that "field pre-emption is itself suspect, at least as applied in the absence of a congressional command that a particular field be preempted." Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Maine, 520 U.S. 564, 614-15, 117 S.Ct. 1590, 137 L.Ed.2d 852 (1997) ( ).
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Fifth Circuit have held that the Federal Aviation Act preempts the entire field of aviation safety. The Fifth Circuit's most recent case addressing federal preemption under the Federal Aviation Act, Witty v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 366 F.3d 380 (5th Cir.2004), discusses preemption in the narrow context of warnings given to passengers on commercial airliners. In Witty, Plaintiff Milton Witty ("Witty") brought suit against Delta Airlines Inc. ("Delta") after allegedly developing Deep Vein Thrombosis ("DVT") while on board a Delta flight from Louisiana to Connecticut. 366 F.3d at 381. Witty claimed Delta was negligent for failing to warn passengers about the risks of developing DVT during flight, for not providing adequate leg room to prevent DVT, and for not allowing passengers to exercise their legs. Id.
The court held that Witty's negligence claim for failure to provide adequate leg room was preempted by the express preemption clause of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 ("ADA"), which amended the Federal Aviation Act. The ADA states, "a State ... may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to price, route or service of any air carrier that may provide air transportation under this subpart." Id. at 382-83 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1)). In holding that the negligence claim was preempted, the court found that the claim imposed a standard "relating to price." Id. at 383. The court further held that Witty's negligence claim for failure to warn was preempted. Id. The court concluded that "Congress intended to preempt state standards for the warnings that must be given airline passengers." Id. (emphasis added). The court stated, Id. at 385. In concluding that a "pervasive" regulatory scheme existed, the court in Witty cited regulations requiring the installation of "no smoking" signs in lavatories and cabins, the use of "fasten seatbelt" signs at certain times during a flight, the requirement that flight attendants give oral briefings to passengers, and the information that must be included on passenger safety cards. Id. at 384. All of these regulations are related to passenger safety on a commercial aircraft. Finally, the court held that the claims for failure to warn and for not allowing passengers to exercise their legs were preempted because they would conflict with warnings that instruct passengers to stay in their seats during flight. Id.
The Witty court did not hold that the entire field of aviation safety is preempted by the FAA. Importantly, the court stated, "we note our intent to decide this case narrowly by addressing the precise issues before us." Id. In its narrow holding, the court stated:
Ultimately, we need not decide whether a state claim for failure to warn passengers of air travel risks is entirely preempted, or, as another circuit has held, is preempted to the extent that a federal standard must be used but that state remedies are available. We hold that, at a minimum, [state claims for failure to warn passengers of air travel risks] must be based on a violation of federally mandated warnings.
Id. The court further stated, "We do...
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