Monroe v. CMMG, Inc.
| Decision Date | 30 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:15-cv-04172-NKL |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
| Parties | JOSHUA ADAM MONROE, Plaintiff, v. CMMG, INC., et. al., Defendants. |
Plaintiff Joshua Monroe, a former employee of Defendant CMMG, brings this suit against CMMG and several CMMG employees for actions relating to Monroe's arrest on suspicion of theft. Seeking damages, Monroe's complaint sets forth six claims: defamation, malicious prosecution, negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, and a Section 1981 claim [Doc. 1-3]. Before the Court is the Defendants' motion to dismiss. [Doc. 6]. For the following reasons, the motion is granted.
Defendant CMMG is a Missouri corporation that manufactures and sells firearms, firearm parts, and firearm components to the general public, to distributors, and to other manufacturers. Before March 28, 2013 Plaintiff Joshua Monroe was an employee of CMMG. Defendants James Watson, Tyson Bradshaw, Angela Strodtman, and Kathleen Stephenson were also employees of CMMG during this time.
On March 27, 2013, Stephenson, Monroe's supervisor, observed Monroe take a box from near his desk and carry it outside the building during the work day. Stephenson followed Monroe outside. After Monroe returned to the building without the box, Stephenson inspected the vehicle of a co-worker who had carpooled with Monroe to work that morning. Inside the vehicle, Stephenson saw the box, opened it, and found firearm barrels inside. Because the barrels had rubber caps that resembled those in CMMG's inventory, Stephenson stated that she suspected the barrels belonged to CMMG and that Monroe had stolen them.
Monroe, however, had not stolen the barrels. Instead he had purchased them from CMMG in an earlier transaction for which he later provided a receipt. CMMG employees were permitted to purchase products when there was sufficient inventory, and Defendant Strodtman knew that Monroe had bought products from CMMG in the past and had recently inquired about making further purchases. CMMG employees were also permitted to bring personal firearms into the CMMG building. While employees in these cases were required to notify a supervisor and place a sticker on their personal items, this procedure was not always followed.
CMMG employees, additionally, were not prohibited from leaving the building with a CMMG firearm. An employee performing a test fire or bringing a firearm to one of the outdoor inventory sheds would necessarily need to leave the building in order to do so.
Stephenson reported Monroe's behavior to her supervisor, Strodtman, who discussed the issue with Bradshaw, the operating manager. Strodtman and Bradshaw viewed security footage and Bradshaw then conducted an inventory count to determine whether any barrels were missing from the inventory room. Bradshaw said that CMMG had recently received a shipment of 500 barrels from Small Arms Manufacturing in addition to two sample barrels, and that inventorycount came up two barrels short. CMMG's purchase order, however, indicated that Small Arms had shipped only 482 barrels.
Someone representing CMMG contacted the Howard County Sheriff's Department on the evening of March 27 and reported that Monroe had stolen the barrels. Monroe does not identify who made that statement to the Sheriff's office. None of the voluntary statements by the Defendants contain such a statement and none of the deposition testimony in the complaint shows such a statement. Nonetheless, the Court construes this statement in the light most favorable to Monroe and accepts as true that CMMG reported that Monroe stole the barrels.
The next morning, on March 28, 2013, Monroe was arrested when he arrived at work and was later charged with theft. The two criminal cases subsequently filed against Monroe for misdemeanor stealing concluded when the prosecutor entered a nolle prosequi.
Monroe was also terminated from his position at CMMG around the time of his arrest. He applied for unemployment benefits, but the Missouri Labor and Industrial Relations Commission denied benefits because an "Employer Statement" provided to the Commission and Bradshaw in his testimony at the unemployment hearing, stated that Monroe had stolen the barrels.
Monroe originally filed this suit in Missouri state court on April 30, 2015. His Complaint contains seventeen counts: five counts of defamation, five counts of negligence, five counts of fraudulent misrepresentation, and one count each of malicious prosecution and a Section 1981 violation. The case was removed to this Court by CMMG.
The Defendants maintain that Monroe's Complaint should be dismissed because it does not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires plaintiffs to plead "short and plain statements" such that "[e]ach allegation [is] simple, concise, and direct." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), 8(d). Monroe's Complaint covers 100 pages and contains 691 paragraphs. Of those 100 pages, over 50 consist of deposition transcripts from Monroe's criminal case. The Defendants are understandably frustrated by this approach, as is the Court.1
The purpose of Rule 8 is to "provide the defendant with fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Gomez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 676 F.3d 655, 665 (8th Cir. 2012). Rule 8 is also intended to avoid later surprises about the parameters of plaintiff's claims and to permit defendants and the court at an early stage to identify which claims are viable and which are not viable.
By including 50 pages of deposition testimony in his Complaint, Monroe has not complied with Federal Rule of Procedure 8. However, Monroe has asked leave to amend his complaint in the event the Court finds it deficient. Unfortunately, Monroe has been dilatory. He was put on notice by the Defendants of deficiencies in his Complaint and took no steps to meaningfully clarify his claims either in his opposition or by filing a proposed amended complaint. Therefore, the Court will only permit him to file an amended complaint on the condition that he pays Defendants their reasonable attorney fees and costs associated with their motion to dismiss. In addition, any permitted motion to amend must be filed within twenty days of the date of this order. The motion to amend must include a proposed amended complaint consistent with this order.
In addition, as set out below, there are certain claims that cannot be salvaged because Monroe's opposition to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and the facts contained in Monroe's own Complaint demonstrate these claims are not viable. Those claims are: (1) Monroe's defamation claim against CMMG and Defendant Watson, based on reports made to the Howard County Sheriff's Department; (2) Monroe's defamation claim based on reports made to the Missouri Labor and Industrial Relations Commission in response to Monroe's application for unemployment benefits; (3) Monroe's malicious prosecution claim; and (4) Monroe's fraudulent misrepresentation claims. These claims are dismissed with prejudice and cannot be refiled in any amended complaint, even if the Defendants' costs are paid.
The defamation claims against Stephenson, Bradshaw, and Strodtman are dismissed without prejudice, as is the 1981 claim, and Monroe is given leave to file a motion to amend to state a claim for defamation against these defendants and for a 1981 claim against CMMG. Any such motion must comply with Rule 11 and include a proposed amended complaint which identifies the specific statements by these defendants that are alleged to be false, how the statements are capable of a defamatory meaning, and with what degree of fault they were published. The motion to amend must be filed within 20 days of the date of this order. If Monroe fails to meet this deadline, the remaining claims will be dismissed against the remaining defendants with prejudice.
Monroe will not be given any additional opportunity to amend.
To state a claim for defamation, a plaintiff in Missouri must plead: "1) publication, 2) of a defamatory statement, 3) that identifies the plaintiff, 4) that is false, 5) that is published with the requisite degree of fault, and 6) damages the plaintiff's reputation." Farrow v. Saint FrancisMed. Ctr., 407 S.W.3d 579, 598-99 (Mo. 2013) (quoting Overcast v. Billings Mut. Ins. Co., 11 S.W.3d 62, 70 (Mo. banc 2000)). A defamation claim that pleads these elements will survive a motion to dismiss "if the communication alleged in the petition . . . is capable of a defamatory meaning." Klein v. Victor, 903 F.Supp. 1327, 1330 (E.D. Mo. 1995).
Any claim based on CMMG's initial statements to the Howard County Sheriff's Department is barred by the statute of limitations. A claim for defamation must be brought within two years of accrual, and accrual occurs when "the damage resulting [from the defamation] is sustained and capable of ascertainment." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.100. Damage is sustained when a "[p]laintiff's reputation interest is invaded," which happens "at the time of publication." Jones v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 456, 458 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). A claim is capable of ascertainment when "a reasonable person would have been put on notice that an injury and substantial damages may have occurred and would have undertaken to ascertain the extent of the damages." Powel v. Chaminade College Preparatory, Inc., 197 S.W.3d 576, 584 (Mo. banc 2006). Because a reasonable person is on notice "when the fact of damage can be discovered or made known," Klemme v. Best, 941 S.W.2d 493, 497 (Mo. banc 1997), Missouri courts generally find that damages are ascertainable at the time of publication as well, Farrow, 407 S.W.3d at 599 ().
According to Monroe's Complaint, CMMG's...
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